This was first posted back on May 2010. Paragraph III and 3. Naturels to Natural Born...
Posted on 06/15/2010 10:48:31 AM PDT by rxsid
"Tuesday, June 15, 2010
The Kerchner et al v. Obama/Congress et al Appeal to the Third Circuit to Be Decided on the Briefs with No Oral Argument
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals which sits in Philadelphia has notified me today by letter dated June 15, 2010 that there will not be any oral argument on the Kerchner appeal to that Court. The case will be submitted on the briefs on Tuesday, June 29, 2010. Our presence is therefore not required.
The Court also informed me that the Third Circuit Panel that will decide the appeal will be comprised of Circuit Judges Sloviter, Barry, and Hardiman.
The court can call for oral argument when it has questions. As we know, the Federal District Court granted Obama’s/Congress’s motion to dismiss the complaint/petition for lack of standing and political question. The Kerchner plaintiffs have appealed that decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On a motion to dismiss the complaint on its face for lack of standing and political question, both the trial and the appeals courts are supposed to accept the facts alleged in the complaint/petition as true and in a light most favorable to the non-movant. We have alleged and shown that Obama is not and cannot be an Article II "natural born Citizen" because he was born a subject of Great Britain through descent from his British subject/citizen father who was never a U.S. citizen, making Obama born with dual and conflicting allegiances if he was born in the U.S. or with sole allegiance to Great Britain if he was born in Kenya. We have also alleged and shown that Obama has not conclusively proven that he was even born in Hawaii. Obama and Congress have presented no evidence or argument to the Federal District Court or to the Court of Appeals contesting these arguments. The issues of standing and political question are well briefed. We have presented in our briefs how the Kerchner plaintiffs have standing and how the Obama eligibility issue does not present any objectionable political question for the Court. Hence, the Court might not have any questions and so it did not see any need for oral argument.
Of course, it is our hope that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the decision of the Federal District Court which dismissed the complaint/petition for lack of standing and political question and returns the Kerchner case to the District Court for discovery and trial. If the Third Circuit Court affirms the District Court, we will then be filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court which will have the final word in any event.
Mario Apuzzo, Esq."
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2010/06/kerchner-et-al-v-obamacongress-et-al.html
His one parent who was 'undoubtedly' an American citizen married two foreign nationals and moved away from America to live with one of them. How does the child of such a person have any natural allegiance to the United States from such a person?? His only connection is his grandparents who the 'American citizen' dumped her child with. And this foreign father had a profound impact on little Barry Soetoro's life by giving him a basketball as a present. He kept his father's name and has gone to Kenya several times as an adult. His own wife says Kenya is his home COUNTRY. And more recently, he's been trying to influence a new Kenyan constitution. Yeah, no foreign influence on that kid ...
pls respond to post 277.
The main thing that the NBC clause is trying to prevent is divided loyalties OR the ability of another country to exert undue influence over the POTUS. This can happen both through voluntary allegiance owed by POTUS to a foreign power or through the ability of a foreign government to use coercion against the POTUS by threatening his non US relatives, or even using the POTUS's non-US citizen relatives to influence him to act contrary to the US's best interests. So you see, its not just the possibility of voluntary allegiance that is a problem, its the possibility for foreign powers to coerce POTUS if he still has blood connections still resident in a foreign nation that is a problem.
So if a country to whom you have no blood connection, such as Russia grants you citizenship that you have not solicited, then that is less problematic because you have no real connection to the country. However, if you have kin in that country, it is definitely a potential problem. The Founding Father's wanted to minimize the risk of this danger.
Of course.
That must mean that all babies of foreign tourists are also "natural born citizens of the US
How they translated “indigenes” or “natives” matters not at all because they defined the term. Marshall, Story, Kent, and Ramsay, who called it birthright citizenship, all used phrases with identical meaning. This fuss over terms is just the usual game to discourage and confuse those just beginning to catch on. Whether one calls it a “loo” or a “bathroom” or a “privy” or “the head” doesn't change the functionality of the place in question.
Marshall, Story, Kent and Ramsay were all members of ratifying committees. Is it likely that they established the practice made famous by Nancy Pelosi when she suggested that we should all vote for the health-care bill so that we could read it and find out what was in it? Certainly, they knew the meaning of every word of the Constitution, and all wrote extensively and eloquently about its meaning, and all explained that the president shall be born on our soil of parents who are citizens; so did Michael Chertoff with Patrick Leahy agreeing in 2008, and Chief Justice Charles Hughes, who cited Minor v. Happersett, even after he tried to flaunt the Constitution when he ran for president against Woodrow Wilson.
Perhaps Marshall was showing off his knowledge of French when he cited Vattel in his 1814 clarification in The Venus, 12 U.S. 253 at paragraph 289? By that time there had been over twenty English translations of Law of Nations done in the U.S., and another ten on England. What counted was his clear statement the qualification for the presidency required, 35 years, 14 years residency and “being born on the soil of citizen parents.”
I've seen more impressive sophistry from trolls. Don't waste time with their puerile attempts. Most of the original sources are on line. Dr. Ramsay's “Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring Citizenship” is a gem, and available here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/29342214/Ramsay-Natural-Born-Citizen-1789
Minor v. Happersett is clear and concise. The Venus 12 U.S. 253 by our greatest Chief Justice John Marshall is similarly easy reading. John Jay, our first Chief Justice, who prompted Washington to require natural born citizenship, wrote about Vattel to James Madison; Jay was upset that a letter sent to Madison in Spain was not coded because Spain had banned Law of Nations, presumably because, in spite of the claims of trolls, Vattel’s compendium of natural law was a blueprint for representative government, and a threat to monarchy. James Wilson's Lectures on Law, Law of Nations, discusses the influence of Law of Nations in very flowery language, mixed with anecdotes, quotes from Greek and Roman authors, and a running diatribe against English common law.
Don't be distracted by trolls. They are evil because their goal is to help hide the truth of Obama's inelibility. Read original sources. Like most of us you will learn more about our history in a few hours than in the years of dry American History classes, because these people, by whatever label we call them, are people trying hard to destroy the republic. They believe they know better how we should conduct every aspect of our lives, and know they most impose their will by force. They consider themselves the deserved ruling class; few of them have any experience of the productive class. If you read just one short document, read Dr. David Ramsay's Dissertation.
You presume that “subject” has the same meaning as “citizen” without any shred of evidence that, that is the case under the definitions used in law. Is the Constitution not the Supreme Law of the land? Id so, then wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that we would have to look to the definition of each of those terms in light of the law?
Tuckers Blackstone (1803) William & Mary College
We must here recollect, that the laws of England are divided into two distinct classes; the unwritten, and the written law: the former consisting of ancient, immemorial, general rules, maxims, and usages; the latter of written statutes, or acts of parliament, from time to time made in affirmance, or for the amendment, of the ancient unwritten law; or to remedy some defect, mischief, or inconvenience therein; or finally, to repeal and annul it, altogether. Consequently, the common, or unwritten law must have been in a state of continual change, from the first institution of parliaments, in the thirteenth century, to the present time; a period of more than five hundred years; two centuries whereof have elapsed since the first migrations were made to America, under the authority of charters granted by the crown of England; though not quite half a century passed over, between the establishment of the colony of Georgia, and the declaration of independence.
The ancient, immemorial, unwritten law of England, may be divided into the jus commune, common law, or folk-right, of which the ancient English were so tenacious,[10] and which they struggled so hard to maintain under the first princes of the Norman line: which subsequent princes so frequently promised to keep and restore, as the most popular act they could do, when pressed by foreign emergencies, or domestic discontents, and which depended solely upon custom; which carries this internal evidence of freedom along with it, that it was probably introduced by the voluntary consent of the people.[11] And, secondly, the jura coronae, or prerogatives of the crown, as contradistinguished from the rights and privileges of the people: the foundation of which could only be discovered in many respects, to rest upon immemorial usurpations, exactions, and oppressions, generated by feudal tyranny, and enforced by irresistible military authority. From these two copious, and opposite springs are derived all those rules and maxims, which constitute the ground and foundation of the common law, generally so called. And it is in the admixture of these opposite characters and principles, that we discover, according as the scale of liberty, or prerogative has preponderated, a greater or less proportion of the one, or the other, in every subordinate rule and maxim, which, together, compose the whole body of the English common law.
The jus commune, or folk-right, above-mentioned, had for its object, the rights of persons; comprehending the rules, maxims, and usages adopted to ensure the legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of a man's life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation; with the power of locomotion, or changing his situation, or moving to whatever place his own inclination may direct; and generally, of doing every thing that his own disposition might prompt, or suggest to him to do, that is not attended with injury to any other, or to the society at large, without imprisonment, molestation or restraint; and lastly, the free use, enjoyment, and disposal, of all his lawful acquisitions, without any control or diminution. These being the rights and privileges which were expressly guaranteed by the royal charters, there can be no reason to doubt that it was the intention of the colonists to adopt them, in all cases where they might be found applicable to their new condition. To judge of this applicability, time, and experience were both requisite; since it might happen that a rule which might have been highly beneficial and practicable in the mother country, might from local circumstances, or other considerations, be deemed inexpedient, or impracticable, in an infant colony. Thus we find that in Massachusetts they very soon disregarded that ancient rule of the common law, which constitutes the eldest son sole heir to his father, and divided the estate, whether personal, or real, according to circumstances, among all the branches of the family:[12] A departure from the principles of the feudal law, of the propriety of which few Americans at this day entertain any doubt, yet certainly not authorized by the terms of their charter. Local circumstances, likewise, gave an early rise to a less justifiable departure from the principles of the common law in some of the colonies, in the establishment of slavery; a measure not to be reconciled either to the principles of the law of nature, nor even to the most arbitrary establishments in the English government at that period; absolute slavery, if it ever had existence in England, having been abolished long before. These instances shew that the colonists in judging of the applicability of the laws of the mother country to their own situations and circumstances, did not confine themselves to very strict, and narrow limits.
The jura corona, or lex prerogativa as denominated by Sir Matthew Hale, may be divided into two heads. First, those prerogatives which appertained strictly to the person of the prince; and secondly, such as regarded him in his political capacity, only; as the supreme head and ruler of the nation. Though all these which were not expressly given up by the crown in it's charters, might, in strictness, be considered as potentially existing in every part of the nation, yet the exercise, or violation, of them, or a great part of them, being perfectly impracticable in remote colonies, such parts may well be considered as in abeyance, or perfectly dormant, there. All those prerogatives which were annexed to the person of the prince, as an individual, in whose case, that was law, which was not law in any case of a subject,[13] must have been of this latter description; since the colonies could have nothing to do with them, in the internal administration of their affairs .... On the other hand those parts of the jura coronae which regard the prince, in his political capacity, only; that is, as the chief magistrate of the nation; the representative of his people; the administrator of the laws, and general conservator of the peace of his dominions, were applicable, or inapplicable, I apprehend, as circumstances might direct. Those laws, for example, which regard the king as supreme head of the national church, and punished non-conformity to its doctrines, and discipline, could not have been deemed applicable to the circumstances of a colony in which universal toleration in matters of religion was established by charter; and still less, perhaps, where the established, or prevailing religion of the colony differed from the church of England both in discipline, and in doctrine. Neither can we suppose the laws which regarded the king as supreme lord of the soil of his dominions, and those who held under him as military vassals, would be applicable to the condition of colonists who held their lands in free and common socage: yet the military tenures were not abolished in England, till near a century after the first charters granted to the colonies; and consequently that part of the common law which was founded upon the nature of these tenures remained in full force there, whilst it would have been perfectly absurd to suppose it could have been at all applicable to the colonies. Upon this ground we may infer that all the rules and maxims of the common law which sprung from that source, were equally inapplicable to the colonies; for cessante ratione, cessat et ipsa lex.
(snip for length)
Nor must we forget, what was also before slightly mentioned, that a part of the present United States was first settled by a Dutch colony; and another part, by Swedes. The tract claimed by those two nations extended from the thirty-eighth to the forty-first degree of latitude, and was called the New Netherlands, comprehending the present states of New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the Eastern Shore of Maryland: it was conquered by the English, and confirmed to the crown of England by the treaty of Breda in 1667. The Dutch inhabitants remained in their settlements in New-York, and a part of Jersey; the Swedes, if I mistake not, were removed from Delaware to New-York, where they likewise remained. According to judge Blackstone, the laws of England, as such, could have no allowance, or authority there; this being a conquered and ceded country, and not a colony originally planted by Englishmen: and according to his principles, also, the laws of Holland, and of Sweden, were the municipal laws of those provinces, until the period of their conquest; and so continued until other laws were imposed upon them by the crown of England. When, and in what degree, a change was made in this manner; or whether any such change was ever formally made, can only be determined by recurrence to documents not within the reach of the author of these sheets.
From all these considerations it will appear, that in our inquiries how far the common law and statutes of England were adopted in the British colonies; or, in other words, what parts of those laws might be deemed applicable to their respective situations and circumstances, we must again abandon all hope of satisfaction from any general theory, and resort to their several charters, provincial establishments, legislative codes, and civil histories, for information. For although the colonial legislatures are understood to have been inhibited from passing any law derogatory from the sovereignty of the crown, or repugnant to the laws and statutes of England; which seems to have been the only common rule imposed upon them, yet the application of this rule in the several colonies will be found to have been as various as their respective soils, climates, and productions.
(snip for length)
3. Thirdly; what part of the laws of England were abrogated by the revolution, or retained by the several states, when they became sovereign, and independent republics.
And here we may premise, that by the rejection of the sovereignty of the crown of England, not only all the laws of that country by which the dependence of the colonies was secured, but the whole lex prerogativa (or Jura Coronae before mentioned) so far as respected the person of the sovereign and his prerogatives as an individual, was utterly abolished: and, that so far as respected the kingly office, and government, it was either modified, abridged, or annulled, according to the several constitutions and laws of the states, respectively: consequently, that every rule of the common law, and every statute of England, founded on the nature of regal government, in derogation of the natural and unalienable rights of mankind; or, inconsistent with the nature and principles of democratic governments, were absolutely abrogated, repealed, and annulled, by the establishment of such a form of government in the states, respectively. This is a natural and necessary consequence of the revolution, and the correspondent changes in the nature of the governments, unless we could suppose that the laws of England, like those of the Almighty Ruler of the universe, carry with them an intrinsic moral obligation upon all mankind. A supposition too gross and absurd to require refutation.
In like manner, all other parts of the common law and statutes of England, which, from their inapplicability, had not been brought into use and practice during the existence of the colonial governments, must, from the period of their dissolution, be regarded not only as obsolete, but as incapable of revival, except by constitutional, or legislative authority. For they no longer possessed even a potential existence, (as being the laws of the British nation, and as such, extending, in theoretical strictness, to the remotest part of the empire,) because the connexion, upon which this theoretical conclusion might have been founded, was entirely at an end: and having never obtained any authority from usage, and custom, they were destitute of every foundation upon which any supposed obligation could be built .... This is a regular consequence of that undisputed right which every free state possesses, of being governed by its own laws .... And as all laws are either written; or acquire their force and obligation by long usage and custom, which imply a tacit consent;[52] it follows, that where these evidences are wanting, there can be no obligation in any supposed law.
Another regular consequence of the revolution was this: when the American states declared themselves independent of the crown of Great-Britain, each state from that moment became sovereign, and independent, not only of Great-Britain, but of all other powers, whatsoever. Each had it's own separate constitution and laws, which could not, in any manner, be affected or controlled by the laws, or constitutions of any other. From that moment there was no common law amongst them but the general law of nations, to which all civilized nations conform.
(snip for length)
From the whole of the preceding examination, we may deduce the following conclusions:
First .... That the common law of England, and every statute of that kingdom, made for the security of the life, liberty, or property of the subject, before the settlement of the British colonies, respectively, so far as the same were applicable to the nature of their situation and circumstances, respectively, were brought over to America, by the first settlers of the colonies, respectively; and remained in full force therein, until repealed, altered, or amended by the legislative authority of the colonies, respectively; or by the constitutional acts of the same, when they became sovereign and independent states.
Secondly .... That neither the common law of England, nor the statutes of that kingdom, were, at any period antecedent to the revolution, the general and uniform law of the land in the British colonies, now constituting the United States.
Thirdly .... That as the adoption or rejection of the common law and statutes of England, or any part thereof, in one colony, could not have any operation or effect in another colony, possessing a constitutional legislature of it's own; so neither could the adoption or rejection thereof by the constitutional, or legislative act of one sovereign and independent state, have any operation or effect in another sovereign independent state; because every such state hath an exclusive right to be governed by it's own laws only.
Fourthly .... Therefore the authority and obligation of the common law and statutes of England, as such in the American states, must depend solely upon the constitutional or legislative authority of each state, respectively; as contained in their several bills of rights, constitutions, and legislative declarations .... which, being different in different states, and. wholly independent of each other, cannot establish any uniform law, or rule of obligation in all the states.
Fifthly .... That neither the articles of confederation and perpetual union, nor, the present constitution of the United States, ever did, or do, authorize the federal government, or any department thereof, to declare the common law or statutes of England, or of any other nation, to be the law of the land in the United States, generally, as one nation; nor to legislate upon, or exercise jurisdiction in, any case of municipal law, not delegated to the United States by the constitution
http://www.constitution.org/tb/t1e.htm
According to Tucker, Virginia's laws were the ones that followed English common law more strictly than all the others. After the Declaration Virginia adopted the most extensive & complete law regarding citizenship which was based on Vattel whom Tucker refers to at every turn of the page unless he is referring to English Law, then he refers to Blackstone. Imagine that, but imagine this 1st:
Virginia May 1779 A Bill Declaring Who Shall Be Deemed Citizens of This Commonwealth
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth and all who have resided therein two years next before the passing of this act, and all who shall hereafter migrate into the same; and shall before any court of record give satisfactory proof by their own oath or affirmation, that they intend to reside therein, and moreover shall give assurance of fidelity to the commonwealth; and all infants wheresoever born, whose father, if living, or otherwise, whose mother was, a citizen at the time of their birth, or who migrate hither, their father, if living, or otherwise their mother becoming a citizen, or who migrate hither without father or mother, shall be deemed citizens of this commonwealth, until they relinquish that character in manner as herein after expressed: And all others not being citizens of any the United States of America, shall be deemed aliens.
MAKES FOR A GREAT HISTORY LESSON, YOU SHOULD TRY SPENDING SOME QUALITY TIME WITH IT SOME DAY.
This was first posted back on May 2010. Paragraph III and 3. Naturels to Natural Born...
French text (about “natural” born citizens): “Les naturels, ou indigenes, sont ceux qui sont nes dans le pays, de parens citoyens”
To English, gives this: the natural born, or indigenous are those born in the country, parents who are citizens.
Yes, but they were specifically exempted. They had to have been citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Madison made the point about a child being born into a society. Barry Obama was born into the American society, unsullied by ANY discernible influence by his sperm donor father
No influence? Maybe not directly, but he did write, or had ghost written, and entire book, "Dreams From My Father, A Story of Race, and Inheritance", which shows just how much his foreign parentage influenced him.
That's no Little House on the Kansas praire, nor any Hawaiian hut either, depicted on the cover.
Then of course there was the Indonesian stepfather, who did act as a father. Even took the little nipper to Mosque with him. Signed him up in school as his Muslim child.
No foreign influence there at all, right? Wrong!
The residency clause is still active. It's sort of comparable to the lenght of citizenship requirements for Congressmen, but it does acknowledge that their could be situtations were even someone born in the country with citizen parents, could have spent so much time abroad so as to have developed attachments to a forieng country. Most think the residency was to have been a continuos period precedeing the person being eligible for the Presidency. But like the NBC clause, it's never been tested in Court.
The 14th doesn’t use the term “native born” either. Both Steinkauler and Elg’s parents were citizens of the time of their birth.
Decisions before the 14th amendment use the terms interchangeably as well. So does the 1797 translation of “Law of Nations”.
The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”
Logically the only way “A” (Natives) or “B” (natural born citizens” can both be defined by “C” (born in the country of parent who are citizens), is for them to be “A” and “B” to be synomyms. They can’t possibly be different things.
“US v Wong Kim Ark” (1898) is stare decisis, having been cited more than 1000 times in other post 14th Amendment citizenship cases. Wong Kim Ark was ruled to be a natural born citizen although neither of his parents were US citizens.
From the Wong Kim Ark decision:
[An alien parent’s] “allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke, 6a, ’strong enough to make a natural subject, for, if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject’”
The Wong court went on to state: “Subject’ and ‘citizen’ are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives; and though the term ‘citizen’ seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, ’subjects,’ for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.’ and the Court added that
“…every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as originally established.”
There are more referances to Vattel than to Blackstone in the debates of the Federal Convention. They did not just use ONE sentence, they used a lot from his work.
Also, US citizenship is & always has been a contractual consent between the parties (person & state/country)& an infant under law can not enter into contracts other than by the consent of a parent or expressly, that of the father at the time of the adoption of the constitution. The phrase that the you drones/trolls purposely avoid is ‘subject to the jurisdiction’. Foreigners only owe a temporary & local allegiance while they are in the country, citizens owe complete allegiance to the jurisdiction of local & federal. So that begs the question, can a foreigner enter into a contract for his child that binds him to that foreign government forever? The answer is NO. You are either a citizen by nature, natural law is that the child is of the father not of the soil OR you are a citizen by consent. With the US adopting the right of expatriation upon the Declaration of Independence, we know that dual allegiance was neither adopted or allowed by the laws of the states and thus a child of a foreigner owed allegiance to his fathers country at the time of birth. The only way for the child born of a foreigner to gain citizenship was for the father to consent to it by himself becoming a citizen. Under the laws of the US, which mutual consent must be given in EVERY CONTRACT, an alien does not have the legal standing to bestow a foreign citizenship upon his child without the consent of those of the people under the laws adopted and the infant does not retain the legal capacity to enter into a binding contract without the parent’s consent. In these modern times, you all claim that a birth certificate is proof of citizenship, but I ask you, when did a birth certificate become a binding contract? And that is the crux of the entire issue.
********************************************************
Is the Birth Certificate an adhesion contract? Not really! There is no consideration and none is explicitly conveyed so how could it be a contract?
How is “contract” defined in law? Please reference the following:
“Contract defined.” A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing. California Civil Code, Section 1549
Does a Birth Certificate mention anything about an agreement to do or not do a certain thing? Of course not, so how could it be a contract?
All contracts have essential elements to make a contract lawful. Please consider the following for your legal edification:
“Essential elements of a contract.” It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: (1) Parties capable of contracting. (2) Their consent. (3) A lawful object. (4) A sufficient cause or consideration. California Civil Code, Section 1550
An adhesion contract is a one-sided contract, more commonly known as a “nudum pactum” or naked contract:
“Nudum pactum.” Latin. A bare contract or agreements that amounts to merely a naked promise. See 22 S.E. 2d 186. “A contract, naked of any obligation or duty on one side, a ‘nudum pactum’ is not enforceable. 151 P. 270, 273. Contracts must generally be supported by a consideration on each side. A naked contract is one that is bare of a valid consideration on one side and hence unenforceable. See “mutuality of obligation.” Barron's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition
Also, consider the following from Public Law:
“Adhesion contracts do not bind the citizen to a commercial contract. Without the six elements of a valid contract, none exists. PL#95-147, 91 Stat. 1227 (Oct. 28, 1977)
1. a valid offer and acceptance
2. two or more parties involved
3. parties who are legal age and competent understanding
4. a termination date
5. full disclosure; and
6. the contract must be voluntary in nature
In reality, the Birth Certificate is simply documentation denoting that a human being was born and converted into juristic person (artificial person) status by the State's agent or res accessoria, the mother.
C. W. F. Dumas’ diplomatic services. § 185. Charles William Frederick Dumas, numerous letters from whom will be found in the following pages, was a native of Switzerland, but he passed a large portion of his life in Holland, chiefly employed as a man of letters.
He was a person of deep learning, versed in the ancient classics, and skilled in several modern languages, a warm friend of liberty, and an early defender of the American cause.
About the year 1770, or a little later, he published an edition of Vattel, with a long preface and notes, which were marked with his liberal sentiments.
In the preface of the 1797 Edition of Vattel’s Law of Nations the editor mentions the 1773 edition printed in Neuchatel.
It is in the Congressional record Dumas published an Edition of Vattel with a long preface and notes.
There are reports some of the London editions were actually printed in Neuchatel and the 1797 Edition was translated by Thomas Nugent.
We know the first mention of natural born citizen is in the 1797 edition, but the translator died around 20 years earlier.
What role did Nugent play in the 1797 edition and where is the 1773 edition.
Jefferson had a copy of Nugents pocket dictionary..it is in the Congressional record.
Is there a link with Jefferson and Nugent regarding translations. I read somewhere Jefferson and Nugent translated Montesquieu.
“It is not only vain, but wicked, in a legislator to frame laws in opposition to the laws of nature..” jefferson
1797 Edition with the notes
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/index.html
or here
http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_01.htm
link does not work
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