Iran Update, March 17, 2024
Nothing special
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2024
Iran Update, March 18, 2024
Local Syrian opposition media reported on March 18 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seeks to expand its military infrastructure at al Hamdan Airport in eastern Syria.[49] This reporting is consistent with Iran’s long-standing efforts to secure a permanent presence there. The IRGC has previously conducted training exercises at the airport.[50] The same Syrian opposition source claimed that the Lebanon-based construction company Jihad al Binaa will help the IRGC expand its operations at the airport.[51] Jihad al Binaa is a Lebanese Hezbollah-run and Iranian-funded construction company subject to secondary sanctions as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.[52] Iran uses military infrastructure in eastern Syria to secure a safe route through which it can facilitate Iranian weapons shipments to its proxies and partners in the region.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2024
Iran Update, March 19, 2024
Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call on March 19.[1] Raisi told Putin that Iran is “ready to maintain stability” and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.[2] Iran’s interests in the Caucasus include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from using Azerbaijan’s territory to operate against Iran, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority.[3] Russian readouts of Raisi and Putin’s phone call notably did not mention that the pair discussed the Caucasus.[4]
Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit the Russian focus on Ukraine to increase Western influence in the Caucasus. Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[5] Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt stretching from Istanbul to Xinjiang that would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”[6]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2024
The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[59] This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.[60] Houthi military spokesperson Yahye Saree said that the expanded operation would target all Israel-associated commercial vessels traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[61] The Houthi’s maximum weapon range is 2,200km, which encompasses only some parts of the shipping routes toward the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, suggesting that the supreme leader's statement is largely aspirational.[62] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50% since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[63] The Cape of Good Hope has seen a 74% increase in traffic compared to 2023 after Houthi attacks forced ships to re-route from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.[64] The Houthis have not conducted an attack outside the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the announcement on March 15. Iran did target a vessel 200km off the Indian coast in the Indian Ocean on December 23.[65]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government's shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech on March 20.[66] Khamenei announced “controlling inflation and” economic production as Iran's new year's slogan at the beginning of the last Persian calendar year in March 2023.[67] Khamenei stated on March 20, 2024 that the state of inflation and economic production in Iran is “relatively far from what we wanted.”[68] Khamenei said in a separate Nowruz message on March 20, 2024 that Iranians should not expect the regime to address “big issues” such as inflation and production growth “within a year.”[69] Khamenei also described the economy as Iran's “main weakness” and announced a new slogan, “a leap in [economic] production with [the] people's participation,” for the upcoming Persian calendar year.[70]
Iran's inflation rate is approximately 44 percent, according to Iranian media.[71] The actual inflation rate is likely higher given Iranian officials and media's tendency to fabricate economic statistics, however. Western and diaspora media recently reported that many Iranians refrained this year from buying goods that they normally would for Nowruz, such as new clothes and sweets, due to high prices.[72]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2024