Posted on 03/08/2011 9:56:04 AM PST by rxsid
"New York Tribune 1896: Those born of non-citizen parents may not be eligible for POTUS.
The issue of which I write on this blog – whether a person born with dual allegiance is eligible to be Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces – has been discussed at numerous times in our nation’s history. It’s not like it was just made up by people who do not support Obama.
HISTORY LESSONS
Back in 1896, the issue of whether a citizen – who was not born of US citizen parents – could be President of the United States was discussed in the Tribune (aka New York Tribune) during that Presidential campaign. Here is the full text of the story (see pg. 131 at link):
The question as to whether the Labor candidate for the Presidency would, if chosen by a majority of the electoral vote, be entitled under the Constitution to take his seat is one which since his nomination at Chicago has been frequently and freely discussed, but not satisfactorily disposed of. The facts which are fully admitted by both parties in regard to Mr. Schurmann are these—namely, that his parents, Johannes Schurmann and Barbara, his wife, reached Now York by the sailing ship Hamburg, of the Black Ball Line, on the 18th day of August, 1848, as German immigrants, and that on the following day, in a lodging-house at No. 5 Greenwich Street, the present Labor candidate for the Presidency of the United States was born. Is he, under these circumstances, “a natural-born citizen” in the sense implied by the fifth clause of Art. II. of the Constitution? Various Attorney-Generals of the United States have expressed the opinion that a child born in this country of alien parents, who have not been naturalized, is, by the fact of birth, a native-born citizen entitled to all rights and privileges as such, and the State Department has always acted on this presumption in deciding upon questions of this nature brought before it. There is, however, no United States statute containing any provision on the subject, nor have any judicial decisions ever been made in regard to it. It is at best an open question, and one which should have made Mr. Schurmann’s nomination under any circumstances an impossibility. Fortunately, the result of the campaign appears no longer doubtful, yet to the misguided voters of the Labor Party, even when led up to a forlorn hope at the polls, it would no doubt be some consolation to know that they were casting their votes for a candidate concerning whose eligibility no possible question could be afterward raised. [emphasis added]
he Tribune mentions that this issue had been “frequently and freely discussed”. So what does that tell you about President Chester Arthur? It tells you that while the issue was “frequently and freely discussed” as to Schurman, it was not discussed at all as to Chester Arthur.
This is because Arthur concealed the fact that he, like Scurmann, was not born of US citizen parents. Both Schurmann and Arthur were born with dual allegiance. Had the nation been aware of Arthur’s status as a British subject, there would have been no question about Schurmann’s eligibility. Arthur had recently been President in 1895.
Had it been known Arthur was a British subject, the Tribune certainly would have mentioned that fact in the article.
If Arthur’s dual allegiance had been known, there would have been no point in writing the article about Schurmann. (This blog first revealed Arthur’s deception to the nation in December 2008.) And since the Tribune stated that the issue had been frequently discussed – while not mentioning Chester Arthur – it gives credibility to the importance of the issue then and now.
Chester Arthur was responsible for appointing Justice Horace Gray to the US Supreme Court. Gray went on to write the controversial decision in Wong Kim Ark. That decision appears, perhaps, to have been an attempt to protect Gray’s robe since Gray might have been removed from the bench had Arthur’s status as a British subject become known prior to the Wong Kim Ark decision. (Should this issue ever reach the Supreme Court as to Obama, both Sotomayor and Kagan would have an ethical responsibility to recuse themselves.)
Thank you, Chester Arthur. Good lookin’ out, bro – for yourself that is. Ditto to Gray? That’s an open question. The stench of ineligibility causes big ripples if left to rot the nation’s Constitutional core.
Chester was also responsible for forcing the US military to salute the British flag.
Furthermore, the Tribune article was republished in, “The Presidential Campaign of 1896: A scrap-book chronicle” by George Lynde Catlin, 1925. That book was copied into Google from the Harvard College Library (Obama attended Harvard law). And the reason for the book? The intro is telling (go to pg. 5 in the pg. counter):
“Descended as you are from an ancestry identified with the earliest traditions of our republic, and reared, as you have been, under influences and teachings purely American, every incentive is offered you to improve yourself, in your day and generation, a good and useful citizen of these United States. Assuming integrity of character, fairness of judgment, and unselfishness of purpose to be the prime requisites of good citizenship, I go one step farther to urge upon you the necessity of acquiring a thorough acquaintance with the political history of your country…In the study of these events you will note the invariable triumph of a living, active American patriotism over the dangers successively arising to confront it. Chief and foremost among these averted dangers I place that one with which we were menaced in 1896 by the combined alien forces of Socialism, Anarchy, and Atheism.”
You think Obama wasn’t aware of the Presidential campaign of 1896? Anyone who answers that question in the affirmative has no respect for Obama’s intelligence.
by Leo Donofrio, Esq. (…with another big hat tip to the research team)
There was only one source the colonists where widely familiar with during the founding of the country...that described who "Les naturels" citizen's were. It was Vattel's legal treatise on the Law of Nations.
The "Celebrated" work from the "genius" Vattel - North Carolina, 1764:
THE
LAW OF NATIONS
OR
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS
OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS
FROM THE FRENCH OF
MONSIEUR DE VATTEL.
“Nihil est enim illi principi Deo qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, acceptium, quam concilia coestusque hominum jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur.” Cicero, Som Scip. [1]
FROM THE NEW EDITION, BY
JOSEPH CHITTY, Esq. Barrister At Law
WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES AND REFERENCES,
By EDWARD D. INGRAHAM, Esq.
PHILADELPHIA:
T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO., LAW BOOKSELLERS,
No. 535 CHESTNUT STREET.
1883.
http://home.earthlink.net/~dybel/Documents/LawOfNations,Vattel.htm
____________________________________________________
Excerpt:
§ 17. And to preserve its members.
If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less obliged carefully to preserve all its members. The nation owes this to itself, since the loss even of one of its members weakens it, and is injurious to its preservation.
It owes this also to the members in particular, in consequence of the very act of association; for those who compose a nation are united for their defence and common advantage; and none can justly be deprived of this union, and of the advantages he expects to derive from it, while he on his side fulfils the conditions. (15)
The footnote reference:
(15) This principle is in every respect recognized and acted upon by our municipal law. It is in respect of, and as a due return for, the protection every natural born subject is entitled to, and actually does, by law,
receive from the instant of his birth that all the obligations of allegiance attach upon him,
and from which he cannot by any act of his own emancipate himself. This is the principle upon which is founded the rule “Nemo potest exuere patriam,” Calvin’s case. 7 Coke 25. Co Lit. 129, a; and see an interesting application of that rule in Macdonald’s case, Forster’s Crown Law 59. — C.
_____________________________________________
Excerpt:
§ 51. But the nation may curb a tyrant, and withdraw itself from his obedience.
But this high attribute of sovereignty is no reason why the nation should not curb an insupportable tyrant, pronounce sentence on him (still respecting in his person the majesty of his rank) and withdraw itself from his obedience.
To this indisputable right a powerful republic owes its birth.
The tyranny exercised by Philip II. in the Netherlands excited those provinces to rise: seven of them, closely confederated, bravely maintained their liberties, under the conduct of the heroes of the House of Orange; and Spain, after several vain and ruinous efforts, acknowledged them sovereign and independent states.
If the authority of the prince is limited and regulated by the fundamental laws, the prince, on exceeding the bounds prescribed him, commands without any right and even without a just title: the nation is not obliged to obey him, but may resist his unjust attempts.
As soon as a prince attacks the constitution of the state, he breaks the contract which bound the people to him; the people become free by the act of the sovereign, and can no longer view him but as a usurper who would load them with oppression. This truth is acknowledged by every sensible writer, whose pen is not enslaved by fear, or sold for hire.
http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_01.htm
them there are some powerful words
sfl
Will this work if I refuse to pay federal taxes? I dare think it could only work if it was done on a massive and overwhelming scale by large numbers of people.
Vermont Constitution 1786
Article I, Sec XXI. That all people have a natural and inherent right to emigrate from one State to another
On the other hand, I do not see the term “natural born” in this version of the Vermont Constitution. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt02.asp Do you have a link to the one that does?
Yale Index listings -
Law of Nations, The (Vattel): and European
state system, 16, 152; and Madison’s
use of, 215n25; and peacetime,
21; and treaty making, 75, 246n82,
261n114
Vattel, Emmerich de: and European
state system, 16; and interpretation
of treaties, 75, 261n114; The Law of
Nations, 16, 21, 43–44, 152, 215n25,
233n114; and natural law, 29,
227n55
Venezuela, 51,
http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/index/stagg_borderlines.pdf
Yale Law School
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship Series
Excerpt:
290 The notion that the power to regulate immigration is an incident of sovereignty predates this nation. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 288, at 1143 (”Citing Vattel’s works on international law, the Federalists argued [in 17981 that because the law of nations recognized the absolute right of a nation to expel aliens, the Alien Act... violated no constitutional provisions.”).
291 Early criticism by some dissenting Justices, who insisted that all federal authority must derive from the constitutional text, soon faded. For example, in Fong Yue Ting, Justice Field stated in dissent:
The government of the United States is one of limited and delegated powers
....When, therefore, power is exercised by Congress, authority for it must be found in express terms in the Constitution, or in the means necessary or proper for the execution of the power expressed. If it cannot be thus found, it does not exist.
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1940&context=fss_papers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Jefferson’s Autobiography
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
by Thomas Jefferson
1743 — 1790
Excerpt:
On the contrary, it was argued by Monroe, Gerry, Howel, Ellery & myself that by the modern usage of Europe the ratification was considered as the act which gave validity to a treaty, until which it was not obligatory. (* 3)
Footnote in reference:
(* 3) Vattel, L. 2, 156. L, 77. I. Mably Droit D’Europe, 86. Return to the Text
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffauto.asp
Ankeny, et. al. v The Governor of Indiana, Mitch Daniels.
Indiana Court of Appeals, November 12, 2009
B. Natural Born Citizen
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that both President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain are not “natural born Citizens” as required for qualification to be President under Article II, Section 1, Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that therefore because neither person was constitutionally eligible to become President, “[t]he Governor; should [have been] prohibited by order of [the trial court]; from issuing any certificate of ascertainment, or any other certified statement, under the State Seal of the State of Indiana;” Appellants’ Appendix at 13.
Before addressing the Plaintiffs’ specific arguments, we think it helpful to point out the context in which this claim arises; Leading up to the 2008 Presidential Election and in the ensuing months after, a number of lawsuits were filed nationwide challenging both President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain’s status as “natural born Citizens” under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa.2008); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.N.H.2008); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C. Dec.11, 2008), aff’d by 332 Fed.Appx. 640, 2009 WL 2870668 (D.C.Cir. Sept.8, 2009); ;Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn. 522, 958 A.2d 709 (2008).
As to President Obama’s status, the most common argument has been waged by members of the so-called “birther” movement who suggest that the President was not born in the United States; they support their argument by pointing to “the President’s alleged refusal to disclose publicly an ‘official birth certificate’ that is satisfactory to [the birthers].” Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 409-CV-106CDL, 2009 WL 2997605, at *1 (M.D.Ga. Sept. 16, 2009), reconsideration denied by 2009 WL 3111834 (M.D.Ga. Sept. 18, 2009).
The Plaintiffs in the instant case make a different legal argument based strictly on constitutional interpretation. Specifically, the crux of the Plaintiffs’ argument is that “[c]ontrary to the thinking of most People on the subject, there’s a very clear distinction between a ‘citizen of the United States’ and a ‘natural born Citizen,’ and the difference involves having [two] parents of U.S. citizenship, owing no foreign allegiance.” Appellants’ Brief at 23.
With regard to President Barack Obama, the Plaintiffs posit that because his father was a citizen of the United Kingdom, President Obama is constitutionally ineligible to assume the Office of the President.
The bases of the Plaintiffs’ arguments come from such sources as FactCheck.org, The Rocky Mountain News, an eighteenth century treatise by Emmerich de Vattel titled “The Law of Nations,” and various citations to nineteenth century congressional debate.11
For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that therefore the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution governs who is a citizen of the United States. It provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States” U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1. Article II has a special requirement to assume the Presidency: that the person be a “natural born Citizen.”
U.S. Const. art. II, §1, cl. 4. The United States Supreme Court has read these two provisions in tandem and held that “[t]hus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1874). In Minor, written only six years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court observed that:
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.
Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
Id. at 167-168, 22 L.Ed. 627. Thus, the Court left open the issue of whether a person who is born within the United States of alien parents is considered a natural born citizen.12
Then, in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898), the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of “whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subject to the emperor of China becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment” 169 U.S. at 653, 18 S.Ct. at 458. We find this case instructive. The Court in Wong Kim Ark reaffirmed Minor in that the meaning of the words “citizen of the United States” and “natural-born citizen of the United States” “must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution.” Id. at 654, 18 S.Ct. at 459. They noted that “[t]he interpretation of the constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” Id. at 655, 18 S.Ct. at 459 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, 8 S.Ct. 564, 569, 31 L.Ed. 508 (1888)). The Wong Kim Ark Court explained:
The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance-also called ‘ligealty,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘faith,’ or ‘power’-of the king. The principle embraced all persons born within the king’s allegiance, and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual,-as expressed in the maxim, ‘Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem,’-and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects.
But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king’s dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the king.
This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or explanations of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case known as ‘Calvin’s Case,’ or the ‘Case of the Postnati,’ decided in 1608, after a hearing in the exchequer chamber before the lord chancellor and all the judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere.
Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke, 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; Ellesmere, Postnati, 62-64. c. 2 How. St. Tr. 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679.
The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co. Litt. 8a, 128b; Lord Hale, in Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P.C. 61, 62; 1 B1. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 B1. Comm. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn said: ‘By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.’ Cockb. Nat. 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics: “British subject’ means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the crown. ‘Permanent’ allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien, who, because he is within the British dominions, owes ‘temporary’ allegiance to the crown.‘Natural-born British subject’ means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.’ ‘Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.’
The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two: (1) Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.’ (2) Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the crown by the sovereign of a foreign state is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.’
And he adds: ‘The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person’s birth, it in theory at least depended, not upon the locality of a man’s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the king of England; and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of the crown.’ Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, and the jurisdiction of the English sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as originally established.13
Id. at 655-658, 18 S.Ct. at 459-460.
Also, as quoted in Wong Kim Ark, Justice Joseph Story once declared in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830), that “Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 660, 18 S.Ct. at 461 (quoting Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 164 (Story, J., concurring)). The Court also cited Justice Curtis’s dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856):
The first section of the second article of the constitution uses the language, ‘a natural-born citizen.’ It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 662, 18 S.Ct. at 462 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
The Court in Wong Kim Ark also cited authority which notes that: All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
Id. at 662-663, 18 S.Ct. at 462 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court held that Mr. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States “at the time of his birth.”14 Id. at 705, 18 S.Ct. at 478.
Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person “born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject” at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those “born in the allegiance of the United States natural-born citizens.”
The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United States Supreme Court authority in their complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead on an eighteenth century treatise and quotations of Members of Congress made during the nineteenth century.
To the extent that these authorities conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means to be a natural born citizen, we believe that the Plaintiffs’ arguments fall under the category of “conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions” that we need not accept as true when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Irish, 864 N.E.2d at 1120. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case.16
See generally McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (holding that the plaintiffs’ arguments had been sufficiently addressed by Indiana Supreme Court precedent and therefore the trial court did not err when it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); see also, e.g., Diaz-Salazar v. I.N.S., 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir.1983) (noting in its recitation of the facts that despite the fact father was not a citizen of the United States, he had children who were “natural-born citizens of the United States”), cert. denied 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3112, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the Governor’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
A puff of judicial farce (if not embarrassment) and empty wind over the course of time and factual Founders’ history.
Isn’t it interesting that not one of those references refers to Blackstone. You know that dead British dude who had his nose stuck so far up King George’s a$$ that he couldn’t see straight as to keep from contradicting his own self. That dead dude works whom the obots cite as the basis for our laws when that dead dude himself said they had no affect here because those laws were regugnant to our Republican form of government in which he then went on to trash.
I concur, jamese is an embarrassment
Article
Our International Constitution
Sarah H. Cleveland*
*snip*
The Court has looked to international law to determine the scope of state power under the Compact Clause.
In Holmes v. Jennison, Chief Justice Taney construed the Clause’s language in light of Emmerich de Vattel’s Law of Nations,84 which had differentiated between “treaties”
(which involved ongoing relationships such as military
alliances), and “agreements, conventions, and pactions”
(which involved individual discrete acts).85
Taney used this analysis to establish that extradition was an exclusively federal power.
In Poole v. Fleeger’s Lessee Justice Story looked to
international law to hold that the Compact Clause had
preserved for the several states (with the consent of
Congress) the international law authority of sovereigns to
resolve boundary disputes.86
The modern Supreme Court also has suggested that
Vattel’s ‘distinction[s] . . . may have informed the
drafting of Art. I, § 10.”87
Footnote:
84. See VATTEL, supra note 46. Vattel was an eighteenth-century writer whose views were influential on the Framers. David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence and International Law, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 1, 15 (2002). For a discussion of Vattel’s influence on nineteenth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 9 & n.20 (1996).
*snip*
The 1890 case of Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,344 in turn, relied on Pennoyer to hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require recognition of an out-of-state judgment based on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction without notice to the defendant.
Justice Fuller observed that matters of state
jurisdiction or sovereignty were “international” rather than
“municipal” questions, and that the principle that states
did not enjoy extraterritorial jurisdiction was “the
familiar, reasonable, and just principle of the law of
nations.”345
Footnote
345. Id. at 296 (relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Chief Justice Gibson in Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447 (1844), and quoting Vattel, Burge, and Story).
http://www.yale.edu/yjil/PDF/Cleveland.pdf
Thansk STARWISE.
§ 160. Considered from an international point of Right of view, the jurisdiction of a Nation must be founded either upon the person or the property being within its territory. Considered from a civil point of view, jurisdiction may be founded upon natural as well as local allegiance; in other words every independent State claims to make laws perpetually binding upon its natural born subjects wherever they may be. But natural allegiance, or the obligation of perpetual obedience to the government of the country, wherein a man may happen to have been born, which he cannot forfeit, or cancel, or vary by any change of time, or place, or circumstance, is the creature of Civil Law, and finds no countenance in the Law of Nations, as it is in direct conflict with the incontestable rule of that Law ; “ Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur29.”
Vattel, accordingly, holds that a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country and abandon it entirely—a right founded on reasons derived from the very nature of political society. For instance, if the citizen cannot procure sustenance in his own country, it is undoubtedly lawful for him to seek it elsewhere. If the society of which he is a member fails to discharge its obligations towards a citizen, he may withdraw himself. If the major part of a Nation, or the Sovereign who represents it, attempts to enact laws relative to matters in which the Social Compact cannot oblige every citizen to submission, as for instance in the affairs of Religion, those who are averse to such laws have a right to quit the Society and settle themselves elsewhere. Citizens, who under such circumstances abandon their native country and settle themselves elsewhere, are called Emigrants, and the Law of Nations recognizes in such persons a capacity to acquire the National character of the country of their adoption.
Domicii, S 161. According to the Law of Nations, when the the criterion of National character of a person is to be ascertained, the next question is, in what territory does he reside, and is he resident in that territory for temporary purposes, or permanently...If he is only resident in a given territory for temporary purposes, he is regarded as a stranger thereto, and a further question must then be asked, in what country is his principal establishment, and where, when he has returned, does he consider himself to be at home. The country, which satisfies the conditions implied in this further question, is designated in the language of public Law the Domicil of the individual, which Vattel defines as a fixed residence in any place with the intention of always remaining there.
Droit des Gens, L. I. § 217.
Jus Gentium, § 137. c. III. § 30.
Story's Conflict of Laws § 2.
§164. The Domicil of a person for international purposes may be either his Domicil of origin, or his Choice. The Domicil of origin of a person is identical with the Domicil of his father at the time of his birth. “ Patris originem unusquisque sequatur51.” If his parents at the time of his birth should be on a temporary visit to a foreign country, the home of the parents, and not the country of his birth, is the Domicil of origin of the child
http://books.google.com/books?printsec=titlepage&pg=PA238&id=-KELAAAAYAAJ#v=onepage&q&f=false
IOW, when MO said Kenya was Bam’s “Home Country” & being a lawyer, she surely knew the difference and at birth Kenya was his home country and that guided the law as to his nationality at birth.
Born a Brit, NOT legit!
Thank you!
Shocking! I didn’t know that. It must be a lie to besmirch 0h0m0llah! /s
It’s racism...straight up!
Obama instituted a policy in Aug 2009 where children born to soldiers and their wives on foreign land (even if its a military hospital on U.S. military base) while serving in the U.S Armed Forces is NOT a U.S. Citizen at birth.
Obama’s policy directives are issued in the Foreign Affairs Manual.
Thinking it through ... Obama is stating a Natural born citizen is not the always a U.S. Citizen at birth, i.e. McCain was not a citizen at birth, but he became a citizen and natural born citizen after his parents applied for him to be recognized as a U.S. Citizen.
IOW, is it YOUR take that the usurper in the Whit-Hut is a NBC???
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