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Hitler was not a military commander at all. He was a politician, a genius of a politician. Now where have I heard that description applied in the not-to-distant past?

to = too

Now that I had come immediately under Hitler in my capacity as an army group commander, however, I was to get my first real experience of him in his exercise of the supreme command.

When considering Hitler in the role of a military leader, one should certainly not dismiss him with such cliches as 'the lance-corporal of World War I'.

He undoubtedly had a certain eye for operational openings, as had been shown by the way he opted for Army Group A's plan in the west. Indeed, this is often to be found in military amateurs, otherwise his5tory would not have recorded so many dukes and princes as successful commanders.

Yet his belief in his own superiorty in this respect ultimately had disastrous consequences. His interference prevented the smooth and timely development of the Luftwaffe, and it was undoubtedly he who hampered the development of rocket propulsion and atomic weapons.

Morevoer, Hitler's interest in everything technical led him to overestimate the importance of his technical resources. As a result, he would count on a mere handful of assault-gun detachments or the new Tiger tanks to restore situations where only large bodies of troops could have any prospect of success.

What he lacked, broadly speaking, was simply 'military ability based on experience' - something for which his 'intuition' was no substitute.

As in the political sphere (at all events after his successes of 1938), so in the military did Hitler lack all sense of judgement regarding what could be achieved and what could not. Lost Victories - Erich von Manstein, p. 274-75 (1982 ed.) I am not sure what source materials you have been reading, but Hitler clearly was a military if for no other reason that literally took over command supreme command of the OKW.

[Hitler] wanted to be another Napoleon, who had only tolerated men under him who would obediently carry out his will. Unfortunately, [Hitler] had neither Napoleon's military training nor his military genius.

I have already shown in the chapter dealing with the plan for the invasion of Britain that Hitler had so organized the Supreme Command that no one was vested with the authority to advise him on grand strategy or to draft a war plan. The Operations Staff (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab) of O.K.W., which was theoretically qualified to discharge such a task, in practice merely played the role of a military secretariat. Its only 'raison d'etre' was to translate Hitler's ideas and instructions into the terminology of military orders.

But there was even worse to come. Hitler's designation of Norway as an 'O.K.W.' theatre of operations in which O.K.H. had no authority was only the first step in the disruption of land operations. In due course all the other theatres were gradually turned over to O.K.W.. Finally, only the Eastern one remained as an O.K.H. responsibility, and eve then it had Hitler at its head. Hence, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army was left with just as little influence on the other theatres of war as were the Commanders-in-Chief of the two other services in matters of grand strategy. [The Chief-of-Staff of the Army] had no say whatever in the overall distribution of the army's forces and often did not even know for certain what troops and materials were being sent to the various theatres.

In the circumstances, it was inevitable that the O.K.W. Operations Staff and the General Staff of the army should clash. Indeed, Hitler probably created clashes deliberately in order that he alone should at all times have the decisive say. Naturally, such faulty organization of the supreme military leadership was bound to contribute decisively to its breakdown. Another consequence of Hitler's over-estimation of his will-power and military ability was that he attempted more and more to interfere by seaprate orders of his own in the running of subordinate formations.

Hitler . . . thought he could see things much better from behind his desk than the commanders at the front. He ignored the fact that much of what was marked on his far-too-detailed situation maps were obviously out of date. From that distance, morever, he could not possibly judge what was the proper and necessary action to take on the spot.

[Nevertheless, h]e had grown increasinly accustomed to interfering in the running of the army groups, armies and lower formations by issuing special orders which were not his concern at all. . . . His mistrust of his subordinate commanders prevented him from giving them, in the form of long-term directives, freedom of action, which they might put to a use that was not to his liking. The effect of this, however, was to do away with the very essence of leadership. In the long run even an army group could not get along without directives from the Supreme Command - certainly not when it formed part of a larger front and was bound to its neighbours on either flank.

Lost Victories - Erich von Manstein, p. 283-84 (1982 ed.) I

Hitler was not a military commander at all.

As others have pointed out, he was an amateur military strategist of genius. If nothing else, the Battle of France illustrates this. He forced the winning plan on jos reluctant generals and quickly defeated the Allies despite being faced with more and better quality forces in men, tanks and planes.

His attack on the USSR was also wildly successful at first. He did quite poorly in fighting on the defensive, as others have noted. He specialized in surprise attacks on unsuspecting victims.