That is admittedly the economic benefit of protectionism to the protected industry. Regardless, the cost in opportunity on the nation as a whole caused by a protectionist tariff and lack of free trade far outweighs any isolated gains in the protected industry. This is a matter of economic fact and a central part of international trade. The problems on the whole caused by protection may be graphically demonstrated without fail, just as may be done with the isolated gains of a protected industry.
but for more impoverished Southerners it's possible and likely that the benefits of protection could have outweighed the costs.
Most likely not, as they would tend to be hit the most economically from the higher post-tariff prices. Though the prices would increase for all, the burden is less upon those with large ammounts of expendible cash after production than those producing on the margin, or the small farms. Perhaps a small few could get into a protected industry and gain from the artificial economic boost created for that industry by the tariff, but the larger whole would continue to suffer the prices. That is because a large and continuous protectionist tariff is nothing more than a perk to a select few drawn from the greater many.
In the British scheme, Spain and Portugal would always be providers of wine to the English, and the Caribbean Islands would always provide sugar for the home country. 19th century Americans wanted to avoid such a subservient fate.
The best way to do exactly that is to promote free trade and produce where the market strength is. This in turn places trade dynamics within the framework of price and production advantages rather than historical preset expectations.
Virginia manufacturers and ironfounders, Kentucky hemp growers, and Louisiana sugar kings all favored higher tariffs.
Is there any reason to expect that they shouldn't have? Political interests have written personal perks into law wherever the opportunity has presented itself since the dawn of history.
Given Confederate support for protective sugar tariffs, and Virginia manufacturers' enthusiasm for using revenue tariffs against their Northern competitors, it's pretty clear that things weren't so black and white between North and South.
Not in the least. That a small minority of any given population acts in a politically inconsistent manner from that population's greater majority in no way means that dissent to be widespread or significant beyond itself. Historical evidence in 1860 makes it clear that the majority representations of both regions advocated opposite policies. The best example of this is the Morrill Act vote in the House of Representatives, which, if I may remind, occurred before secession and therefore enjoyed the full presence of all the state delegations during the vote. The vote broke on strictly sectional lines - arguably the most sectional of any vote taken before the war. Here is how it split:
Total: 105 yes, 64 no.
Yes votes from Confederate state representatives: 1.
Yes votes from the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri: 6.
No votes from Union state representatives: 15.
Southern congressman voting in favor (including border states): 12.5%
Northern congressman voting in favor: 87%
That at least is one view, though it's likely that slavery and the power of the planters was enough to doom all such attempts at development.
While it's true that protection inhibits trade between developed countries and decreases prosperity, it's also clear that earlier in history protection helped first Britain, then the US and Germany, and later Japan to develop industries and achieve greater national prosperity.
Perhaps in theory this shouldn't have happened. Perhaps it was the wrong way to proceed. Perhaps remaining agrarian would have been a better option. But it's undeniable that protection did work for these countries in one period of their history. It's not clear that free trade would have worked anywhere near as well for them at the same stage in their development. One may have moral objections to protectionism, but it's not clear why they should carry the day and moral objections to slavery should be muted, marginalized or overlooked.
It's by no means certain that Southern opposition to US national tariffs was indicative of a more general, principled support for free trade. Southern nationalism was in the air. A tariff that gave Northern manufacturers control of the Southern market would naturally be opposed. It's less clear that tariffs that worked to exclude Northern products from Southern markets would be equally unpopular.
What characterized early 19th century America was a growing nationalism and a revolt against that nationalism in many Southern slave states. The same dynamic of growing nationalism and state and sectional opposition to nationalism repeated itself in the Confederacy. Many of those who were strongly opposed to US nationalism became staunch supporters of Confederate nationalism, and of a statist control of the economy in order to win the war.