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March 2003 Top Secret Memo: TRANSFER OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION (POTENTIAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS) Translation
Pentagon/FMSO Iraq Pre-War Documents ^ | April 17 2007 | jveritas

Posted on 04/17/2006 8:40:37 AM PDT by jveritas

Document ISGP-2003-0001498 ISGP-2003-0001498 contains a 9 pages TOP SECRET memo (pages 87-96 in the pdf document) dated March 16 2003 that talks about transferring “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” from one ammunition depot in Najaf to other ammunition depots near Baghdad. As we know by now the term SPECIAL AMMUNITION was used by Saddam Regime to designate CHEMICAL WEAPONS as another translated document has already shown. For example in document CMPC 2004-002219 where Saddam regime decided to use “CHEMICAL WEAPONS against the Kurds” they used the term “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” for chemical weapon http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1601810/posts. What is also interesting is that these “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” were listed as 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shells which are not by itself SPECIAL unless it contain CHEMICAL WEAPONS. In fact the Iraqi have always used 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shell as a main delivery tool for Chemical Weapons Agents by filling these type of shells with Nerve Gas, Sarin, Racin, Mustard gas and other Chemical Agents.

Beginning of partial translation of Pages 85-96 in document ISGP-2003-0001498

In the Name of God the Merciful The Compassionate

Top Secret

Ministry Of Defense

Chairmanship of the Army Staff

Al Mira Department

No. 4/17/ammunition/249

Date 16 March 2003

To: The Command of the Western Region

Subject: Transfer of Ammunitions

The secret and immediate letter of the Chairmanship of the Army Staff 4/17/308 on 10 March 2003

1. The approval of the Army Chief of Staff was obtained to transfer THE SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS in the ammunition depots group of Najaf and according to the following priorities:

A. The first priority

First. Ammunition (122 mm)

Second. Ammunition (130 mm)

Third. Ammunition (155 mm)

To the depots and storage of the Second Corp and the two ammunition depot groups Dijla/2/3

B. Second priority.

First. Ammunition (23 mm)

Second. Ammunition (14.5 mm)

To the ammunition depots of the air defense and distributed to the ammunition depot groups in (Al Mussayeb- Al Sobra- Saad).

2. To execute the order of the Chief Army Staff indicated in section (1) above, we relate the following:

A. Duty

Transfer of the ammunitions shown in sections (A) and (B) from the ammunitions depots of Najaf to the ammunition depots in (Dijla 2/3, and Al Mansor, and Saad, and Al Mussayeb, and Sobra and Blad Roz and Amar Weys from March 16 till April 14 2003.

Signature…

General Rasheed Abdallah Sultan

Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff- Al Mira

March 2003

End of Partial translation

The remaining pages of this 9 pages top secret memo talk about getting the special vehicles to transfer the SPECIAL AMMUNITION and the people assigned to supervise and execute the transfer and they were top Iraqi Army and Military Intelligence officers.


TOPICS: Breaking News
KEYWORDS: bush; bushdidntlie; chemicalweapons; iraq; iraqiintelligence; jveritas; media; mediabias; onfreep; prewardocs; sarindar; specialammunition; waronterror; wmd; wmds; wot
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To: eyespysomething

That's my recollection. I know the stories are in the PreWarDocs list.


141 posted on 04/17/2006 1:17:26 PM PDT by SittinYonder (That's how I saw it, and see it still.)
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To: RayRobisonblog; jveritas

The spelling of names...

Rasheed and Rashid.

Al Mira, Al Mirah, Al-Mirah, Al-Mira

Abdallah and Abdullah.

Are these still the same, even with the different spellings? Does Al Mirah mean the mirror?


142 posted on 04/17/2006 1:17:55 PM PDT by eyespysomething (American liberals like everything about the struggle for freedom except the struggle.)
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To: Coop

Great find.


143 posted on 04/17/2006 1:21:31 PM PDT by rwfromkansas (http://xanga.com/rwfromkansas)
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To: Izzy Dunne
Too bad we don't have a free press to help with this...

My thoughts exactly.

144 posted on 04/17/2006 1:23:58 PM PDT by bad company (Caedite eos. Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius)
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To: jazusamo

Tony Snow talked this morning enthusiastically about the recent revelations. It shows that a number of our friends in the conservative media are finally getting the truth out to their listeners.


145 posted on 04/17/2006 1:29:16 PM PDT by driftless ( For life-long happiness, learn how to play the accordion.)
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To: driftless

That's good news, I hope more of the media will pick up on it. Tony Snow is a friend of FR and jveritas spoke on his show one day last week.


146 posted on 04/17/2006 1:39:29 PM PDT by jazusamo (-- Married a WAC in '65 and I'm still reenlisting. :-)
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To: eyespysomething
These names are the same despite the different spelling.

Mirror is Al Miraya or AL Miraa't in Arabic.

Al Mira can be a name in the Iraqi dialect more rather than a common Arabic word. In each Arabic dialect there are 5 to 10% of the words, specially name of places, that are not not the same in other dialects.

147 posted on 04/17/2006 1:46:59 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: elfman2

Thank you. I hope that the word will go out on this documents and others.


148 posted on 04/17/2006 1:49:21 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: jveritas

Again Joseph great job.


149 posted on 04/17/2006 1:49:39 PM PDT by Dog (We have had a date with destiny and Iran for 27 years---appealof2)
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To: xzins
However in Saddam Regime the term "Special Ammunition" was exclusive to "Chemical Weapons".
150 posted on 04/17/2006 1:50:30 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: BagCamAddict

Thank you very much, I greatly appreciate this comment.


151 posted on 04/17/2006 1:52:24 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: jveritas

Thanks, it makes it hard when searching Lexis Nexis or google!!


152 posted on 04/17/2006 1:52:44 PM PDT by eyespysomething (American liberals like everything about the struggle for freedom except the struggle.)
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To: beyond the sea

I am sure he will :)


153 posted on 04/17/2006 1:53:50 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: Coop

Excellent point.


154 posted on 04/17/2006 1:54:27 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: Dog

Thanks Dog. Great to know this.


155 posted on 04/17/2006 1:56:14 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: jveritas; SeenTheLight

STL - you've GOT to check out JVeritas' work. He's translating Iraqi prewar documents and there's some seriously mind-blowing stuff here. The world NEEDS to know about this.


156 posted on 04/17/2006 1:58:24 PM PDT by Terabitten (The only time you can have too much ammunition is when you're swimming.)
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To: xzins; Coop

Saddam was planning a soviet style defense of Fortress Baghdad as in Fortress Stalingrad. He thought that the real fight will be in Baghdad where the US will suffer a lot of casualties there that will turn the public opinion against the war and force the US to withdraw. He failed miserably.


157 posted on 04/17/2006 1:59:42 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: gov_bean_ counter
Bimp.??!!

Bimp? Is this a new entry in the FR lexicon of unique coinage, to join the infamous 'set your beebers to stune', 'what a maroon', and of course 'I'm going to take a shower now'?

158 posted on 04/17/2006 2:00:54 PM PDT by IonImplantGuru (Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.)
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To: mware

That is great. Tony Snow is the only national Radio Talk Show Host that has been talking about these documents. I hope more of our guys on Radio will follow his steps. There are a lot of very important facts and TRUTH in these documents that can turn the debate about the war heavily in our favor.


159 posted on 04/17/2006 2:05:58 PM PDT by jveritas (Hate can never win elections.)
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To: SittinYonder; Coop; Marine_Uncle; Grampa Dave; eyespysomething; jveritas
Looking for a place to post some info....

From (Highlighted Links available thru this Link ...):

Command releases JCOA-produced Iraqi perspectives report

**************************************************************

U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis has completed the unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq, reflecting the Iraqi civilian and military leadership’s perspective of events.

Read the whole report | Read a transcript of the Pentagon media roundtable


By Jennifer Colaizzi
USJFCOM Public Affairs

(SUFFOLK, Va., - March 24 , 2006) –- Can history be wrong? Not exactly, but history can be distorted if data is provided by only one side’s perspective.

U.S. Joint Forces Command has released an unclassified historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq. The twist is that this historical report reflects the Iraqi civilian and military leadership’s perspective of events.

“Opinions are not facts; one data point is not a trend, and a group of data points from a single perspective isn’t going to convince anyone,” said Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM), Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) director.

So, how do you find “ground truth” in battle analysis? There are multiple options, but only one good answer, according to Cucolo.

“Ground truth is getting the red side, or enemy’s, perspective from red,” said Cucolo. “Looking at the enemy’s actions through American military eyes,” or even through the eyes of an expert trained in the enemy’s battle and culture, is valuable, “but it’s still a friendly’s view of red.”

The overthrow of Saddam’s regime during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided an opportunity to study an adversary.

“It’s the first time since World War II, we had an opportunity to evaluate military events from both our own perspective and the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership,” Cucolo said.

“This means reading their documents, reading their orders, interviewing their commanders and civilian leaders and asking what happened.”

This two-year project of delving into the decision-making processes of the former adversary, started in 2003 and became known as the Iraqi Perspective Project (IPP).

The Iraqi military leaders wanted to tell their side of the story.

“Military professionals like to explain their actions, talk tactics, talk strategy, and give their view of what happened and why,” the general said. “You get in a room, roll out a map in front of a former Iraqi general and say, ‘hey sir, we understood you were here when this happened, what were your actions?’”

According to Cucolo, in terms of lessons learned, the historical approach implemented during the IPP provided excellent results.

“If I want to capture the most accurate history I can, I want to hear what you did and how you made decisions. I’ll get more through dialogue than if I go about it and say, ‘Where were you on the night of April 6?’ It makes interviewees inhibited,” said Cucolo.

The IPP team conducted more than 100 interviews; 23 with senior members of the former regime.

Interviews conducted by the IPP team included: Saddam’s personal secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, the secretary of the Republican Guard, both Republican Guard corps commanders, the commander of the Special Republican Guard, the director of military intelligence, division commanders and others.

To augment the interviews conducted in Baghdad, the IPP team also reviewed thousands of captured documents and the transcripts of hundreds of hours of secret regime recordings. They also mined hundreds of existing interrogation transcripts.

The initial classified report has been used in a variety of Department of Defense training courses, including Capstone, Pinnacle, and courses at the Joint Forces Staff College.

According to USJFCOM officials, the IPP report provides useful lessons learned that can be factored into ongoing and future operational planning against a similar closed regime.

Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report include:

• Iraqi regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf of their own economic interests in Iraq to block any UN Security Council actions to authorize an invasion.
• Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including London) and the Middle East
• Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition invasion; therefore bridges were not blown, oil fields were not torched, and the south was not flooded – all part of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done prior to the invasion.
• Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda
• Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many colleagues never stopped believing in them.
• Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military forces.
• Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true state of their capabilities.
• Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance from the political leadership, creation of “popular” militias, prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus.
• The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition, but not to support the insurgency or a guerilla war.

The IPP report is just one example of the work JCOA does on a daily basis.

“We fill a void. While services do a great job of tactical and component lessons learned and the Joint Staff does strategic lessons learned, we do the operational level,” said Cucolo.

Cucolo stated the IPP is a step in the right direction, but the directorate is still studying documents to further expand picture of regime.

160 posted on 04/17/2006 2:09:06 PM PDT by Ernest_at_the_Beach (History is soon Forgotten,)
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