Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is continuing to struggle to consolidate support among Iranian youth ahead of the June 28 election. Pezeshkian promoted reformist ideals such as increased international engagement and freedom of thought during a meeting with Esfahan University students on June 19.[11] This meeting marked Pezeshkian’s second meeting with university students—a key voter demographic—since June 16.[12] Pezeshkian called on Iranian students to vote in the upcoming election, warning that boycotting the election could lead to greater restrictions and repression.[13] A Esfahan University student accused Pezeshkian of participating in the election to increase voter turnout and claimed that 90 percent of Iranian youth intend to boycott the election.[14] The student added that many Iranian youth do not care who becomes president because they oppose the regime as a whole.[15] Another Esfahan University student questioned Pezeshkian’s ability to challenge mandatory hijab enforcement.[16] These statements follow a similar statement by Sharif University students on June 16 that questioned the impact of the Iranian president on regime decision-making and called on Pezeshkian to withdraw from the election if he cannot guarantee meaningful change.[17]
Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that will install 1,400 new centrifuges at Fordow, which has the capacity to produce nearly 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium within one month of being installed. IAEA inspectors confirmed on June 19 that Iran plans to increase its uranium enrichment capacity at Fordow and Natanz.[43] Iran notified the IAEA early last week that it plans to install 1,400 IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within four weeks, according to the Washington Post. A US weapons expert noted on June 19 that the installation of 1,400 centrifuges would increase Fordow’s enrichment capacity by 360 percent. The weapons expert added that the centrifuges could produce approximately 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium (WGU)—enough WGU for five nuclear weapons—within one month of being installed. The Washington Post report comes after anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow.[44] The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to censure Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-19-2024
Iran and Hamas are continuing to coordinate politically to maintain alignment across the Axis of Resistance during the Israel-Hamas War. Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, on June 20.[6] Bagheri Kani emphasized that the Axis of Resistance should pursue alternative methods of “resistance” against Israel including through legal and political forums as well as public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the practice of advancing national goals and objectives through informing and influencing foreign publics.[7] Iran and Hamas have both used information operations to inform and influence foreign publics during the current war. Bagheri Kani appears to be continuing to pursue political coordination with Haniyeh in line with the precedent set by his predecessor, Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[8]
Bagheri Kani further encouraged members of the Axis of Resistance to use ”all capacities” to exact a heavier cost on Israel for its actions in the Israel-Hamas war.[9] Haniyeh stated the actions of the Axis of Resistance have made it impossible to return to a pre-October 7 world. Haniyeh said that Hamas ”welcomes any [ceasefire] that will meet the demands of the Palestinian people. Haniyeh presumably is referring to Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands that will leave Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip.[10]
Iran is holding its second televised presidential debate on June 20 with a focus on economics and judicial governance.[55] All six Guardian Council-approved presidential candidates, including five hardliners and one moderate, are participating in the debate. The candidates will provide potential solutions to the country's problems.[56] The Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) published a survey that illustrated 73% of those polled did not watch the first presidential debate on June 17.[57] The survey added that 35.9% of those polled do not follow the elections. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the first presidential debate failed to “sway the audience in any direction.”[58] The debate is still ongoing at the time of writing. CTP-ISW will provide complete analysis of the second televised debate in our June 21 update.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-20-2024