[Az Joe]

Criminal intent nullifies any presidential immunity. I’m not waiting for anything. It’s in the SCOTUS case I referenced, those words and intent. They wrote and decided that. Your argument is with SCOTUS, not me.

[Bruce Campbells Chin]

Well, think what you want about that case. You are misreading it and don't understand what is precluded by immunity.

Have a nice day.

[woodpusher]

[Az Joe at #12] Obama doesn’t have presidential immunity in this case because he had criminal intent which nullifies any immunity. (See SCOTUS, Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).)

[Az Joe at #23] Criminal intent nullifies any presidential immunity. I’m not waiting for anything. It’s in the SCOTUS case I referenced, those words and intent. They wrote and decided that.

After careful review, I find that neither the term criminal intent, nor the word intent, appear anywhere in the Opinion of the Court. Intent is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.

As for the holding of the Court, the Syllabus encapsulates the holding on presidential immunity.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/603us1r57_6k47.pdf

Trump v United States, 603 US 593 (2024)

Syllabus at 596:

(1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and statu­tory authority,” he takes offcial action to perform the functions of his offce. Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757. Determining whether an action is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President's author­ity to take that action. But the breadth of the President's “discretion­ary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States frequently makes it “diffcult to determine which of [his] innu­merable `functions' encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. The immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe­rimeter” of the President's offcial responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC).

In dividing offcial from unoffcial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of offcial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unoffcial merely be­cause it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. Otherwise, Presi­dents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was un­lawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect. Ibid. Pp. 617–619.

In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor railed against the holding of the Court as follows:

At 659:

The Court now confronts a question it has never had to answer in the Nation's history: Whether a former President enjoys immunity from federal criminal prosecution. The majority thinks he should, and so it invents an atextual, ahis­torical, and unjustifable immunity that puts the President above the law.

[...]

Whether described as presumptive or absolute, under the majority's rule, a President's use of any offcial power for any purpose, even the most corrupt, is immune from prosecution. That is just as bad as it sounds, and it is baseless. Finally, the majority declares that evidence concerning acts for which the President is immune can play no role in any crimi­nal prosecution against him. See ante, at 630–632. That holding, which will prevent the Government from using a President's offcial acts to prove knowledge or intent in prosecuting private offenses, is nonsensical.

At 666:

In sum, the majority today endorses an expansive vision of Presidential immunity that was never recognized by the Founders, any sitting President, the Executive Branch, or even President Trump's lawyers, until now. Settled understandings of the Constitution are of little use to the majority in this case, and so it ignores them.

IV

A

Setting aside this evidence, the majority announces that former Presidents are “absolute[ly],” ante, at 615, or “at least . . . presumptive[ly],” immune from criminal prosecution for all of their offcial acts, ante, at 614 (emphasis omitted). The majority purports to keep us in suspense as to whether this immunity is absolute or presumptive, but it quickly gives up the game. It explains that, “[a]t a minimum, the President must . . . be immune from prosecution for an offcial act un­less the Government can show that applying a criminal pro­hibition to that act would pose ‘no dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.’” Ante, at 615 (emphasis added). No dangers, none at all. It is hard to imagine a criminal prosecution for a President's offcial acts that would pose no dangers of intrusion on Presi­dential authority in the majority's eyes.