Posted on 07/14/2005 7:19:28 PM PDT by Leo Carpathian
POLAND AND RUSSIA HAVE CONFLICTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE SOONER BRUSSELS UNDERSTANDS IT, THE BETTER (Ukraine)
Russia wants to keep Ukraine in its exclusive zone of influence and Poland perceives Ukraine as a EU member in the near future. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
COMMENTARY: By Joanna Strzelczyk Chief of Staff of Warsaw Mayor Lech Kaczynski Former Foreign Ministry Official (1990-1996) Article published in Rzeczpospolita Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Wed, Jul 13, 2005
Since 1989, with a short break in the late 1990s, the Russian question has been one of the most important ones in Poland's foreign policy, writes Joanna Strzelczyk, chief of staff of Warsaw mayor Lech Kaczynski, former foreign ministry official (1990-1996), in Rzeczpospolita.
Today, the question's significance has been rapidly growing, due chiefly to mounting Polish-Russian disputes and conflicts. That has been a result, on the one hand, of the neo-imperialism of Vladimir Putin, who has exploited historical issues to make short-term political gains, and, on the other, of controversies, present since the early 1990s, in Polish-Russian relations.
In the recent years, those controversies had been hushed for various reasons, so as soon as they became public knowledge, the situation intensified.
That was reflected in historical disputes, stimulated by the Moscow celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of world war II, which brought back into the spotlight issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Katyn massacre, or Poland's post-war enslavement. Those are hot media topics, but also issues important for Poland's image in Europe. They are not, however, first-rate issues.
The anniversary celebrations are over and the real problem has now emerged, hidden so far under the historical and hysterical rhetoric: are we doomed to conflict in Polish-Russian relations? The answer is affirmative, and the issue is not new.
It is a consequence of the processes occurring in Europe following the collapse of the bipolar world. This means that Poland and Russia have increasingly divergent interests, and that this process will continue.
What are Poland's interests in Russia? In principle, there are only THREE: [1] regulating the historical issues, [2] access to the Russian markets, and [3] supplies of Russian energy commodities.
And what are Russia's interests in Poland? Only ONE: dominating Poland's energy and fuel markets.
A strategic goal inconsistent with Poland's national interests. And vice versa, as Poland's interests in Russia, with the exception of fuel imports, are inconvenient for Russia.
What are the controversial issues between the two countries? There are several, and all of fundamental significance for Poland and Russia.
The FIRST issue, Ukraine today and Belarus in the future. Russia wants to keep those countries in its exclusive zone of influence.
Poland, in turn, perceives Ukraine as an EU member in a relatively near future, and the other post-Soviet states Georgia, perhaps with time Moldova, and certainly post-Lukashenka Belarus in close relations with Europe. Those two strategies are irreconcilable.
The SECOND issue: energy commodities and the Polish fuel market. Russia is interested in monopolising supplies and promoting Russian investment in the broadly meant energy sector. Russian companies are an instrument of Moscow's foreign policy. That policy concerns all of Europe, but Poland in particular.
Given the above, it has to be admitted that Russia has reasons to feel irritated. The prospect of the moderate right winning the upcoming elections means that the controversial issues will further intensify.
The PO-PiS coalition, if it is successfully formed, will certainly attach great significance to close and friendly relations with Ukraine. It will also try to diversify oil and gas supplies, partly with transit through Ukraine something that Russia has so far managed to prevent.
The new government will also subject the Polish fuel market and all the related issues to closer scrutiny. The parliamentary committee of inquiry into PKN Orlen has already revealed such a strong involvement of official and unofficial Russian factors in this area that new regulations will need to be urgently passed. The very exposing of the mechanisms used by Russia to gain influence has to be irritating enough for the Kremlin.
In this situation, the various Russian secret services can be expected to carry out operations aimed at discrediting the centre-right parties, such as the PO and the PiS, to strengthen the position of not only leftwing formations but also those rightwing ones that Russia perceives as friendly.
Using historical issues to tarnish Poland's image in the EU is an even more tangible threat. As a result of such efforts, Poland appears as an irrational, quarrelsome country that lives in the past and thus attacks all its neighbours.
It is impossible, writes Strzelczyk, to talk about history in an honest and adequate way without remembering the Russians and the Germans who started world war II, who was its victim, and what are the moral and political consequences of that.
This, however, again puts Poland in the face of a propaganda war with two enemies. And weakens its position in the EU. For while it is clear that Poland's eastern policy should be part of the EU's policy towards Russia, respecting Poland's interests in the EU policy is a different matter altogether. Warsaw has few arguments convincing for Brussels and formulating them is what it should focus on.
The anniversaries pass and very well, let the atmosphere around them calm down. This does not mean that we should forget about history, but rather that we should look at it anew.
The shifting of stress in presenting historical issues such as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact or Katyn should consist in remembering what has already been achieved and going forward, rather than stubbornly returning to the starting point.
And quite a lot has been achieved: Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, admitted officially that the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact had been invalid from the point of view of international law. It also admitted that Katyn was a work of the Russians. Discussing those issues anew could tempt Russia to backtrack on its earlier statements. Poland should adopt the principle that issues once agreed will not be discussed again.
An issue that needs to be taken up are war reparations, especially compensations for Poles sent to forced labour and exile in the Soviet Union. The issue, present in Polish-Russian talks for a decade now, has been progressing at a very slow pace. Efforts must be made to bring it to completion, Forced labour compensations already have a precedent, and it is time they became a European standard.
Russia has been loathe to pay the compensations, and has deliberately kept the dispute at an early stage, arguing that it lacks the funds and its own victims of Stalinism were paid only pennies.
Those are unacceptable arguments. As the Soviet Union's continuator, Russia has been paying the Soviet debts without protest. It is therefore time it started paying out compensations. It is the only historical issue that should be Poland's priority today. Warsaw should make all it can for the Polish claims to be understood and supported by Brussels.
As far as economic issues are concerned, the first-rate issue is the planned Baltic gas pipeline linking Russian gas deposits with western Europe. The pipeline will be an alternative for the Yamal pipeline crossing through Poland.
Perhaps it would be worth reminding the Russians that they are bound by a contract under which two lines of the Yamal were supposed to be developed, whereas only one has been developed and that is supposed to be it.
For that reason, Poland will incur substantial financial losses, and it would make sense to demand damages or start talks on alternative solutions offsetting them. Contracts should be kept. Russia does not stand above the law.
The Polish-Russian conflict, political, not historical, is therefore a fact. It cannot be avoided. Too much sets the two countries apart.
In fact, those divisions are inevitable if Poland is to retain its identity and not return from the European and euroatlantic path it has chosen. In its own interest, but also in Europe's. It is worth making sure that Brussels understands this.
[The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
=> Lukasz wrote: "They were kept in camps but not in concentration camps."
Lukasz--according to Webster definition of concentration camp:
concentration camp: a camp where persons (as prisoners of war, political prisoners, or refugees) are detained or confined.
Certainly Polish POW Camps were not nearly as bad as Nazi or Soviet GULAG's, and Soviet POW's were a part if defeated invading Army of Totalitarian Power. However, let's not change definitions for "political correctness".
"Soviet Union people was even poorer. Then Stalin decided istead of killing by hunger those polish POWS it is mrcier to shoot them. "
RusIvan, I'm sorry but you are telling a complete nonsense. Stalin Famines (like that In Ukraine and SOuthern Russia in 1932-1933) were artificially planned. Seizure of grain and livestock from farmers (so called "kulaks"), forced collectivization and other things is not the same as epidemy because of poor living antisanitary conditions.
You mean like Stalin gave Chechnya to Chechens? Should Chechnya be allowed to "proclaim themselves free?"
It is the height of hypocrisy for Russians to lament support of the Chechens when they themselves support separatists in Georgia. The butcher of Beslan Basayev even supported the Russian war on Georgia. He beheaded Christians in Abkhazia in the early nineties for his jihad. I don't support Chechens because I wouldn't want Russia to support separatist rebels in the USA. When you support the Abkhaz, you undermine the effort in Chechnya.
thank you all translation
"Let history speak for itself; I can bet you I can outperform your concept Rus for I have family who actually fought with Bolsheviks in 1918-20. What happened then has nothing to do of today. Listen well of all you: calm down; this can be twisted so many ways it makes lady in a park look like a victim of assassination. Rus keep in mind Jozef Pilsudzki
knew well before hand what is at stake. Lenin was running rampant destroying dignity of Russian people religion; should I go deep into historical facts and point to you what communist stands fore; let berry those who need to be berried."
cos dla was
http://www.sciagawa.pl/a/1947.html
Well, I think that this definition is nonsense. In Poland when you are saying “concentration camp”, you mean camp where planed extermination happened.
It was sarcasm on Lucasz's logic. Read our before posts.
You mean like Stalin gave Chechnya to Chechens? Should Chechnya be allowed to "proclaim themselves free?"==
Joe you should read more carefully:)).
I meant that Stalin made them A PART OF GEORGIA. Before it Abkhazies was not part of Georgia.
SO abkhazies go free when Soviet Union died.
It is the height of hypocrisy for Russians to lament support of the Chechens when they themselves support separatists in Georgia. ==
This pathetism ar edue to your misreadinmg Joe so Won't answer.
About chechens.
You maybe surprised but I support thier independence from Russia. I think that Putin made mistake by holding them.
They are alien people to russians.
(Accually same aliency as pakistani muslim bombers in London are citizens of Britain. So Russia doesn't make mistake bigger then Britain).
BUT before depart firstly chechens has to return the lands of Terek cossakcs which was given to them by Stalin (the north of river Terek and Sunzha).
I think it is fair. They go away but with those lands which they came. No extras.
"Well, I think that this definition is nonsense. In Poland when you are saying “concentration camp”, you mean camp where planed extermination happened."
No--of course not, Lukasz. You irresponsibly jumped to conclusions. However, I formulated my thoughts not well, and I should have said this:
Polish POW Concentration camps were definitely not extermination camps of Nazis or Labor-to-death camps of GULAGS. But still they were concentration camps by definition.
Anyway, I think you understand what I mean. Definitely Poland did not have camps designed for extermination. They were detention centers.
"Those who look in past are doomed. Relax your heart all of you and go further in journey of life for it is worth it to forgive and let it go. History is like boiling water of acid; love brings this to calm."
thank you all
Yes this is the same logic that leads to the idea that Chechnya should "go free" now that the USSR is dead. The fact that you support Chechens just explains why you would also support their slaughter of Georgian Christians at Russia's behest.
"Those who look in past are doomed. Relax your heart all of you and go further in journey of life for it is worth it to forgive and let it go. History is like boiling water of acid; love brings this to calm."
Very Good reminder ! Let's learn from the past but look toward future -:)))
Have I mentined 30% of them?
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