Posted on 12/09/2007 8:55:00 PM PST by indcons
From High Tide at Gettysburg by Glenn Tucker, Chapter 20, The Council and The Captain, Section 2, Lee's Letters Are Found in the Mailbag:
"Captain Ulric Dahlgren had a roving Federal calvary squadron, which on July 2 he took across South Mountain at the Monterey Pass, led through Waynesboro, and halted at Greencastle, where he was greeted much as if he were a conqueror, to the gratification of his pride and vanity.
He had just reached the age of 20. His father, Admiral John Adolf Dahlgren, after whom the big, bottle shaped, smooth bore naval guns were named, was one of Lincoln's close confidants, whom the President, with his tinkering and inventive instincts, delighted to visit. Ulric was well acquainted with all the great figures of Washington whom the President brought to Admiral Dahlgren's house, stopping on visits to the Navy Yard, and probably could have had any type of military career he desired. But he had entered the dashing cavalry arm and was serving as a foot-loose patrol of Kilpatrick's division around Gettysburg.
Young Dahlgren was about to engage in as exploit that would fascinate the army and the capital, enliven the newspaper columns, win him a jump promotion over two grades, from captain to colonel, and ultimately lead to his death in circumstances that left him one of the figures in the Federal Army most odious to the South.
The sight of Dahlgre's blue column, in the rear of Lee's army, aroused the citizens who had watched so long the passing of the Southern host. The entire Greencastle population was brought to the streets. Dahlgren, accepting their cheers for a time, ordered them back into their houses and restored the town to a normal appearance. Then he hid his troopers around the corners of the public square, making ready to intercept and communications on that afternoon between Lee's army and the Confederate capital, for he was on the main route. With the trap set, he climbed to the belfry of the Dutch Reformed Church and surveyed the surrounding country with his glasses.
Sure enough, a Confederate cavalry company was approaching from the south. It was not well led and came into town blindly, without even outriders or an advance party. Jeb Stuart had contributed so much already to Lee's discomfiture that it seems superfluous to mention other instances. But if Stuart had been on hand properly discharging his duties, one of which was to protect the army's communications, Lee's rear would not have been exposed to the molestation of such small Federal bodies as Dahlgren's. Robertson, Jones, and Imboden were supposed to be watching, but their forces were limited and Stuart's vigorous leadership was lacking.
As the Confederate troop came into the square, Dahlgren's men dashed out suddenly with a shrill yell, fired their pistols, and, more by the impetuosity of their assault than by their numbers, threw the Southern column into disorder and flight. The prisoners included 3 officers and 14 men.
Then Dahlgren discovered what a treasure of intelligence he had captured. The detachment was bringing up the official Richmond mail addressed to General Lee, and even cursory examination disclosed to the Federal cavalry captain its significance. Dahlgren set out at once for Meade's headquarters, about thirty-five miles away. So concerned was he lest he encounter another body of Confederates and have his packet wrested from him, on leaving Waynesboro, he split his command and had part of the men form a barricade on the eastern hill by piling wagons and farm equipment across the roadway. He crossed again over Monterey Pass, moved by Emmitsburg, and finally handed the Confederate mailbag to Meade's chief of staff, General Butterfield. Butterfield read the letters and went at once to Meade. The hour is uncertain, but it must have been near midnight.
The correspondence showed that Lee's force on Seminary Hill was the full load of the invasion.
Lee would not receive the reinforcements of Corse's, Jenkins', or Cooke's brigades. He would have to detach men from his own army to keep his communications open. Beauregard would not establish a second front in Virginia threatening Washington. This highly important phase of Lee's planning - the assembly of an actual army, or "an army in effigy," at Culpeper, to menace the Federal capital from the south while Lee was on its flank in Pennsylvania - had collapsed.
All this was clear from the correspondence. Meade need not worry about any sudden foray on Washington, or the arrival of reinforcements for Lee, or operations against his own rear, or anything except the embattled Confederate army in his immediate front. The reading of these dispatches bolstered Meade's confidence; if, as some have felt, it had been as limp as a wisp of smoke, it quickly came as stiff as a gun barrel."
The slander of Stuart really needs to stop. (Not from you but from lazy historians...)
This is why I love posting on the Civil War threads. I learn so much from Freepers. Thank you for taking the time to find that for me. I will have to put your post with my other papers on Gettysburg. Thanks again.
Its meaningless to this conversation. As the quotes from the book note, Dahlgren intercepted the mail bag around midnight July 2nd.
By that time, Meade already KNEW he was facing the entire Army of Northern Virginia. He knew which corps were where to the northeast, north, northwest, west, southwest of his position atop Cemetary Ridge. The decision to stay and ‘fight it out’ was being made AT the time of Dahlgren’s ‘discovery’. This is heavily noted in every CW history worth opening, due to the ‘council of war’ Meade called on the evening of July 2nd.
Every Union Corps commander was present.
btw, there is a helluva big difference between intercepting a mail bag that had some correspondence from Lee, and intercepting Lee’s plan of battle, as was alleged up above.
As for Stuart.....(chuckle)
The man screwed up, big time. I don’t think it would have changed the end result, but I’ve looked high and low throughout my own library on the subject, and the internet and its thousands of forums on the topic.
I keep coming back to Stuart’s own men noting he ‘worried them out with concerns about pomp and foppery he was so fond of’ the three days before Brandy Station took place, and his actions immediately afterward influenced his decision making during the Gettysburg campaign, with disasterous results.
So we should ignore the orders he received from Lee on June 22 and Longstreet's endorsement of that order. The review before the Battle of Brandy Station is what history pivoted on.
We will just have to agree to disagree.
‘So we should ignore the orders he received from Lee on June 22 ...’
sure, why not?
Stuart did....(chuckle)
You're welcome.
Like you, I enjoy these threads and have learned a lot from the discussions.
Tell you what I'll do. I will post his orders and then you can point out to me exactly what he ignored. Would that be okay with you?
No need, I saw them the last time you posted them.
Stuart failed to keep Lee informed of any Union movements in reaction to taking Winchester, and then moving north into first Maryland, then Pennsylvania.
He failed in that task. There is no mitigating it.
Since you first put forth that theory, with fine documentation I might add, I’ve given your view serious consideration. I”ve always found the ‘Boy Cavalier’ facinating.
But in the summer of 1863, he was thrown ‘off his game’ as a result of his ego, and his love of the ladies. The whole ‘grand review’ which given the circumstances was in fact a gross waste of resources, time, and horseflesh, kept him from aggressively challenging any Union attempt at a raid, which Pleasanton (of all people to be taken surprise by, outside of Kilpatrick/Kill cavalry, this was the worst) took full advantage of at Brandy Station.
Its my belief the Army of Northern Virginia, from Robert E Lee on down the line to the lowest private, became unbelievably ARROGANT after Chancellorsville, which we both know had thundered to its conclusion six weeks before Lee began the ‘second invasion of the North’. It also explains Lees insane suicidal charge on July 3rd....
You can see this arrogance throughout all the coorespondence of that time frame (June 1863 to July 4th, 1863) in how the invasion was laid out, how lax the orders given were throughout the entire matter, excepting the withdrawal, which Lee himself issued detailed instructions both in writing and verbally to Imboden for example.
Stueart? He took the least inhibiting viewpoint of the orders you are basing your theory on, and simply ignored them once he crossed the River. The clear fact remains after advancing only 20 some miles in 24 hours, having found his planned line of advance blocked by the UNION ARMY, he should have turned around and REPORTED THE MOVEMENT.
He did not do so, for one reason, and one reason only. He was exceedingly aware of the Richmond papers for the first time, castigating him publicly for getting caught by surprise at Brandy Station. So he was determined to exceed his first two famous ‘rides around the Union army’ and retrieve his faltering personal reputation.
JEB Stuart was a magnficent cavalry officer throughtout the Civil War....with the exception of his performance from June 22nd to July 3rd of 1863. IN those two weeks, he failed miserably, by his own hand, not by anything inflicted upon him by the opposing force.
Excluding his surprise by Pleasanton, that is.
Some of the blame can and should be laid at Robert E Lee’s feet, no disputing it. He could have recalled Jenkins days earlier, but he refused to do so. He could have sent the cavalry that was with his army forward, but he refused to do that as well, seeing it as a rebuke of Stuart primarily from what I can tell, and you know as well if not better than I his fondness for his ‘cadet Cavalier’.
That said, Stuart failed in his primary job of being the ‘eyes and ears of Lee’s army’ a job he had performed prior to this incident, and after this incident, as well as any Cavalry Officer ever has in my view.
I read something long ago that seems pertinent here. Orders are a guide for a good officer. Thats all. Nothing has come down from the Mount written in stone...well, since the tablets of lore.
Stuart should have known better, in fact he did know better. He simply couldn’t let go of the sting of criticism from the Richmond papers which up to that point had showered him with acolades pretty much from day one of the conflict, and it adversely affected his judgement as a commander.
The ‘arrogance’ of which I speak of above can also be seen in how the Army of Northern Virginia approached Gettysburg in the first place. Besides placing his least experienced corps commanders ‘first in line’ ahead of his only remaining, tried and tested corps commander (Longstreet) he let the new corps commanders Ewell and Hill ‘lead’.
Ewell, as history notes, was at best mediocre in the job. Hill was simply careless as he was at Mechanicsville, and then again late in the war where he got 2,000 troops killed in an ambush near a dam (sometime in 1864).
Even though Hill was informed ‘Union Cavalry is in Gettysburg’ he still allowed Heth to go ‘looking for shoes’ which in itself is one of the most oft repeated LIES of the entire war (there was no shoe manufacturing facility in Gettysburg EVER in its history).
Its my belief, and the belief of many of the parks resident experts Heth and others concocted the fable about ‘looking for shoes’ to hide the fact Heth too failed to obey his instructions. Henry Heth had a thirst for glory just like every other Virginian in command that summer of 1863, and it caused him to disregard all established protocal and orders, forcing a fight when Lee specifically said not to bring on a ‘general engagement til the army is up’.
The arrogance brought about by Chancellorsville was worth two large corps to the Army of the Potomac over the next three days, as history shows us.
Okay...
(chuckle)
Hey, I spent quite a bit of time with the two previous posts.
LOL! Probably.
No it's not. I'm not going to type in the whole chapter but the pages prior to the section I submitted details how little confidence Meade had. My point was that if 'intel' about the Southern Army had not been intercepted, Meade's cautious nature may have put him in reverse.
Meade already KNEW he was facing the entire Army of Northern Virginia.
Not according to Tucker's account, which is a highly credible book on Gettysburg.
The decision to stay and ‘fight it out’ was being made AT the time of Dahlgren’s ‘discovery’.
It was a vote by the other corp commanders. The northern army held 'war councils'. The war council made recommendations to remain in the field, which Meade accepted. There's a monster difference between 'accepting a recommendation' and 'making a decision'.
At the time Dahlgren intercepted the mail bag, Meade was drawing up plans for a retreat.
btw, there is a helluva big difference between intercepting a mail bag that had some correspondence from Lee, and intercepting Lee’s plan of battle, as was alleged up above.
A memory discrepancy on my part. However, mailbag or battle plan, it was interception of 'intel' that supports my point.
As for Stuart.....(chuckle)
As you probably know, the leadership styles between Lee and his northern counterparts was quite different. Lee's orders were often left open to interpretation, which is what made Jackson so successful because he understood Lee so well. If my memory serves, as it sometimes does, Stuart simply misinterpreted Lee's orders.
Here is some information: [Link, see pages 22-23].
Also see Wikipedea [Link].
Even after I admitted I was being lazy, you still help me. You are very kind to do so. Thanks!
Meade already KNEW he was facing the entire Army of Northern Virginia.
Not according to Tucker’s account, which is a highly credible book on Gettysburg.
then its not ‘credible’. Sorry.
You're going to have to do better than that.
Provide sources.
then its not ‘credible’. Sorry.
You’re going to have to do better than that.
Provide sources.
Take your pick of any historical work related to the Civil War found in the library of Congress for starters.
"duckie" asked (last Friday) me WHY i need so many books, as i mostly "mess with" Johnson/Evinrude/Sea King OBs of the mid -late 1950s (essentially the SAME engines,btw) & 617-series Mercedes diesels of the 1980- 85 vintage.
i couldn't think of a GOOD answer. (chuckle!!!)
free dixie,sw
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