Iran Update Special Report, August 5, 2026
The factional nature of Iranian decisionmaking is likely slowing Tehran’s approval of the draft Iran-Oman agreement covering vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. There are conflicting reports of whether the regime has finalized the draft agreement. Axios reported on August 4 that Iran's leadership approved the agreement.[1] Two unspecified regional officials told the Associated Press on August 5, however, that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had not approved the agreement.[2] This round of negotiations — like the others before it — has reportedly taken place without the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[3] A faction of anti-concessions Iranian leaders, likely from the IRGC and led by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, are close to the supreme leader and have consistently won policy arguments since the war began. One of the few times the IRGC did not win this argument was when Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian successfully convinced the supreme leader to accept the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June by offering his resignation as president. The repeated insistence of Iranian officials that the Iran-Oman talks only cover technical transit arrangements further indicates that the regime has not yet reached consensus on the agreement.[4]
This lack of consensus on the agreement likely reflects the regime's internal divisions over negotiations.[5] ISW-CTP assessed on July 28 that three groups are competing to shape Iran's negotiations policy: an anti-concessions faction likely led by Vahidi that supports talks but rejects any agreement that limits Iranian control over the strait; a pro-concessions faction that includes Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and is more willing to compromise to reduce economic pressure; and the ultra-hardline Paydari (Stability) Front, which opposes negotiations with the United States altogether.[6] All these factions agree that Iran must maintain a certain level of control over the strait; their differences are related to tactics, not strategic objectives.
The emerging Iran-Oman arrangement will reportedly give Iran a greater role in controlling traffic through the strait than Iran had before the war. Axios reported on August 4 that the agreement stipulates that inbound vessels will travel through Iranian waters, while outbound vessels will use a route through Omani waters “in coordination with Iran” for sixty days while mines are cleared from the recognized transit scheme.[7] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi described a broader Iranian role on August 5, however.[8] Gharibabadi stated that vessels would also travel through Iranian waters during part of their outbound passage before continuing through Omani waters.[9] Gharibabadi added that the new arrangement would replace both existing temporary routes, referring to the US-facilitated southern route through Omani waters and the route through Iranian waters that Iran has coerced vessels by force to use in recent months.[10] Gharibabadi’s description therefore suggests that Iran is seeking more direct control over outbound traffic than what Axios described on August 4.[11] A regional source told Reuters on August 5 that the unspecified ”parties” had already accepted some form of Iranian control over the strait but did not provide further detail.[12] Iran is likely seeking to convert the temporary leverage it gained by disrupting maritime traffic into a lasting role in managing the waterway, which would allow the Iranian regime to monitor vessel traffic, pressure adversaries, and threaten renewed disruption of the strait during future crises. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iranian control of the strait is detrimental to global commercial interests because it enables Iran to selectively determine which vessels may pass through the strait and at what cost.[13]
Iran is likely linking any lifting of restrictions on traffic through the strait to both US economic and strait-related concessions. Lifting restrictions on the strait without US concessions would weaken Iran's bargaining position in negotiations while leaving the US blockade, sanctions, and other economic pressure in place. Unidentified Iranian sources told Iranian media on August 5 that Iran would not reopen the strait unless the United States ended its attacks on Iran, addressed the alleged US MoU “violations,” met Iran's conditions, and provided guarantees that the United States military would not attack Iran.[14] Iran notably viewed any strait transit that crossed without its approval as a violation of the MoU, which suggests that Iran is seeking even more significant strait-related concessions. Iran likely calculates that restoring normal traffic through the strait before securing economic benefits and its concessions to its control of the strait would reduce the costs that the conflict imposes on the United States and regional states and thus weaken the US incentive to make concessions. The Financial Times reported on August 4 that the United States would lift its naval blockade and ease restrictions on Iranian oil exports if Iran agreed to reopen the strait, according to a person briefed on the recent talks.[15] Axios also reported on August 4 that the temporary Iran-Oman arrangement concerning the strait could facilitate renewed ceasefire and nuclear negotiations.[16] The regime likely views the strait agreement as an initial step as part of a broader and more comprehensive agreement related to the strait and will not give up substantive leverage without a broader agreement.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued an evacuation order ahead of conducting airstrikes in Mansouri, Tyre District, on August 5, after announcing that Hezbollah violated the ceasefire.[17] The IDF has not issued evacuation orders ahead of strikes in southern Lebanon since July 11.[18] The IDF did not provide details of the reported Hezbollah ceasefire violation.[19] Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese media reported on August 5 that an improvised explosive device killed two IDF soldiers operating in Majdal Zoun, Tyre District, which neighbors Mansouri, however.[20] Hezbollah has not claimed this attack at the time of this writing.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s anti-corruption and militia disarmament efforts are reportedly deepening divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework. An Iraqi political source told Saudi media on August 5 that unspecified Iraqi officials who initially supported Zaydi’s disarmament and anti-corruption initiatives have “begun to back down” in recent weeks.[21] The source claimed that some framework leaders have withdrawn support for Zaydi’s efforts out of concern that Iraqi authorities will investigate and hold their own political networks and associates accountable.[22] Unidentified framework leaders also reportedly refused Zaydi’s request to arrest senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders as part of the campaign.[23] ISW-CTP previously assessed on July 8 that some framework members may be attempting to limit the scope of Zaydi’s anti-corruption campaign by making “settlements” with individuals accused of corruption and manipulating prosecution procedures.[24] Iraqi authorities have primarily arrested Sunnis and allies of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani during the campaign as of the time of this writing.[25] The Iraqi political source claimed that some framework members have begun to assert conditions and reservations concerning their militias’ disarmament amid regional tensions and claimed threats to Iraqi internal security.[26] Multiple Iraqi militias, including groups closest ideologically to Iran and most kinetically active in recent months, have continued to refuse to disarm.[27] Unspecified Iraqi militias are also attempting to circumvent the disarmament process, including by handing over “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones.[28]
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein discussed prospects to develop a pipeline that would link Iraq with the Red Sea during meetings with Egyptian and Jordanian leaders in Amman, Jordan, on August 5.[29] Hussein held separate meetings with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, in which the ministers discussed the possibility of developing a planned oil pipeline that would extend from Basra to the Jordanian Red Sea port of Aqaba.[30] Iraq and Jordan began planning the Basra-Aqaba Pipeline in 2013 but never completed the project.[31] Iraq, the United States, and regional partners have discussed proposals in recent weeks to develop alternative routes to the Strait of Hormuz for Iraqi oil exports, amid Iranian efforts to control traffic in the Strait and the Persian Gulf.[32] A US State Department official told Reuters on July 14 that the United States supports joint Iraqi-Syrian efforts to redevelop and operate the defunct Kirkuk-Baniyas Pipeline between northern Iraq and Syria's Mediterranean coast, for example.[33] Gulf and regional states have increasingly relied on alternative energy export corridors toward the Red and Mediterranean Seas during the war in order to circumvent Iran's controls on maritime traffic. Saudi Arabia in particular has depended on its Red Sea port at Yanbu and the East-West Pipeline, which extends from Saudi oilfields and refineries in eastern Arabia to Yanbu, to avoid exporting oil through the Persian Gulf.[34]
The Houthis claimed attacks against two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden on August 5.[35] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on August 5 that the Houthis fired several ballistic missiles targeting the Saudi-flagged, Saudi-owned NCC Wafa oil tanker off the coast of Yanbu in the Red Sea.[36] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has not confirmed the attack on the NCC Wafa at the time of this writing. The Houthis also claimed on August 5 that they fired one ballistic missile targeting the Dominica-flagged, Saudi-operated Daisy oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden to prevent the vessel from transiting the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[37] UKMTO confirmed on August 5 that an unspecified tanker master reported hearing an explosion near the vessel in the Gulf of Aden.[38] These attacks follow a likely Houthi one-way naval drone attack against an Indian-flagged cargo tanker near the Bab al Mandeb Strait on August 4.[39] The Houthis have claimed several attacks on Saudi vessels since July 22 as part of their efforts to enforce a blockade on Saudi ports.[40]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-5-2026/
Iran Update Special Report, August 6, 2026
Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. An informed source told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media on August 6 that the Iran-Oman deal stipulates that ships will enter the strait through Iranian territorial waters and exit through Omani territorial waters for a “certain period.”[1] Four industry sources similarly told Reuters on August 6 that the proposed deal between Iran and Oman would give Iran “control” over ships entering the Persian Gulf through the strait.[2] All ships would then, after this period, pass through a central route, with Iran managing ships’ entrances and Iran and Oman jointly managing ships’ exits.[3] The source added that the deal includes “insurance, fueling, and environmental fees,” which are effectively tolls.[4] The arrangement described by IRGC-affiliated media would enable the Iranian regime to retain control over both inbound and outbound traffic in the strait and earn revenue through charging tolls. This Iranian media report contradicts an August 6 Saudi media report in which a “senior source” claimed that the agreement does not include transit fees or service charges, however.[5]
Achieving international recognition of its control over the strait would enable Iran to use the strait as a deterrent against its adversaries in potential future conflicts. The Supreme Leader's website newspaper, Voice of Iran, argued in an op-ed on August 5 that the regime views the strait as a central pillar of its security architecture rather than just bargaining leverage in negotiations with the United States.[6] This argument is consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that one of the regime's strategic objectives is to secure long-term and permanent control over the strait.[7] Voice of Iran's argument also comes after some “pragmatist” elements have questioned how much effort the regime should expend in enforcing its control over the strait. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, for example, argued on August 3 that Iran has a time-sensitive window of opportunity to capitalize on its control of the strait and argued that Iran should use the strait as leverage in negotiations to recover economically and avoid further US military action.[8]
Iran continues to use force to consolidate its control of the strait. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 5 that a vessel's crew heard two explosions while passing through Omani territorial waters.[9] Iran has repeatedly targeted vessels in the strait using the Omani route because traffic through this route undermines Iranian efforts to assert full control over the strait.[10]
Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely attempting to deter the Syrian government from disrupting smuggling routes used to support Hezbollah.[11] A UK-based Saudi-owned outlet reported on August 4 that numerous Iranian cells in Syria have prepared to launch attacks on Syrian government and civilian targets if the Syrian government decides to take unspecified action against Hezbollah.[12] Iran and its Axis partners in Iraq and Lebanon have consistently attempted to infiltrate Syria with clandestine cells and recruit former pro-Assad fighters who remained in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in 2024.[13] The Syrian government has thwarted several Iranian-supported smuggling attempts to equip Iranian cells in Syria as well as attempts to move Iranian-backed fighters across the Syria-Lebanon border in recent weeks.[14] Many Iraqi and Syrian fighters have already entered Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah.[15]
Iran likely believes that continued Syrian government efforts to disrupt Hezbollah smuggling routes in Syria represent Syrian cooperation with Israel and the United States against Hezbollah when, in reality, Syria is exercising its sovereign right to secure its borders. Iran likely views Syrian efforts against Hezbollah and weapons smuggling as threats to Iranian supply lines to Hezbollah and evidence of Syrian support for Israeli objectives, as reflected in Axis of Resistance media reports.[16] Iran and its partners and proxies have surely observed Western reports claiming that US President Donald Trump has repeatedly asked Syria to take action against Hezbollah, which would reinforce Iranian and Axis of Resistance perceptions. These Syrian government efforts instead address broader threats to Syrian sovereignty, including continued Axis of Resistance activity and smuggling in Syria after years of Iranian and Axis support for the Assad regime.[17] Iran has historically viewed Syria as a critical component to its ability to support Axis of Resistance operations throughout the region and has utilized Assad-era Syria to support Hezbollah with weapons and funding via Iraq.[18]
ISW-CTP is considering two possible courses of action for Iran in Syria:
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Iran uses clandestine cells in Syria to conduct spectacular attacks within Syria that force Syrian security forces to divert resources from border regions to respond to such attacks. This would both divert resources away from the border regions (thereby making counter-smuggling efforts less effective) and could act as a deterrent against future border security efforts. Spectacular attacks would force already strained Syrian security forces to divert resources and personnel from monitoring active smuggling routes in border regions. Iran and the Axis could take advantage of these gaps in security to smuggle equipment, funds, and personnel across the Syrian border. The attacks would also create political challenges for Ahmad al Shara’s government.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major Syrian counter-smuggling operation on the Lebanese border against Hezbollah triggers a coordinated Iranian-backed response involving clandestine cells, cross-border attacks, and possibly Iranian strikes to deter further Syrian government action. A major Syrian counter-smuggling operation—perhaps against Hezbollah warehouses in Lebanon or an operation that kills a significant number of Hezbollah fighters—could create a volatile situation that triggers a wider Iranian and Axis response. Iranian cells could conduct a series of coordinated attacks against Syrian forces supported by Axis and possibly Iranian drone, rocket, and missile strikes in response to such an operation. Such a campaign may result in broader Hezbollah objectives beyond deterring the Syrian government once the campaign begins.
The Syrian government has deployed an increased number of forces to the Syria-Iraq border to support border security in response to Iranian and Axis of Resistance threats and activity.[19] The UK-based Saudi-owned outlet reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and Hezbollah have reinforced positions along Syria's borders.[20] This deployment reportedly prompted the Syrian Defense Ministry to mobilize forces along the Iraq-Syria border.[21] The Syrian government reportedly informed the Iraqi and Lebanese governments that Iranian and Axis activity on Syria's borders threatens Syria's internal stability and warned both governments that Syrian forces would respond to any Hezbollah or Iraqi militia attacks.[22] The Iraqi Border Forces commander told Iraqi media on August 4 that the Syria-Iraq border situation is normal and Syria's border security measures are being coordinated with Iraq.[23] This statement indicates that both Iraq and Syria interpret the Syrian deployment of forces to the border as part of a border security operation to prevent smuggling.
The activities of Iran and the Axis of Resistance across the region, including their reported actions in Syria, are likely causing an increasing alignment of interests between different regional states. Iran has increasingly threatened Syrian security both through the reported Iranian and Axis of Resistance cells and strikes on Syrian territory, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) strikes on the former US base in al Tanf, Syria, on July 17.[24] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have repeatedly struck multiple regional countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[25] Syria has increased its coordination with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in recent weeks. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara held two phone calls with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Nahyan on July 30 to discuss regional developments and condemn Iranian attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure, for example.[26] These activities have spurred increased cooperation between Arab states as they have become more frustrated with Iran.
The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military camps in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6, possibly in response to ROYG ground movements near Houthi frontlines.[27] The Saudi-backed, ROYG-affiliated Yemen Emergency Forces confirmed that the Houthis attacked several of its camps and other ROYG-affiliated units on August 6.[28] The Houthi attacks killed at least 45 ROYG soldiers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Saudi media on August 6.[29] The Houthis claimed on August 6 that they conducted the attacks in response to a recent mobilization of ROYG and “Saudi” forces in Marib and Hadramawt governorates.[30] Anti-Houthi and Saudi media indicated in late July that ROYG forces were mobilizing in Marib Governorate. Anti-Houthi media reported on July 31 that ROYG security forces in Marib Governorate arrested several individuals for filming military movements on public roads.[31] Saudi-owned UK-based media also noted on July 25 that an unspecified actor conducted airstrikes on Houthi positions in Marib and al Jawf governorates, which coincided with ROYG military movements.[32] The immediate trigger for the recent Houthi attacks remains unclear, however. These attacks come after unspecified Yemeni sources told The Guardian on July 30 that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possible land offensive against the Houthis to end the group's “chokehold” on Saudi Red Sea oil exports.[33]
The Houthi attacks on ROYG military positions also come after the Yemen Emergency Forces raided a Houthi-linked explosives manufacturing factory and seized Houthi military equipment in Hadramawt Governorate on August 3.[34] The Houthis may have also conducted their attacks on ROYG positions on August 6 to deter future ROYG actions targeting Houthi logistics and military procurement networks.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces thwarted a reported planned militant attack in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[35] The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base announced on August 6 that its forces dismantled an unspecified militant cell before it could conduct an attack in southern Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[36] IRGC forces reportedly ambushed the cell and killed two of its leaders during the operation.[37] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotspot for anti-regime activity, including by anti-regime Baloch separatist groups that frequently attack Iranian security forces in the province.[38]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have reportedly threatened to respond to the recent US-Saudi strikes on militia sites in Iraq if Saudi Arabia fails to meet the militias’ demands, which include an official apology.[39] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, previously said it would respond to the strikes after August 6.[40] An informed source said that the militias’ demands include an official apology from Saudi Arabia, compensation for the victims’ families and damage caused to Iraqi property, and limiting anti-militia discourse in Saudi media.[41] The United States and Saudi Arabia conducted joint strikes on militia positions in Iraq on July 28 in response to Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and US interests in Iraq and the region.[42] The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) said that the US-Saudi strikes killed at least 20 PMF members and injured 30 members.[43] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[44]
The militias’ decision to make their response contingent on Saudi Arabia meeting their demands, instead of immediately responding kinetically, may be in response to Iraqi federal government pressure on the militias to de-escalate. The militias could still resort to using force, however, particularly if Saudi Arabia does not agree to their demands. Informed sources told independent Iraqi Kurdish media on August 5 that the militias are “serious” about a military response to Saudi Arabia, but high-level government and political pressure is preventing them from responding militarily.[45] It is unclear what form of pressure the federal government has applied to the militias or whether the pressure will be sufficient to prevent the militias from responding kinetically. Previous Iraqi governments, including under former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, frequently attempted to halt the militias’ kinetic activity in moments of high regional tension, most of the time to no avail.[46] Sudani constantly pressured the militias to stop attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024, but the militias only stopped these attacks after receiving direct orders from IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani to do so.[47]
The Iraqi militias continue to take security precautions due to concerns over further US strikes.[48] Security sources in Baghdad told Qatari-owned, UK-based media on August 6 that Iraqi militias evacuated their bases and established new positions following the US-Saudi airstrikes last week.[49] A senior security official also said that the militias transferred weapons, sensitive equipment, and commanders to the new positions after the strikes.[50] This report follows the PMF Ninewa Operations Command reportedly ordering the complete evacuation of its headquarters and formations in Ninewa Province on August 2 in anticipation of future strikes.[51]
The Saudi Defense Ministry appointed a commander for the Saudi-led multinational “maritime defense coalition” on August 6 to plan and coordinate coalition activities to protect international shipping from Houthi threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.[52] Fourteen countries, including the ROYG, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, and Sudan, as well as other African and South Asian countries, joined the alliance on July 30.[53] Saudi Arabia formed the coalition in response to the ongoing Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia that began on July 20.[54]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-6-2026/