The case before the court was not whether their power to issue the writ had been suspended. That implies that they did have the power but it was denied in this instance. No, the case was that they lacked the authority to issue the writ in the first place under any circumstances. And the court ruled that they did. Since habeas corpus had not been suspended then that wasn't an issue before the court. And since habeas corpus had not been suspended then the question of who may suspend it was certainly not an issue before the court.
Without knowing if their power had been suspended, how could they proceed? In every case, it is absolutely essential to establish jurisdiction to hear the case.
[Non-Seq #2050] That implies that they did have the power but it was denied in this instance.
There is no implication whatever. The court must determine jurisdiction to hear the case. To do so, they must determine if their jurisdiction obtained or had been suspended. The court cannot assume is has jurisdiction.
The court stated, "As preliminary to any investigation of the merits of this motion, this court deems it proper to declare that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States."
[Non-Seq #2050] No, the case was that they lacked the authority to issue the writ in the first place under any circumstances. And the court ruled that they did.
Whatever that says is ambiguous. The court found that it could only have authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus if said authority had been granted by an Act of Congress. It further found that such an Act of Congress existed and gave them such authority.
The court stated, "To enable the court to decide on such question, the power to determine it must he given by written law. The inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court. The 14th section of the judicial act (Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 58.) has been considered as containing a substantive grant of this power."
The court stated, "The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case. If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws. The motion, therefore, must be granted."
[Non-Seq #2050] Since habeas corpus had not been suspended then that wasn't an issue before the court.
Who had the suspension authority and how did you legally determine, for the court, that it had not been suspended?
[Non-Seq #2050] And since habeas corpus had not been suspended then the question of who may suspend it was certainly not an issue before the court.
Who had the suspension authority and how did you legally determine, for the court, that it had not been suspended?
After the court judicially determined (here for the very first time) that only the Legislature could suspend their power, the court could take judicial notice of the fact that no such Act of Suspension by the Congress had been proclaimed. All such laws by Congress must be publicly proclaimed.
In the absence of a judicial determination of WHO could suspend their power, the Court could not take such judicial notice. For example, if a president or military officer could suspend their power, taking judicial notice would be impossible.
No non-seq. It was an even more basic issue than that, namely whether they had the basic power to issue writs. To find the power to issue writs necessarily entails a determination of where that power comes from and, with it, under what circumstances it is denied to the court. It's been a valiant effort, non-seq, but you are simply wrong on this one. The court's ability to rule comes upon what is material to the case, not what non-seq personally decides they can and cannot rule upon out of his own convenience.