An IRGC Quds Force-affiliated recruitment center in Deir ez Zor City is recruiting Syrians for counter-US operations in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) territory. This reporting supports CTP’s assessment that Iran may be preparing to direct proxy attacks against US forces in Syria.
CTP previously reported that Iranian and Russian military officials met to discuss expelling the United States from Syria, which may indicate Russia's intent to facilitate Iranian-backed attacks on US forces.[7] CTP is considering several hypotheses about how Russia would interact with an Iranian-backed campaign against US forces in Syria. The hypotheses are listed in order of least to greatest Russian involvement in the campaign. The list does not, however, cover all the potential avenues for Russo-Iranian cooperation against the United States in Syria.
1 Russia withholds support for Iranian-backed attacks on US forces. Russia would either play no role in an Iranian attack campaign or only conduct information operations to support Iran. The latter could include statements and media that frame the US military presence in Syria as permanent and expanding or condemn the presence of US forces in Syria. This is plausible given Russian information operations to date. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, for example, claimed that the United States would create a new Free Syrian Army in Raqqa Province on May 10.[8] Avoiding direct support for Iran while propagating information operations would present the least risk of escalation between the United States and Russia in Syria.
2 Iran and Russia coordinate on when and where Iranian-backed forces attack, but Russia does not directly support them. Iran and Russia agreed to establish a coordination center in Syria in November 2022 to coordinate efforts to attack Americans in eastern and northeastern Syria.[9] Russia could use such coordination mechanisms to ensure its forces are not collocated with Iranian forces or Iranian-backed militias. Keeping Russian forces out of a conflict between the United States and Iran would reduce the risk of a confrontation between the United States and Russia.
3 Iran and Russia share intelligence to support Iranian-backed attacks on US forces. Iran and Russia previously shared intelligence during the fight against ISIS in 2015, which demonstrates there is a precedent for intelligence sharing.[10] Jusoor Studies—a Syria-focused think tank based in Turkey—recirculated reports that Russia assisted Iran in targeting US forces by sharing intelligence during the most recent March 2023 escalation cycle.[11] CTP is unable to verify the claims Jusoor cites. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran would present a low risk of Russia getting involved in an escalation cycle while potentially making Iranian attacks more deadly for US forces.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-8-2023
Iran is establishing military storage facilities in eastern Syria, likely to facilitate Iranian weapons transfers and military entrenchment along a critical transportation route into the country. These construction projects are part of a larger Iranian effort to build military infrastructure throughout Deir ez Zor Province.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its quarterly safeguards, verification and monitoring reports on the Iranian nuclear program on June 8, detailing significant Iranian nuclear advancements. The IAEA reports furthermore demonstrate that Iran has not resolved any of the agency's inquiries into undeclared nuclear activities—contrary to recent Western media reports.
Iranian news outlets published the finalized version of the Judiciary's Chastity and Hijab Bill on June 8. This bill demonstrates the regime's uncompromising stance on women's rights issues and continued refusal to grant sociocultural concessions in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini movement.
The Biden administration revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, Russia, which underscores the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.[15] National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 9 that the drone factory—which the Wall Street Journal reported in February 2023 could produce at least 6,000 Iranian Shahed-136 drones—could be operational by early 2024.[16] Kirby previously announced on May 15 that Russia is seeking to purchase new drones from Iran after expending most of its Iranian drone supply.[17] A factory producing Iranian drones in Russia would support Russia's war effort against Ukraine. Russia could provide Iran with advanced military equipment that would help modernize Iran's armed forces, such as Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, and YAK-130 combat trainer aircraft, in return for helping construct the factory
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-9-2023