Yes it does. The Supreme Court can only rule on issues which appear before it, which means that it is ruling on the Constitutionality of some act which has been committed. It cannot issue a ruling on something which has not happened. That would be issuing an advisory ruling and the Court is Constitutionally prohibited from doint that. Habeas Corpus had not been suspended, the court cannot rule on the Constitutionality of who suspended it.
"The motion, therefore, must be granted"
Yeah, it was. Bollman and Swarthout had petitioned the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and it was granted. What else could it have done? How could it grant any motion on the question of the suspension of habeas corpus when there had been no such suspension?
Your claim that the suspension clause statement, the same statement upon which the case itself was decided, was "dictum" is nothing more than a result of fraudulent motives, an absence of education, or a combination of both on your part.
Based on your asinine arguements in your vanity post, I question whether you have any understanding of how the Supreme Court works in the first place. How can the court rule on something that did not happen?
No. It does not. If the court recognizes the suspension clause as legislative in order to establish the legislative authority over habeas corpus in a particular case, it has effectively ruled on that clause even though no suspension occured.
The Supreme Court can only rule on issues which appear before it
The issue of whether the legislature had jurisdiction over habeas corpus to extend the issuing of writs within the court system came before the court. The court ruled on the grounds that the suspension clause was legislative.
which means that it is ruling on the Constitutionality of some act which has been committed.
The act of establishing a judiciary system with the writ power had been committed by way of authority seated in the suspension clause, and that was the case. Hence the court could and did rule on the suspension clause.
Habeas Corpus had not been suspended, the court cannot rule on the Constitutionality of who suspended it.
Again, you are missing the issue. The question settled in Bollman was not who suspended habeas corpus. It was who had habeas corpus jurisdiction under the Constitution, and in finding that jurisdiction the court ruled that the suspension clause applied to the legislature. In simplified terms, they stated that the court can issue writs because the judiciary was set up to issue writs, and the legislature who set up that judiciary to issue writs did so under the constitutional authority implicit to the suspension clause. Since the suspension clause directed that the legislature could take away habeas corpus in times of emergency, the court reasoned, the jurisdiction of issuing writs of habeas corpus could accordingly be extended by the legislature, which had vested that writ power in the courts.
Yeah, it was. Bollman and Swarthout had petitioned the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus and it was granted. What else could it have done?
Theoretically although erroniously, it could have found that the legislature did not have the power to set up the judiciary with jurisdiction over the writ of habeas corpus. In that case, the power of the court to issue a writ would have been unconstitutional and the motion would have been denied. But that did not happen because of the court's ruling, which rested on the suspension clause being a legislative power.
Based on your asinine arguements in your vanity post
Call it all the names you like. You and I both know who has the stronger case though. I question whether you have any understanding of how the Supreme Court works in the first place.
Question what you may. Without reason to support your question though it carries little weight.
How can the court rule on something that did not happen?
You're missing the issue again, and perhaps intentionally so. The court didn't rule on something that had not happened. They ruled on how an existing clause in the Constitution vested power in the legislature, which in turn was grounds for the legislature's involvement in that same area.