Iran Update Special Report, July 9, 2026
Iran is threatening the resumption of large-scale conflict by striking civilian vessels and the Gulf states to try to achieve permanent control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has launched numerous strikes targeting commercial vessels and the Gulf states in recent days as part of a broader effort to secure control over the strait despite apparent resistance from the Gulf states.[1] Clause 5 of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to discuss the “future administration and maritime services” of the strait with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with “applicable international law.”[2] A senior US administration official told the Daily Wire on June 17 that clause 5 was designed with the assumption that Gulf states would moderate Iran's position vis-a-vis the strait through the discussions required by the clause.[3] This assumption did not take into account that Iran could fail to reach an agreement with the Gulf states and resort to using force to impose its desired “future administration” of the strait on these states. Iranian officials initially attempted to frame Iran's post-war approach to the strait's management as part of a new regional security framework that would ultimately benefit the Gulf states.[4] Iranian officials have since become much more hostile toward the Gulf states due to these states’ opposition to Iranian efforts to control the strait.[5] Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait.[6] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi stated on June 29 that Iran would implement its “sovereignty and new policy” in the strait even if Iran and Oman failed to reach an agreement on the waterway's future management, for example.[7] Iran's continued attacks on civilian vessels and Gulf states in recent days demonstrate that the Iranian regime prioritizes control of the strait over avoiding renewed large-scale conflict with the United States. Iran's attacks also illustrate that Iran views control over the strait as its primary strategic deterrent and that Iran is unlikely to abandon its efforts to control the strait in response to opposition from the Gulf states.
The United States struck 90 targets across Iran on July 8 to degrade Iran's ability to attack international shipping.[8] Recent US strikes have had no visible effect on Iran's ability to threaten shipping, and it is unclear when these strikes would have an effect on Iran's ability or willingness to threaten shipping. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on July 8 that US forces conducted strikes in Iran targeting air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran's southern coastline. These strikes were in response to Iranian strikes on civilian vessels in the strait on July 6 and 7.[9] CENTCOM conducted similar strikes on July 7.[10] Geolocated footage shows damage from US strikes to a reported maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar Port, which is on Iran's southeastern border along the Gulf of Oman.[11] Geolocated footage also shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Shahid Asarinejad barracks in Shiraz, Fars Province.[12] The United States has repeatedly conducted limited strikes in southern Iran since the MoU came into effect, targeting similar sites as it did on July 8. These targets include radars, communications nodes, and air defense systems.[13] Iran has continued to attack commercial vessels, however, relying on its ability to fire only a small number of projectiles into the strait to hit individual ships and thereby compel commercial vessels to abide by Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme.[14] A member of the Iranian negotiating team, Mehdi Mohammadi, emphasized on July 9 that recent US attacks have not changed Iran's ability or willingness to control the strait.[15]
The United States also struck bridges and railroads used by the Iranian armed forces to transport missiles, drones, weapons components, and other material for military reconstitution, according to US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[16] The United States struck a railway in Golestan Province in northeastern Iran that Iranian media stated was used to transport goods from Russia.[17] IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News reported that Chinese train traffic along the route has tripled since the United States launched its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[18] Russia and China have helped Iran try to reconstitute its drone and missile programs, such as by providing Iran with drone technology and missile components, respectively.[19]
Iranian forces launched missiles and drones at Bahrain, Kuwait, and a US base in Jordan in response to the US strikes. All of the Iranian projectiles were intercepted.[20] Iran likely calculates that attacks against Gulf states will increase pressure on the United States to avoid further military escalation by threatening US forces and raising the costs for US allies.
Iran also likely calculates that it can use control of the strait as economic leverage to shape US decision-making and deter further US military action. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to US attacks. The IRGC Navy stated on July 9 that continued US military operations would disrupt the strait's “reopening process” and threaten Gulf states’ economic interests.[21] Mohammadi similarly warned that Iran could block the strait quickly if necessary.[22] Vessel traffic has increased since the United States and Iran signed the MoU but has fallen in recent days.[23] Iran likely calculates that it can use the threat of “re-closing” the strait and disrupting global commerce to put economic pressure on the United States and discourage the United States from conducting further military action against Iran. ISW-CTP continues to assess that any arrangement that recognizes Iranian control over the strait would preserve Iran's ability to close the strait at will to advance its strategic objectives.[24]
Some Iranian officials have threatened to change Iran's nuclear doctrine, likely in part to try to deter the United States from conducting further strikes on Iran. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei stated on July 8 that Iran may consider changing its nuclear doctrine if the United States launches another “all-out attack.”[25] Rezaei previously stated on July 3 that Israeli officials’ threats to kill Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei constitute a “valid and compelling reason” to reconsider Iran's nuclear doctrine.[26] Parliamentary Economic Commission member Hossein Samsami separately stated on July 9 that Iran must change its nuclear doctrine because Iran is currently engaged in an “existential war.”[27] Samsami was one of 85 Iranian parliamentarians who implicitly called for Iran to develop intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities in a letter to Mojtaba on May 31.[28] An expert close to the regime also told IRGC-affiliated Fars News on July 9 that repeated US threats against Iran would force the regime to review its defense doctrine, including the “military use of nuclear technology.”[29] Parliamentarians in Iran do not yield significant decision-making authority, but these comments nevertheless reflect discussions among Iranian leaders over how Iran should restore deterrence after Iran's traditional forms of deterrence, such as the Axis of Resistance and the Iranian missile program, have failed to prevent repeated attacks on Iranian territory and senior leaders.
The United States is taking steps to support the implementation of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement in Lebanon. US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa told Lebanese President Joseph Aoun that the United States will send a military delegation to Lebanon “within days” to support the implementation of the agreement during a meeting with Aoun on July 9.[30] Issa also stated that a start date for implementing the agreement's “pilot zones” plan will be determined following the upcoming US-Israel-Lebanon negotiations in Rome, Italy, on July 15 and 16.[31] An unspecified US official told Axios that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will begin to withdraw from the two recently announced pilot zones “in a matter of days,” however.[32] Clause two of the agreement's security annex stipulates that Israel and Lebanon will establish the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon to verify disarmament progress in southern Lebanon and operate as an indirect backchannel between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[33] Israeli media reported on June 30 that the IDF postponed its withdrawal from the pilot zones until the United States, Israel, and Lebanon established the coordination group with US military participation in order for the group to vet participating LAF soldiers.[34] This step is intended to prevent Hezbollah from receiving sensitive information from the coordination group.[35]
Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah-allied politicians have continued to condemn the framework agreement and call for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected the framework and claimed that it only serves Israel's interests in a speech on July 8.[36] Qassem also demanded that the IDF completely withdraw from southern Lebanon and allow the LAF to deploy south of the Litani River.[37] Lebanese media reported that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berrih told Issa on July 9 that he seeks an immediate and complete Israeli withdrawal from the pilot zones, while Issa called for a gradual withdrawal from the zones with US oversight.[38]
The Iraqi federal government has agreed to implement unspecified safeguards to prevent Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from obtaining US dollars from Iraqi currency exchanges and Iraqi federal government salary payments, according to unspecified US and Iraqi officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on July 8.[39] The US government has resumed US dollar shipments to Iraq in exchange.[40] The Iraqi Central Bank has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve that has held the Iraqi federal government's oil export revenue in US dollars since 2003.[41] The US Treasury Department initially halted US dollar shipments to Iraq in April 2026 due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the war and reportedly resumed some payments on June 17 and July 2, excluding payments to Iraqi counterterrorism and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) training programs.[42] Members of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister, receive a salary from the Iraqi federal government.[43]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-9-2026/
Iran Update Special Report, July 10, 2026
The United States and Iran are to resume talks following US strikes on Iran between July 8 and 9, but Iran's negotiating position and war aims remain unchanged. Iran's negotiating position and war aims include maintaining Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, preserving the Iranian nuclear program, and protecting Hezbollah. US President Donald Trump stated on July 10 that the United States agreed to resume talks with Iran at Iran's request, but that the United States now considers the ceasefire to be over.[1] Neither the memorandum of understanding (MoU) nor the recent rounds of talks between the United States and Iran have bridged the gaps on the key issues in the war, which include Iran's control of the strait, Iran's nuclear program, and Israeli operations in Lebanon.[2] Two senior Iranian sources told Reuters on July 8 that the Iranian regime considers its control over the strait to be “important leverage” and that giving up such control would be tantamount to “surrender.”[3] The sources added that Iran will not discuss its nuclear program unless the United States recognizes Iran's control over the strait.[4] Iran has also not provided any specifics about what elements of its nuclear program it is prepared to discuss. Iran has previously also conditioned opening the strait and discussing its nuclear program on the cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[5]
Iran is attempting to deter the UAE and other Gulf states to prevent them from supporting efforts to end Iranian control of the strait. Likely Gulf states struck unspecified targets in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province; Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island in Hormozgan Province; and Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, on July 9, according to an open-source intelligence account.[6] It is unclear which Gulf states attacked Iran based on the available information. Iranian officials and analysts have blamed the UAE for allegedly supporting US strikes against Iran, both during recent exchanges of fire between Iran and the United States and during the war.[7] Iranian Parliamentarian and National Security Commission member Esmail Kowsari accused the UAE on July 10 of conducting attacks against Iran and threatened to target the UAE’s maritime, rail, and air transport infrastructure in response.[8] An analyst close to the regime stated on July 10 that Iran should add the UAE to its “target bank” because the UAE is covertly seeking to undermine Iran's control over the strait.[9] The regime likely calculates that it needs to adopt an aggressive approach against the UAE due to the UAE’s military support from the United States and Israel.[10]
The Gulf states are divided over how to respond to Iran's recent attacks. Iran launched strikes against Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar on July 9 in response to US strikes on Iran intended to degrade Iran's ability and willingness to control the strait.[11] Israeli media reported on July 10 that the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait are demanding stronger decisions against Iran through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including via an international arrangement for free transit that would be supplemented by an international military initiative to defend the strait.[12] The Israeli media report added that Oman and Qatar, who have both mediated the US-Iran talks, prefer that diplomatic talks continue.[13] Bahrain spearheaded the effort to pass a UN Resolution in March that would have authorized international naval efforts to ensure freedom of navigation in the strait.[14]
The United States and Iraq will reportedly sign an agreement under which the United States will invest in Iraq in return for Iraq curbing Iranian influence in Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will reportedly sign the agreement with the United States during his upcoming visit to Washington, DC, starting on June 15.[15] This report follows Iraqi and regional reports detailing a “June agreement” designed by Zaydi and US Ambassador to Lebanon and Iraq Tom Barrack during their meeting in Baghdad on June 15.[16] The agreement's stipulations reportedly include that the Iraqi federal government will disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and dismantle their financial networks.[17] The United States has urged the Iraqi federal government to pursue such reforms since 2025 but has increased its pressure due to militia involvement during the recent war.[18] The Iraqi federal government has taken some initial steps towards meeting these consistent US demands in recent weeks. Baghdad formed a disarmament committee as part of efforts to restrict weapons to the state in early June, and Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated that the end of September is the deadline for disarmament, which corresponds to when US-led international coalition forces will leave Iraq.[19]
The United States also continues to oppose militia-affiliated figures controlling the Iraqi federal government, amid continued Iraqi negotiations over the remaining Iraqi ministries to be filled. The June agreement reportedly requires Baghdad to remove militia-aligned figures from senior-level government positions.[20] Zaydi formed a government and entered office on May 14, but has not appointed several important ministers, including defense and interior.[21] The United States opposes the appointment of militia-aligned figures to important government roles, which complicates attempts to fill these ministries. Parties like Sadiqoun, which is Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing and won 27 seats in the 2025 elections, would typically be granted control of a ministry, for example.[22] The United States opposes the allocation of any ministerial portfolio to political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, even if the militias have announced their disarmament.[23] Iraqi political sources told regional media on July 10 that Zaydi’s administration will fill the remaining ministries following Zaydi’s visit to Washington, DC, starting June 15.[24] An unidentified framework leader told Iraqi media on July 8 that no militia member or person who participated in the recent war will receive any “executive position, even at the director-general level” in the Iraqi federal government.[25] Militia penetration into the Iraqi state is still a threat to US interests in Iraq, however, given a June 27 Iraqi media report that unspecified Iraqi political parties with militia wings plan to announce their separation from their affiliated militias as part of a plan to “covertly take [over]” Iraqi state institutions.[26]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly attempting to circumvent the Iraqi federal government's disarmament initiatives. Unidentified framework sources told Iraqi media on July 9 that unidentified militias are handing over “scrap” missiles or inoperable drones to the government but holding onto functional heavy weapons.[27] Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali are the only militias that have publicly announced their willingness to disarm, possibly to gain access to the 35,000 jobs in Iraq's security establishment that Zaydi has reportedly set aside for militia members willing to disarm.[28] Both militias either conducted attacks or directly supported attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[29] Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, all of which were the most kinetically active during the war and are closest to Iran, have continuously refused to disarm.[30] The framework sources said that eight functional ballistic missiles and hundreds of drones are the “sticking point” for disarming the militias.[31] This information is almost certainly incomplete because the Iraqi government has historically lacked accurate information on the number and types of militia weapons due to the covert nature of the militias, including those within the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[32] The militia attacks during the war also demonstrated the large number of missiles and drones the militias have access to via Iran and smuggling routes in Syria. This report of the militias resisting government pressure to disarm follows reports that Iran has urged its Iraqi partners not to hand their weapons over to the Iraqi state.[33]
It does not follow that Iran and its Iraqi partners will by default openly resist disarmament by deciding to operate their armed wings in the same manner they have in the past. These groups could decide to metamorphose into a new form while retaining their arms and/or influence. ISW-CTP continues to assess, therefore, that any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.
The United States is increasing its economic pressure on Iran's shadow bank infrastructure, including Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s personal financial network, in response to Iran's renewed attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[34] The United States sanctioned eight individuals and six entities on July 10, including Dubai-based financier Ali Ansari, who oversees assets benefiting Mojtaba Khamenei, other regime elites, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[35] The US Treasury Department also sanctioned Ansari-owned Smart Global Limited, three Iranian exchange houses, and two front companies that move or hold billions of dollars annually for sanctioned Iranian banks through shell-company networks.[36]
Hezbollah appears to be deterring the Lebanese government from using force to disarm the group in southern Lebanon. President Joseph Aoun told Lebanese media on July 10 that he plans to discuss the necessity of “cooperating with Hezbollah” to disarm the group during his upcoming meeting with US President Donald Trump on July 21 in Washington, DC.[37] Aoun’s caution is warranted to some degree, given the risks implicit in any violent flare-ups between the government and Hezbollah. But any disarmament plan that relies on cooperating with Hezbollah will almost certainly fail, as Hezbollah will not disarm on its own accord.[38]
Hezbollah is actively attempting to make the Lebanese government more hesitant and cautious as it attempts to disarm the group, likely with the aim of ultimately preventing disarmament outright. Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah-allied politicians have continued to assert that Hezbollah will remain armed in southern Lebanon and have threatened that attempts by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to disarm the group would cause civil war.[39] Unspecified sources told Lebanese media on July 6 that the LAF refuses to initiate an “internal confrontation” with Hezbollah because of the risk of starting a civil war with the group and fracturing the LAF.[40]
The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, which is headed by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-linked judge Faiq Zaidan, announced on July 10 that it has developed a legal initiative with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi to reduce legal penalties for individuals facing corruption charges if they voluntarily return stolen public funds.[41] This initiative likely possesses significant accountability and enforcement gaps, however. The initiative appears to be a response to the Iraqi public's dissatisfaction with anti-corruption investigations and their failure to recover stolen funds in recent years.[42] The Supreme Judicial Council said that the initiative will consist of the same legal procedures as a previous anti-corruption amnesty incentive adopted during a major embezzlement trial in 2022.[43] This incentive failed because the suspect fled Iraq and did not return stolen funds, which totaled over $5 billion, after the Iraqi government granted the suspect bail.[44] The initiative also follows a July 7 Saudi media report that members of the Shia Coordination Framework intend to “engineer” corruption trials and issue “settlements” for Iraqi officials facing corruption charges.[45] ISW-CTP assessed on July 8 that some framework members may be attempting to limit the scope of Zaydi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign.[46]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-10-2026/