10 greatest military commanders of all time

freerepulic ^ | August 31, 2002 | zapiks44

[wimpycat]

I can't believe no one has mentioned Gaius Marius, uncle by marriage of Julius Caesar. I think it is safe to say we would never have heard of Julius Caesar if it weren't for the reforms, contributions and innovations of his uncle.

REFORMS IN THE LEGIONS

Now commander-in-chief of Rome's African legions, Marius came face to face with a problem that would eventually result in his greatest contribution to Roman legionary organization. From the very beginning of its history, Rome had accepted only soldiers of means, capable of purchasing their own armor and supplies and, as owners of land and property, having a financial stake in the success of Roman arms. Any Roman male who did not meet the property and land qualifications was not permitted to serve. The armies of the Republic had been almost continuously at war for the entire second century, from the Second Punic War to the wars against Jugurtha. Rome and her Italian allies had been systematically denuded of suitable manpower to fight for Rome's new, imperial, obligations. Marius, who probably had little real understanding of the earthshaking implications of his idea, decided to go for manpower to the despised capite censi, the "head count"; in other words, the illiterate, landless, volatile Roman mob. For generations, small farmers had been displaced in Italy as wealthy senators and knights bought up their land and put slaves to work it. Since the Gracchi, thousands of displaced former landholders had swelled the city of Rome. The landless had fought before in Rome's armies in minor, supportive positions. Marius proposed to give them all full-time employment.

Historians of Rome agree that this single action, which took poor men and put them under a great general who promised them booty, land upon retirement, and forged an emotional relationship with them, created a whole new type of soldier, loyal not to Rome's institutions, but to the status and wealth his general could provide. In addition, having no homes or land to go back to, the new soldiers tended to become career professionals, in the legions for 20-25 years before retirement. Marius' new legions prefigured Caesar's troops crossing the Rubicon, the later Praetorian Guard who made and broke Emperors, and the eventual empowerment of the Roman legions to choose and control the autocrats of state. All this, however, was buried in the future. At the moment, in 107 BC, Marius simply ignored the law requiring that Roman soldiers own anywhere from 3,000 to 11,000 sestertii in property, and filled his armies from the milling Roman mob.

In addition, he made the kind of pragmatic changes in organization and weaponry that shows his quality as a practical soldier. Marius altered the way that the pilum (the throwing spear of the common soldier) was fixed to the shaft; this caused the point to break off upon impact, which meant Rome's enemies could not return the spear against her legions. Marius altered baggage arrangements, insisting that his soldiers carry tents, weapons, and food upon their backs - hence the so-called "Marius' Mules" - rather than slow down the legions by endless baggage trains. Pliny stated that the earlier Republican army had five standards: eagle, wolf, Minotaur, horse, and boar. Marius elevated the Eagle - symbol of Jupiter Optimus Maximus - to the universal legionary standard, which fostered a subconscious loyalty and pride among the common soldiers. Most importantly, Marius is credited with switching from the maniple to the cohort as the core tactical element of the legion. The maniple had consisted of four various units of soldiers, each bearing different weapons, and thus used differently in combat. The cohort eliminated the more poorly equipped units of the maniple and, essentially, permitted the state to arm all legionaries with similar equipment. Rather than the complex subgroups of the maniple, the cohort functioned upon six identical units of 80 soldiers each, or 480 men to a cohort. Rather than forming in long lines, the cohorts combined in lines of three cohorts each, in depth, which permitted autonomy to each unit and flexibility in formation. Finally, Marius began promoting officers from within the ranks, rather than utilizing political or social connections, which vastly improved the quality of the centurions and other officers leading the legions on a day-to-day basis.

[TheEngineer]

Vo Nguyen Giap in Viet-Nam defeated the greatest technological army of the 20th century with barefoot soldiers.

Hard for me to agree with this one. General Giap won a war of attrition where the N.Vietnamese to American KIA ratio was something like 20-1. The N. Vietnamese leaders and generals placed no value on the human lives fighting on their side. I don't think that qualifies any of them for the top 10.

[TheEngineer]

Since the time of the Roman Republic, no one had ever done what he did, which was gain power and then voluntary renounce at the appointed time.

Your points are really excellent. And those are some of the points which made him one of the greatest men in the world.

After the revolution was over, and with an army at his disposal, he returned to his farm. And after 8 years as president, and with almost unanimous popularity, Washington stepped down and handed over the power.

Contrasted with bill clinton who was impeached, convicted of perjury, disbarred, and reviled by at least 40% of the country.... yet still wanted to cling to power ever longer.

[Steve Van Doorn]

"The N. Vietnamese leaders and generals placed no value on the human lives fighting on their side."

You are right. I take back my previous post.

[laconic]

I posted my candidates for the ten WORST generals of all time in reply to your Russian news item post, so I'll repeat them here: Braxton Bragg (CSA); William Westmoreland (USA); Samsonov and Rennenkampf (Imperial Russia, WW1); MacMahon (France, Franco-Prussian War); Hooker (USA, Civil War); Lord Haig (UK, WW1); Richardson (UK, WW1); Crassus (Imperial Rome); Conrad Hotzendorf (Austria-Hungary, WW1). Anyone have alternative suggestions?

[vbmoneyspender]

If you will expand the category to include military leaders, I would say Hitler was the worst military leader of all-time.

[ConsistentLibertarian]

It's one thing for a dictator with absolute political control to prepare a country for war. It's another to do it in a democracy. Themistocles was successful because he lied. Not that this would ever happen today.

[Destro]

He did not lie. He was "optimistic". I mean if your a tiny little city-state up against the largest empire the world has ever seen and they full weight of that empire is comming to get you a leader would kind of distort things don't you think?

I humbly add the Athenian Miltiades in the honor role for his generalship at Marathon.

[Leisler]

He fought the east. Against slave armies. And you could see your enemy commander. Pretty much, against his enemies, if you killed the king, the troops ran. Against the Greeks, it was a different matter.

[ConsistentLibertarian]

He lied long before the naval battle, before anyone was even thinking of the possibility of war. He lied in order to get people on side to build up a navy.

[Leisler]

He kicked the south all the way down the Mississippi with a unique blend of army and navy, amphibious landings, and a long logistics chain. Then he went after Lee. He knew, as did Lee, that if he locked on, which he did, it was but time. Furthermore he was confident enough to have generals like Sherman and Sheridan under him with no jealousy (unlike the south) and full confidence. A new blend of industrial, logistics warfare against a foe that knew him as well as he did himself.

[Jeff Chandler]

Hitler was not a military commander at all. He was a politician, a genius of a politician. Now where have I heard that description applied in the not-to-distant past?

[Jeff Chandler]

to = too

[Burr5]

Sure, McClellan (USA, Civil War).

[Leisler]

One of my favorite books, and I keep it in my car if I ever need something to read is Thucydidies, The Peloponnesian War. But you know what, I don't think the old guys compare. Yes the basics are there, but the modern Generals, and their Officer Corps are something new all together. Those leaders didn't have to deal with constant technological change, and at such a pace. I, personally, believed it began with the American Civil War. Mass industries, new inventions, etc. For example, could Alexander with his buddies be a General today? No. Sure modern generals aren’t as colorful, and are more likely to have a MBA than a dueling scar, but it is a machine, numbers, and electronic world with warfare reflecting it.

[laconic]

McClellan was a poor strategist, but an excellent tactician. He always waited until he had all the right tools in place and the troops were in top shape and then he did nothing; if you wanted a general who was excellent at logistics and training, McClellan was great. But if you categorize the worst generals on the basis of squandered opportunities, he ranks in the top ten (Antietam, several times in the Seven Days Battles) as does Meade (refusing to attack Lee after Pickett's Charge and when the latter was in retreat from Gettysburg).

[laconic]

I hate to say it, but Alexander the Great would have some trouble under the "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy.

[vbmoneyspender]

Now that I had come immediately under Hitler in my capacity as an army group commander, however, I was to get my first real experience of him in his exercise of the supreme command.

When considering Hitler in the role of a military leader, one should certainly not dismiss him with such cliches as 'the lance-corporal of World War I'.

He undoubtedly had a certain eye for operational openings, as had been shown by the way he opted for Army Group A's plan in the west. Indeed, this is often to be found in military amateurs, otherwise his5tory would not have recorded so many dukes and princes as successful commanders.

Yet his belief in his own superiorty in this respect ultimately had disastrous consequences. His interference prevented the smooth and timely development of the Luftwaffe, and it was undoubtedly he who hampered the development of rocket propulsion and atomic weapons.

Morevoer, Hitler's interest in everything technical led him to overestimate the importance of his technical resources. As a result, he would count on a mere handful of assault-gun detachments or the new Tiger tanks to restore situations where only large bodies of troops could have any prospect of success.

What he lacked, broadly speaking, was simply 'military ability based on experience' - something for which his 'intuition' was no substitute.

As in the political sphere (at all events after his successes of 1938), so in the military did Hitler lack all sense of judgement regarding what could be achieved and what could not. Lost Victories - Erich von Manstein, p. 274-75 (1982 ed.) I am not sure what source materials you have been reading, but Hitler clearly was a military if for no other reason that literally took over command supreme command of the OKW.

[vbmoneyspender]

[Hitler] wanted to be another Napoleon, who had only tolerated men under him who would obediently carry out his will. Unfortunately, [Hitler] had neither Napoleon's military training nor his military genius.

I have already shown in the chapter dealing with the plan for the invasion of Britain that Hitler had so organized the Supreme Command that no one was vested with the authority to advise him on grand strategy or to draft a war plan. The Operations Staff (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab) of O.K.W., which was theoretically qualified to discharge such a task, in practice merely played the role of a military secretariat. Its only 'raison d'etre' was to translate Hitler's ideas and instructions into the terminology of military orders.

But there was even worse to come. Hitler's designation of Norway as an 'O.K.W.' theatre of operations in which O.K.H. had no authority was only the first step in the disruption of land operations. In due course all the other theatres were gradually turned over to O.K.W.. Finally, only the Eastern one remained as an O.K.H. responsibility, and eve then it had Hitler at its head. Hence, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army was left with just as little influence on the other theatres of war as were the Commanders-in-Chief of the two other services in matters of grand strategy. [The Chief-of-Staff of the Army] had no say whatever in the overall distribution of the army's forces and often did not even know for certain what troops and materials were being sent to the various theatres.

In the circumstances, it was inevitable that the O.K.W. Operations Staff and the General Staff of the army should clash. Indeed, Hitler probably created clashes deliberately in order that he alone should at all times have the decisive say. Naturally, such faulty organization of the supreme military leadership was bound to contribute decisively to its breakdown. Another consequence of Hitler's over-estimation of his will-power and military ability was that he attempted more and more to interfere by seaprate orders of his own in the running of subordinate formations.

Hitler . . . thought he could see things much better from behind his desk than the commanders at the front. He ignored the fact that much of what was marked on his far-too-detailed situation maps were obviously out of date. From that distance, morever, he could not possibly judge what was the proper and necessary action to take on the spot.

[Nevertheless, h]e had grown increasinly accustomed to interfering in the running of the army groups, armies and lower formations by issuing special orders which were not his concern at all. . . . His mistrust of his subordinate commanders prevented him from giving them, in the form of long-term directives, freedom of action, which they might put to a use that was not to his liking. The effect of this, however, was to do away with the very essence of leadership. In the long run even an army group could not get along without directives from the Supreme Command - certainly not when it formed part of a larger front and was bound to its neighbours on either flank.

Lost Victories - Erich von Manstein, p. 283-84 (1982 ed.) I

[Jeff Chandler]

Please allow me to clarify. When I said that Hitler was no military commander at all, I didn't mean he didn't run the show. I meant that he was not at all an effective commander, the fact of which is suported by your documents.

Hitler was a master politician whose singular talent was acquiring and maintaining power to himself through personal charisma, political intrique, manipulation of the masses, and brutal thuggary. Doesn't that sound like someone we know?