Iran Update, April 7, 2023
Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) have indicated that they seek to contain and deescalate their recent flareup with Israel—at least for the moment—after Hamas conducted a large-scale rocket attack from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Regime officials are trying to cohere Muslim countries together to condemn Israel for its recent arrests and raids around the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid—who has inspired weekly Friday anti-regime protests in Zahedan since September 2022—may be losing momentum.
Armenian media reported on April 7 that Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan will travel to Tehran on April 9 to meet with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Admiral Ali Shamkhani.
At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-7-2023
Palestinian militants expanded rocket attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights.
The IDF responded to the April 8 attacks by striking Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southwest Syria.
Iran may view the Palestinian attacks into Israel as an opportunity to redouble its efforts to transfer air defense and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) into Syria.
CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran has facilitated the rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in part to distract Israel from the transfer of Iranian air defense and PGM systems into Syria.
Iranian officials participated in a series of diplomatic engagements between April 7 and 9 to preserve Iranian strategic interests in the Caucasus. The regime's interests in this region include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from operating against Iran from Azerbaijan, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran's Azeri minority. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani discussed the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) in separate meetings with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin in Tehran on April 9.[30] The INSTC is a land route through the Caucasus which enables Iran to export products to Russia and Europe. Shamkhani may have discussed the INSTC with Grigoryan and Levitin in the context of Azerbaijani efforts to link mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region—an Azerbaijani exclave in western Armenia.[31] Connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region to mainland Azerbaijan would cut off Iran from an overland route in the Caucasus.[32] The regime regards territorial changes in the Caucasus as a threat to Iran's internal security, likely fearing that territorial changes could precipitate calls for separatism among Iran's large Azeri minority in northwestern Iran.[33] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately held two phone calls with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on April 7 and 8.[34] Iranian state media reported that Abdollahian and Bayramov discussed “misunderstandings” between Iran and Azerbaijan, likely referring to the regime's disapproval of growing Azerbaijani-Israeli ties.[35] Regime officials have strongly criticized Azerbaijan's decision to open an embassy in Israel in recent days.[36] The regime has additionally repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use its territory as a base to organize and launch operations against Iran, as CTP previously reported.[37]
The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the recent Israeli raids on al Aqsa Mosque to politically unite Muslim countries against Israel and prevent further expansion of the Abraham Accords.
Protest activity increased sharply on April 9 in response to deteriorating economic conditions and recent student poisonings.
At least five protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on April 8, 18 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9, and one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 10.
Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Ahmad Reza Radan announced that the LEC will begin using advanced surveillance capabilities to widely enforce mandatory veiling in public spaces on April 15.
The Iranian rial remained relatively stable between April 7 and April 10, depreciating from 505,500 rials to one US dollar on April 7 to 506,000 rials to one US dollar on April 10.
IRGC-affiliated media circulated reports of cabinet reshuffles within the Raisi administration's economic team.
Iranian and Saudi officials continued to discuss reestablishing diplomatic relations on April 10.
IRGC Ground Force (GF) Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization Head Ali Kouhestani announced on April 9 that the IRGC-GF had successfully tested the new Meraj-532 kamikaze drone.
Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor province, Syria on April 10.
Iranian-backed militants deployed to Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province on April 10.
more:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-10-2023