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“Born in the allegiance” of what parent(s)?

A pathetically desperate grope.

One is born in the allegiace of a sovereign, not in the allegiance of one's parents.

First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502, paragraph 40, footnotes omitted:

“Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.” “There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11.”

In Wong Kim Ark, Brief on Behalf of the losing Appellant [United States], page 22-23, the losing side argued:

“Subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is the language of the Constitution, and it is the most significant provision of the definition of citizenship there contained. Who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States? Manifestly not those who are subject to the jurisdiction of any other nation, or who owe allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty. Such is the contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution’s definition by the very Congress that framed it, as is evidenced by what is now section 1902 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. It is there enacted: “All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.” Clearly, then, it was never intended that children born in the United States of alien parents should be considered citizens.
Such children at the moment of birth would be subject to a “foreign power,” to wit, the country of the parent, for it is a principle of international law, and recognized by the United States (sec. 1993, Rev. Stat. U. S.), that the children born abroad of citizens or subjects are citizens or subjects of the country of the parent. So, in respect to this case, it is the law of the Chinese Empire that the children of subjects when born abroad are subjects of the Emperor, Therefore, when Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco of Chinese parents there domiciled he at the moment of birth became a subject of the Emperor of China, and for that reason could not have been born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

At page 24, the losing Brief argues,

It is true, he was born in the United States; but he was not at the time of his birth, and certainly at no time afterwards, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof;” we mean, of course, the political jurisdiction of the nation; not the territorial jurisdiction, or which is the same thing, the jurisdiction, or more accurately, the operation of the laws. All the authorities agree that the provision of the Constitution's definition, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” has reference to the political jurisdiction of the United States in its international relation of a sovereign nation, and not to the operation of the laws. In other words, the sovereignty of the United States is of a dual nature—internal and external. The jurisdiction of the law pertains to the former; and the political power of the nation to the latter. All persons born in the United States and subject to the political power thereof are citizens—natural born citizens; it follows that persons born in the United States of aliens are not citizens.

At page 35, the losing side added,

It is said in the district court’s opinion that—
The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory.
* * *

Here is a more complete version of that quote from the district court:

The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority.

The inconvenient existing and controlling judicial authority came from the Circuit Court for the 9th Circuit.

The existing judicial authority was from In re Look Tin Sing, Circuit Court, California, 21 Fed R 905 (1884), Opinion of the Court by U.S. Supreme Court Justice (1863-1887) Stephen Field, sitting as a Circuit Court justice.

At 21 Fed R 906:

The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside.” This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents.

At 21 Fed R 908-909:

With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” it is evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship, and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.

The Supreme Court rejected the pig slop that was offered up and ruled the direct opposite, affirming the District Court which had ruled according to the existing binding precedent set in the Circuit Court, extending that binding precedent to all state and Federal courts. That was in the 19th century. It is binding precedent today.

Ludlam v. Ludlam, 84 Am. Dec. 193, 26 New York 356 (1863), first Headnote at 193,

Common Law at Time of Adoption of Federal Constitution Determines Question of Citizenship, in the absence of any other law upon the subject.

Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383 at 384 (1858) headnote states,

“A child born in this state of alien parents, during its mother’s temporary sojourn here, is a native born citizen.”

At 400-401, Opinion of the Court

It is further contended, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff himself is an alien. He was born in Ballston Spa, in this state, while his father was a resident of Canada, and returned to his father's domicil, with his mother, within a year after his birth. His mother was temporarily there—without any actual change of residence, either on her part or that of his father. It is argued that, at common law, a natural born subject was one whose birth was within the allegiance of the king. (Bac. Ab. tit. Alien, A. Com. Dig. A. and B. 7 to 18. Bl. Com: 336, 74.) The cases of children of ambassadors, born abroad, and of children born on English seas were considered exceptions. Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, defines a native born citizen to be- a person born within, and an alien one born out of, the jurisdiction of the United States. (2 Kent's Com. 37—50.) In Lynch v. Clarke, (1 Sand. Ch. B. 583,) the question was precisely as here, whether a child born in the city of New York of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn there, was a native born citizen or an alien; and the conclusion was, that being born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States, he was a native born citizen, whatever was the situation of the parents at the time of the birth.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1898)

In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."

The point about parents was argued to the U.S. Sureme Court and thereupon rejected.