The Houthis no longer rely solely on clandestine shipments of complete Iranian weapons entering Yemen. Evidence reviewed for this investigation shows that the group has incorporated international trade, commercial companies and civilian supply chains into its military procurement system.
The evidence confirms the first central hypothesis of this investigation: trade has become a structural component of the Houthi military apparatus, not merely a cover for individual smuggling operations.
A second pattern is also emerging. The Houthis are using the weapons, expertise and maritime networks developed inside Yemen to build relationships with armed actors and trafficking networks across the Horn of Africa. The returns may include cash, but they may also take the form of recruits, training camps, coastal access, storage sites, boats, local protection and routes that expand the operational reach of both the Houthis and Iran.
This does not yet prove the existence of a fully developed Iranian network of missile bases in Africa. It does show, however, that the Houthis have evolved from a recipient of Iranian support into a regional military operator capable of converting trade into weapons and weapons into cross-border influence. Technical investigations into intercepted Houthi missiles and drones have found combinations of Iranian-origin materials and internationally manufactured commercial components. This suggests a production model in which Iran does not need to deliver every weapon in complete form.
Iran can provide designs, guidance, specialised parts and technical experts. Commercial networks obtain motors, batteries, cameras, processors and industrial materials from international markets. Houthi workshops then assemble, modify and test the final systems inside Yemen.
Sheba Intelligence revealed that an IRGC-linked technical cell had assessed the relocation of Houthi missile and drone facilities from Yemen's western coast to mountainous and desert areas, including locations in Al-Jawf. The cell reportedly examined underground facilities, protected storage sites and alternative deployment zones. This indicates that Iranian involvement is not limited to the supply of hardware. It extends to the protection, relocation and operational management of the capabilities produced from imported components.
Sheba Intelligence has reported, citing security sources in Puntland, that Somali piracy networks obtained weapons and GPS navigation equipment through channels connected to the Houthis or their partners. The information does not prove that every pirate group is controlled by the Houthis. It does suggest that weapons and technical equipment may be moving from the Yemeni network toward actors on the African coast.
The clock is ticking—it's time to do something about this as soon as possible.
