[snip] ...Whilst a few passages do imply literal shoving withshields (Thuc. 4. 96. 2; Xen, Cyr. 7. 1 334), they do not suggest that therear ranks were pushing those in front of them forward, but that individuals in the front ranks were using their shields to buffet and try to unbalance individual enemies. However, support for the traditional view has continued to be passionate. In a reply to the most recent advocate of the orthodox view, Krentz commented: to the best of my knowledge I have not convinced anyone.
Yet, the advocates of massed shoving have failed to demolish these objections to their theory. The proponents of a series of loose-formation duels have also been unable to prove their case. An alternative model for the nature of hoplite battle is required. One of the most pressing needs is to explain the role of the rear ranks and the reason why deep phalanxes were so often successful. I believe that the key to the problem is to explore two factors, both of which have been largely ignored in the past. The first of these is the practical difficulty of moving large numbers of men as a group across even the flattest battlefield. The second factor is even more vital to understanding any type of battle, namely the morale of the participants. Too often in the past morale has been relegated to a minor role in hoplite battle. Even Hanson, who gives far greater attention to morale than any previous study, often fails to carry arguments to their logical conclusion. This is not a fault unique to those studying Greek warfare, but common to much of military history. By re-examining the primary accounts in the context of these factors I hope to present a more convincing picture of hoplite battle, and to demonstrate that these encounters did not involve massed shoving.
Before moving on to discuss these points, it is worth noting that it cannot be argued that close combat was a matter of massed shoving in any other period of military history, including those when armies were equipped solely with edged weapons. Indeed, when men became closely packed together, it was usually a sign that things had gone badly wrong and resulted in especially high casualties. [/snip]The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle | Adrian K. Goldsworthy | 7/27/2019
People wonder. But we live in an age where we have a few artifacts, sparse records, and ample supplies of people with free time, interest, and theories.
Why not put them to work in conducting exercises. Kit a few thousand able bodies and put the academics’ theories to the test. No killing and no blood drawn (if it can be helped) but formations could be organized and participants can have at it.
Find out what it takes to organize, train, and employ companies of slingers, cavalry, peltasts, and hoplites in field. And let the participants improvise using the tools and weapons we know they had at hand.
Steven Peessfield’s _The Gates of Fire_ would be a great primer to get people in the spirit.
I don’t know about the particulars of battle tactics, but I do know that Greek warfare was predicated on a relatively low population, which enhanced the value of the individual soldier and/or necessitated a far greater dependency on the individual solder, especially as opposed to larger empires who could conscript mass armies and not care about individual losses.