Nonsense. Habeas corpus had not been suspended, not by the President, not by Congress, not by anybody. How could an issue which had not happened appear before the court?
The question settled in Bollman was not who suspended habeas corpus. It was who had habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Constitution, and in finding that jurisdiction the court ruled that the suspension clause applied to the legislature.
Again, nonsense. The Supreme Court cannot rule on the legality or illegality of something that hasn't happened. The question settled in Bollman was whether the Supreme Court could issue a writ of habeas corpus. That was what was decided, not who could suspend it.
Theoretically although erroniously, it could have found that the legislature did not have the power to set up the judiciary with jurisdiction over the writ of habeas corpus. In that case, the power of the court to issue a writ would have been unconstitutional and the motion would have been denied. But that did not happen because of the court's ruling, which rested on the suspension clause being a legislative power.
Utter nonsense yet again. Habeas corpus had not been suspended. Marshall's comments on who may suspend it were a complete dictum and were not binding in any way.
You and I both know who has the stronger case though.
If you mean you have provided evidence supporting your belief that only Congress may suspend habeas corpus then I agree with that. I have always said that had Lincoln appealed the Ex Parte Merryman decision to the full Supreme Court then the court would most likely have ruled against him. If you mean that you have made the case that the court has ruled that only Congress can suspend habeas corpus, then I disagree completely. Chief Justice Rehnquist is right and you are wrong.
You're missing the issue again, and perhaps intentionally so. The court didn't rule on something that had not happened. They ruled on how an existing clause in the Constitution vested power in the legislature, which in turn was grounds for the legislature's involvement in that same area.
And you are missing, intentionally or otherwise, the fact that the Supreme Court cannot issue a ruling on something that has not happened. I would suggest that any first year law student has a grasp of this simple fact which keeps escaping you. The question of who may suspend habeas corpus was not an issue in the case before the Court so your claim that Bollman and Swarthout somehow support your agenda is a complete canard. Chief Justice Rehnquist has recognized this, any competent lawyer would recognize this, yet you cling to your interpretation no matter how wrong it is. Do so if you wish, but the title of your ego post is wrong.
No, not nonsense. It's right there in the final question of the case.
Habeas corpus had not been suspended, not by the President, not by Congress, not by anybody.
Straw man. I have not suggested that to begin with.
How could an issue which had not happened appear before the court?
It didn't, but that does not mean that a case involving legislative power over habeas corpus did not come before the court. In fact, such a case did in Bollman, and on the grounds that Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 applied to the legislature, the Bollman ruling found that the legislative act placing the writ-issuing jurisdiction in the court was constitutional.
Again, nonsense.
Again, not so. It's right there in the final statements of the case. Try reading it for once.
The Supreme Court cannot rule on the legality or illegality of something that hasn't happened.
Straw man. That is not what the case was about. The case was about the legislature's authority to designate the judicial system with the writ power. In order to determine that ability's constitutionality, the court had to find what in the Constitution let the legislature do what it did. In answer to that question, the court cited the legislative involvement in setting up the judiciary combined with its own jurisdiction over the writ. The location of that jurisdiction is in the suspension clause. The question settled in Bollman was whether the Supreme Court could issue a writ of habeas corpus.
That, and whether or not the legislature had the constitutional grounds to designate the court as the instrument where the writ was to be issued. In determining those grounds the court used the suspension clause:
"If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so. That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws. The motion, therefore, must be granted."
Pay close attention to the last two sentences in particular. The ruling is saying in the plainest of terms that the constitutional power designating the judiciary as issuer of the writ comes from the fact that the Constitutional jurisdiction to do so is in the legislature. Under that jurisdiction, the legislature had expressed its will by designating the court as the issuer of the writ. Therefore it was constitutional for the court to issue the writ, which permitted the motion to be granted to Bollman and Swartwout.
In simpler terms, the court observed that Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 was legislative. Because it was legislative, legislation pertaining to its subject and conducted within its bounds was constitutional.
Utter nonsense yet again.
No, not really. Just a hypothetical that could have happened in error, though it did not.
Habeas corpus had not been suspended.
Straw man.
Marshall's comments on who may suspend it were a complete dictum and were not binding in any way.
Not so, in as far as they say who the clause pertains to. That is so because the issue of who the clause pertains to determines whether or not the legislature acted constitutionally when it set up a judiciary system with the writ.
If you mean that you have made the case that the court has ruled that only Congress can suspend habeas corpus
Again you mistake me with that implication. I mean to say that the court has ruled that Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 applies to the legislature - it provides the legislature's ability to designate the court with the writ. Since that clause is also the only way to suspend habeas corpus, determining its legislative nature necessarily sets up a logical situation that cannot be carried through with any other conclusion than that the legislature alone can suspend the writ.
If that is confusing you, think of it this way:
Let's say that A represents the notion that legislature to designate the writ to the judiciary through Article I, Section 9, Clause 2.
At the same time, B represents the notion that Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 is a constitutional power of the legislature.
In Bollman the court ruled that A was constitutional because B was true.
Now, let's introduce C, the fact that the Constitution permits the suspension of habeas corpus only through Article I, Section 9, Clause 2.
As a matter of the obvious, if B is true, C may only be done by the legislature.
In Bollman the court ruled A because B was true. Since B was found true in Bollman, the case by necessity means that C may only be done by the legislature. Anything else simply does not work.