Does it say it was a fake, ginned up drama to create a political win for the Republicans?
Yes, Dred Scott was owned by a Republican representative in Massachusetts, one of the most trouble stirring states in the history of the nation. It's those d@mn Puritans and their need to impose *THEIR* morality on everyone else.
The Dred Scott incident was fabricated just to stir up trouble.
Taney was a Democrat. He had been against slavery when young, and came to support it as he grew older. The case was promoted by Taney and others. The purpose was to put an end to the "slavery question" once and for all, by having the Supreme Court give a definitive ruling, thus saving the Union.
The effect was the opposite of what was intended.
It shows the problems of many grand conspiracies: It is nearly impossible to determine the long term effects of political actions.
After the fact, people propose theories to shoehorn the observed facts into their ideology.
[Mark Twain] To understand what was going on in the Dred Scott decision, I highly recommend "Dred Scott, The Inside story" by David T. Hardy. Here is a link to a review I wrote about it.[DiogenesLamp] Yes, Dred Scott was owned by a Republican representative in Massachusetts, one of the most trouble stirring states in the history of the nation.
To understand what was going on in the Dred Scott decision or judgment, one MUST read the MANDATE of the Court which expresses the Decision of the Court as opposed to the opinions of the justices, or at least read Taney's opinion to its end.
This explains the failure to understand that the decision of the Court was to find that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, and therefore the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court, with instructions for that Court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Conclusion of Dred Scott opinion by Taney:
Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court, that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The MANDATE is an official mode of communicating the judgment of the appellate court to the lower court.
As the mandate issued to the Circuit Court in the case of Scott v. Sandford shows, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and remanded the case to that court with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
Missouri, C.C.U.S.No. 7
Dred Scott, Ptff. in Er.
vs.
John F.A. SandfordFiled 30th December 1854.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
March 6th, 1857. —
- - - - - - - - - -
No. 7
Ptff. in Er.
Dred Scott
vs.
John F.A. SandfordIn error to the Circuit Court of the United Stated for the District of Missouri.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed for the want of jurisdiction in that court and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court with directions to dismiss the case for the want of jurisdiction in that court. —
Ch. Jus. Taney
6th March 1857
Writing the Opinion of the Court was originally assigned to Justice Nelson of New York. Nelson's opinion was short and reads like an opinion of the court. Nine opinions were filed. Justice Curtis wrote a very lengthy opinion and leaked it to the press and had it published before any official opinion had been published. Taney reassigned writing the Opinion of the Court to himself, and he wrote a long opinion, mostly a response to the even longer opinion of Curtis. No point of law raised by Taney was an opinion of the Court unless it gathered the support of five of the nine justices. Very little was agreed to by five justices. Almost all of the subsequent controversy was over dicta of CJ Taney, not an opinion or holding of the Court.
Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, Its Significance in American Law and Politics, 2001, p. 324, provides a box score of results as follows:
1. Four justices held that the plea in abatement was properly before the Court (Taney, Wayne, Daniel, and Curtis).2. Three justices held that a Negro could not be a citizen of the United States (Taney, Wayne, and Daniel).
3. Six justices held that the Missouri Compromise restriction was invalid (Taney, Wayne, Grier, Daniel, Campbell, and Catron).
4. Seven justices held that the laws of Missouri determined Scott's status as a slave after his return to that state from Illinois (Taney, Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Daniel, Campbell,, and Catron).
5. Seven justices held that Scott was still a slave, though there were differences of what the final judgment of the Court should be (same as in number 4).
Only a majority of justices form an Opinion of the Court. There was neither a holding of the Court that a Negro could not be a citizen, nor a holding of the Court that the plea in abatement was properly before the Court. As these were never adopted as Opinions of the Court, discussing them as such is fantasy land. That Taney’s opinion was captioned Opinion of the Court does not make everything in it an opinion of the Court.
In Scott v. Sandford, counsel for both parties jointly filed an agreed statement of facts to include the following:
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves.At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.
The widow Emerson was the Defendant in the Missouri case which held that Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri. The case dragged on for about ten years.
Dr. Emerson died on December 29, 1843. The Scotts filed a petition for their freedom in the St. Louis Circuit Court on April 6, 1846, naming the widow Emerson as their owner and defendant.
Unless the corpse of Dr. Emerson did the alleged selling, the selling had to take place not later than December 29, 1843. But the case of Scott v. Emerson established the widow Emerson as the owner of Scott in 1846. The widow Emerson was known to have been renting out Dred Scott during this time, after her husband's death. Dred Scott went with Dr. Emerson to Illinois and returned to Missouri, but there is no evidence Dred Scott ever set foot in New York.
The McArthur DEMOCRAT, Vinton Ohio, 26 March 1857, PAGE 2
Dred Scott Owned by a Republican Member of CongressFrom the following article, which we copy from the Springfield Argus, it appears that Dred Scott and his family become by, the recent decision of the Supreme Court, the property of the wife of Dr. Chaffee, the Republican member of Congress from Springfield (Mass.) District:
It may perhaps astonish some of our rabid Fremonters, to know that the late decision in the Supreme Court, remanding to slavery Dred Scott and his family, declaring the unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, and establishing the right of slaveholders to carry their chattels into Northern States without affecting their security in them, was obtained in behalf of the family of our present honorable member of Congress. The facts are simply these:— Some years since, Dr. Chaffee, then a widower, married the widow of Dr. Emerson, of Misiouri, who had died, leaving to his wife and only daughter a considerable slave property. Among these slaves were Dred Scott and his family; and as Dr. Emerson, in the performance of his duties as a surgeon in the United States Army, had carried this family into Illinois, they, on his death, claimed their freedom, and brought a suit to enforce it. This suit, thus brought, was defended by the administrator of the estate on behalf and with the consent of the wife of Dr. Chaffee and her daughter, who were the heirs at law. The decison of the Bench that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the United States, and could not sue in the U.S. Court, has remanded him and his famlily to the chattlehood of Mrs. Chaffee. What does the Doctor propose to do with the interesting property? Does he consent to the prosecution, and under cover of his wife's crinoline, propose to keep good friends with the Black-Republicans, by saying that has nothing to do with her estate, and at the same time enjoying with her the benefit of that estate, which does not stop with unfortunate Dred and his family? These questions are open, and naturally suggest themselves to use, as they doubtless will to all who know the facts.
The widow Emerson married Dr. Calvin Chaffee in 1850, before he had entered politics. Pursuant to the law of femes covert, married women could not own property, something the Springfield Argus overlooked. Upon marriage the husband and wife were legally considered to be one, and effectively, for legal purposes, that one was the husband. And thus Dr. Chaffee became the owner of Dred Scott, and the rest of the Scott family, in 1850; and it was Dr. Chaffee who executed the quitclaim deed.
Of course, had Dr. John Emerson sold Scott to Sanford prior to his death, ownership would not have passed to Chaffee. But then Chaffee could not have legally executed the quitclaim deed.
The time between when Sanford died in an insane asylum and when Chaffee executed the quitclaim deed was too short to allow for Sanford's will to have been probated.
Moreover, during the time when the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford was proceeding, he was held in custody of a sheriff who rented him out, with the wages earned going into an escrow account pending the final decision. His wages amounted to about $750. Irene Emerson Chaffee claimed the wages.
26 Saint Louis Circuit Court Record 267Wednesday May 27th 1857
Dred Scott.
vs. )
Irene Emerson. )On motion of defendants attorney it is ordered that the Sheriff of St. Louis County do render his account to the court of the wages that have come to his hands of the earnings of the above named plaintiff and that the said sheriff do pay to the defendant all such wages that now remain in his hands, excepting all commissions and expenses to which the said Sheriff may be legally entitled.
Note how the petition refers to the defendant (Irene Emerson) and so artfully avoids any inclusion of the name Chaffee in the claim of wages. This was done the day after the quitclaim deed was executed by Dr. Chaffee.
Only if Dr. Emerson sold Dred Scott to John Sanford before he died in 1843 did Sanford ever obtain ownership as claimed. If Sanford obtained ownership in 1843 or before, neither the widow Emerson nor her second husband Chaffee ever obtained ownership.
The appellate courts do not rule on the facts of a case. The facts are determined at the trial court level. The appellate courts determine if the correct law was properly applied. The lower court in the sham case accepted a false agreed statement of facts. The two sides were really one, working together to concoct a case.
The case that went to Scotus began in 1854. Federal jurisdiction in Scott v. Sandford was based upon a specious claim of diversity of state citizenship, falsely claiming Scott was a citizen of Missouri, and falsely claiming Sanford of New York was the owner of Scott pursuant to a fictitious sale of Scott which could not have taken place later than 1843.
They could not name a married woman as the owner because married women could not own property. They sure did not want to name her husband, the Republican Abolitionist Congressman from Massachusetts as the owner. They could not name any citizen of Missouri as the owner, or there would be no diversity of state citizenship. And so they made up a fictitious sale and a fictitious strawman owner from a state other than Missouri.
The Courts, all the way through Scotus, made no mention of Calvin Chaffee as owner. There was an agreed statement of facts, accepted by the lower court, that John Sanford of New York was the owner. The two parties conspired together to frame and bring the case, and neither side questioned the statement which they jointly stipulated as facts.
Letter of Calvin Chaffee to Montgomery Blair, April 1, 1857, Blair Family Papers, Dred Scott Folder, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress
CONFIDENTIALSince the decision of the case Dred Scott vs. J.F.A. Sandford has so profoundly stirred the public mind and some of the pro slavery newspapers have attributed to me an interest in the persons claimed as slaves, my wife, as the widow of the last doct. Emerson, and the sole legatee of the will, desires to know whether she has the legal power and right to emancipate the Dred Scott family ...
If she has this right [illlegible] if you [illegible: would forward?] the necessary papers, she will cheerfully execute them.
Had Dr. Emerson sold Scott to Sanford as claimed, the fact of the widow Emerson being the sole legatee of his will would make no difference. It would only matter had Dr. Emerson died as owner of Dred Scott.
Mrs. Emerson Chaffee could not emancipate Scott or execute a quitclaim deed for Scott. Neither could Calvin Chaffee emancipate Scott. It had to be done in Missouri, by a citizen of Missouri. And so the quitclaim deed was executed by the Republican Abolitionist Massachusetts Congressman Calvin Chaffee in favor of Taylor Blow, a citizen of Missouri.
After the quitclaim deed was executed, Dr. Chaffee wrote to his St. Louis attorney Roswell Field on May 14, 1857, "I desire now, in conclusion of the case, to be privately informed of the act of emancipation, but there should be no publicity given the subject beyond strict legal necessity."
Dr. Chaffee tried to run for reelection in 1858, but he failed to win the Republican nomination. His explanations offered to the Argus had met with refutation and ridicule.
Taylor Blow, born near Huntsville, Alabama, March 26, 1820, (not to be confused with his elder brother Henry Taylor Blow born 1817), was the son of Peter Blow and Elizabeth Blow, nee Taylor, and the brother of Peter Ethelred Blow (b. 1811). Travel documents reflected the first name of Dred Scott was Etheldred. As the child of the then owner of Dred Scott, Taylor Blow grew up with Dred Scott and they played together as young children. The quitclaim deed of Republican Abolitionist Congressman Chaffee from Massachusetts named Taylor Blow as the receiving owner.
Both sides of the concocted case conspired to present false claimed facts to the Court to establish a phony claim of jurisdiction. As the two sides were working together, there was no actual controversy between the parties. John Sanford was falsely claimed as the owner of Dred Scott to establish a false claim of jurisdiction, and to hide the actual ownership (Calvin Chaffee of Massachusetts would have worked fine to establish an owner not a citizen of Missouri). A fraudulent statement of facts could be grounds to dismiss the case and sanction the attorneys.
Calvin Chaffee promoting the case as the abolitionist owner of Dred Scott makes a difference as the named defendant was only used to effect a false claim of federal jurisdiction, and had Representative Chaffee been named as the defendant owner, it would have been viewed very differently. In response to the claim that no Republican ever owned a slave, ownership by Republican Representative Calvin Chaffee of the most famous slave in American history seems a clear refutation. Chaffee owned the entire Scott family for about seven years. He could have effected Scott's emancipation in 1850 as easily as 1857.
In the decision of the case itself, the Supreme Court decided that the lower court had lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Scott was not a citizen of Missouri and, therefore, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The mandate was issued to remand the case to the lower court with instructions to that court to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
It comes as a surprise to many that the actual judgment in Scott was to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Missouri had found that Scott was not a citizen of that state. In interpreting state law, the highest court of the state is the ultimate authority. That Missouri finding was binding on the Supreme Court. As Scott was found not to be a citizen of Missouri, Scott's claim of jurisdiction based on his claimed Missouri state citizenship, failed. There was no showing of the requisite diversity of state citizenship between the named parties.
As for the burning question of why slaves could not become citizens, they had a problem which essentially aligns with illegal aliens today. To be eligible for naturalization, one must be an alien, lawfully present in the United States. The ilegal alien of today has a problem becoming lawfully present in the United States. Twenty years of being unlawfully present does not make one lawfully present. The slave could be manumitted, set free, by his owner pursuant to State law. Freedom did not make one a citizen. Slaves were typically born in the United States, or had no birth record. The freedman was not an alien, but neither was he a citizen. Thus, the Constitution was amended to confer citizenship where the statute law did not.
CJ Taney was correct on the law and was never judicially overturned on this point. The amending of the constitution overturned the statute law.