The Houthis conducted four attacks that caused physical damage to commercial vessels between June 9 and June 13, possibly indicating an increase in the effectiveness of Houthi attacks. A British maritime security firm said on June 14 that recent Houthi attacks on commercial vessels demonstrated a “significant increase in effectiveness” in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[11] CTP-ISW has observed that Houthi attacks have struck commercial vessels at a rate of about 0.4 impacts per week since the beginning of the Houthi attack campaign in November 2023. Separate Houthi attacks on two ships on June 9 caused fires aboard both vessels.[12] The Houthis then launched a remote-controlled, one-way attack naval surface drone targeting the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Tutor on June 12.[13] A British maritime security firm said that one crewmember died in the attack, marking the second crew fatality in the Houthi attack campaign.[14] The Houthis struck the Palauan-flagged, Ukranian-owned, Polish-operated M/V Verbena with ballistic missiles on June 13, causing the vessel to catch fire and the crew to abandon ship.[15]
Western and Houthi officials told the Wall Street Journal on June 16 that the Houthis used routes through Djibouti and Lebanon to import Iranian weapons and equipment and Chinese-manufactured weapons parts.[16] Anonymous Western and Houthi officials said that Iranian arms arrive in Djibouti and that unspecified actors transfer the weapons to civilian ships. The Houthis use an established corridor between Djibouti and Houthi-controlled ports along the Yemeni Red Sea coast to smuggle “illicit cargo.”[17] The officials also noted that the Houthis are using Lebanon as a base through which to purchase spare drone parts from China.[18] The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen found in two 2023 Panel of Experts reports that the Houthis smuggled weapons that were manufactured or partially manufactured in China.[19]
A hardline Iranian cleric and parliamentarian claimed on June 17 that unspecified hardline presidential candidates have agreed to withdraw from the election if they perform poorly in upcoming presidential debates.[26] Iran will hold five televised debates beginning on June 17.[27] Reza Taghavi claimed that four unspecified “trusted institutions” will rate the hardline candidates based on their performance in the debates and that “some candidates” have agreed to withdraw in support of the candidate with the best performance.[28]
Taghavi’s claim follows repeated statements from hardline officials calling on the hardline camp to reach a “consensus” ahead of the June 28 election.[29] These calls are driven by concerns that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-17-2024
Iranian presidential candidates discussed the economy in the first debate for the upcoming election.[1] The debate occurred on June 17. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (hardliner): Ghalibaf expressed openness to nuclear negotiations with the West in order to remove sanctions from the economy.[2] Ghalibaf suggested that a phased agreement could work to secure sanctions relief. Ghalibaf’s comments are consistent with reports from Iranian opposition outlets saying that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks. CTP-ISW noted at the time that the outreach is possibly meant to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if Ghalibaf becomes president.[3] Ghalibaf also lamented that economic agreements that Iran has signed with China and Russia have not yet been operationalized.[4] Ghalibaf separately identified inflation as one of the most pressing economic issues.
Saeed Jalili (hardliner). Jalili contrastingly downplayed the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West.[5] Jalili criticized past Iranian presidents, specifically Hassan Rouhani, for relying on international agreements to solve economic issues. Jalili instead promoted an agenda focused on autarkic policies and self-sufficiency. Jalili attributed issues, such as inflation and the struggling private sector, to resource mismanagement.
Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian advocated for expanding economic diplomacy with regional and extra-regional countries.[6] Pezeshkian asserted that Iran needs economic interaction with other countries in order to grow its economy. He specifically called for Iran to increase its exports and foreign investment. Pezeshkian separately stated that international sanctions have been a “disaster” for Iran, which is consistent with his historic support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[7]
Iran has begun running computer models that could support the research and development of nuclear weapons.[9] The purpose of the models is unclear. US and Israeli intelligence services have learned of the models and are investigating further, according to Axios.
The use of these models comes as Iran has expanded its nuclear program in recent months.[10] Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[11] The Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium separately increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[12] The expansion of the Iranian nuclear program is especially noteworthy given that senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly to pursue nuclear weapons in recent months.[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-18-2024