The loss of two US aircraft does not indicate that the combined force has lost or is losing air superiority over Iran. Iranian forces shot down a US F-15E and an A-10 on April 3, marking the first such aircraft losses since the start of the conflict.[1] The combined force has maintained air superiority over Iran since the first phase of the campaign by degrading Iranian air and air defense capabilities.[2] Air superiority is when air power creates the conditions that allow one force to operate at “a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.”[3] Achieving air superiority does not mean that there is no risk to aircraft, and air superiority is not constant at all times, in all places, or at all altitudes.[4] Friendly forces can maintain air superiority even if the enemy is attempting to shoot down friendly aircraft, so long as the enemy air defenses do not seriously impede friendly operations. Iranian attempts to challenge US and Israeli air superiority have not seriously impeded the combined force's ability to conduct operations over Iran, as demonstrated by the persistent strikes nationwide.
China is helping Iran reconstitute the Iranian missile program amid US-Israeli efforts to degrade it. The Telegraph reported that five shipments of likely sodium perchlorate, a key precursor for solid missile propellant, have arrived in Iran from China.[5] All the vessels are owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line Group (IRISL), which the United States sanctioned in 2021.[6] Four of the vessels are docked or floating near the port in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and one of the vessels is docked or near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence. China has previously supplied sodium perchlorate to support Iran's ballistic missile program.[7] The combined force has targeted several elements of the Iranian ballistic missile program, including missile fuel and solid propellant motor production sites. China's efforts to help Iran reconstitute could undermine the combined force efforts to degrade or destroy the supporting elements of the ballistic missile program, however.
The combined force targeted the Iran-Iraq border crossing in Shalamcheh, Khuzestan Province, on April 4 for at least the second time since the war began as part of its ongoing efforts to target Iran's repressive capabilities.[8] Iraq has closed the border crossing following the strikes, according to a security source.[9] The strikes come amid reports that at least 1,000 Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khuzestan Province via the Shalamcheh crossing.[10] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[11]
The IDF struck Iran's petrochemical facilities in Bandar-e Imam Khomeni, Khuzestan Province, on April 4, which the IDF said the regime used to manufacture materials for ballistic missiles.[21] The IDF stated that the strike targeted a site within the complex that constitutes one of two central facilities used to produce materials for explosives, ballistic missiles, and other weapons, including a key material necessary for ballistic missile production.[22] The IDF struck Fajr Petrochemical Company, Rejal Petrochemical Company, and Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company, according to Iranian media.[23] The United States sanctioned Fajr Petrochemical Company in 2019 for being owned or controlled by Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC).[24] The United States sanctioned the PGPIC and its network of subsidiaries in 2019 for providing financial support to Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters, which is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy.[25] The United States sanctioned Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company in 2023 for materially assisting Triliance Petrochemical Company, a previously designated firm involved in brokering the sale of Iranian petrochemicals.[26] The US Treasury reported in February 2023 that Amir Kabir facilitated the export of petrochemical products to buyers in East Asia, supporting Iranian efforts to evade sanctions and sustain export revenue.[27]
The combined force targeted an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) radio and television station in Jamaran, northern Tehran Province, on April 3.[28] Iranian media have described Jamaran Station as the most important and “strategic” broadcast transmitter in Iran.[29] The IDF previously targeted the IRIB headquarters in Tehran on March 2, which is similarly responsible for spreading regime propaganda.[30]
The Houthis launched a ballistic missile with a cluster munition warhead and drones targeting central and southern Israel on April 4.[74] The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile with cluster munitions and several drones at the Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, as well as “vital military targets” in southern Israel.[75] The IDF said that it detected a ballistic missile launch from Yemen but allowed the missile to land in an open area, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[76] The IDF did not indicate whether the Houthi missile included a cluster munition warhead and did not report any drone interceptions, however.[77] The Houthis claimed that they coordinated the missile attack with Hezbollah and Iran.[78] The Houthis previously launched ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads at Israel in 2025.[79] This attack marks the sixth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[80] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the Houthis‘ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[81]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-4-2026/
US President Donald Trump appears to have extended the deadline for Iran to stop attacking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to 8:00 PM ET on April 7 amid discussions with Iranian officials.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said on April 5 that Iran would continue attacking shipping through the Strait, however.[2] Trump had previously set the deadline for Monday, April 6, following a prior extension.[3] Trump threatened to attack energy infrastructure and bridges in the event Iran persists in attacking shipping after his deadline.[4] Mojtaba said on April 5 that Iranian forces would continue to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[5] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on April 5 to discuss Pakistan's mediation efforts between Iran and the United States.[6] Media readouts did not disclose if Iran agreed to any negotiations, however.[7]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces on April 4 successfully completed the rescue of both F-15E crewmembers after Iran shot down their aircraft on April 2 during a combat mission.[8] CENTCOM had not previously acknowledged the earlier rescue of the F-15E pilot, which occurred on April 3.[9] US special operations forces successfully secured the F-15E weapons system officer (WSO) on April 4.[10] US officials told Western media that the WSO survived after evading capture for 36 hours, but he is seriously wounded and now receiving medical treatment in Kuwait.[11] The rescue operation resulted in an unspecified number of Iranian casualties.[12] US forces destroyed two transport aircraft and multiple MH-6 Little Birds that they could not extract from Iran after the rescue operation.[13] US President Donald Trump stated that the recoveries involved two US “raids” and noted that in the second operation, US forces spent seven hours over Iran.[14] Trump also announced he will hold a press conference in the Oval Office at 1:00 PM ET on April 6.[15]
The Iranian regime media is falsely characterizing the shootdown of the F-15E and subsequent downing of an A-10 attack aircraft during rescue operations as a US defeat.[16] US forces successfully established a makeshift airstrip very close to a major Iranian city, successfully extracted all of its personnel, and the combined force has continued to strike targets in Iran.[17] An Iranian military spokesperson said that Iranian forces ”thwarted” the rescue attempt, even though US forces recovered all personnel in Iran, and all personnel are alive.[18] Iranian regime media argued that US forces would not have struggled to get the MC‑130 aircraft off the ground if Iranian air defense systems had truly been neutralized.[19] The MC-130s were unable to get off the ground because their nose gear got stuck in the sand, not because of any Iranian action.[20]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is continuing to target Iranian tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from using tunnels to conceal missile sites. The head of the Israeli Air Intelligence Group stated on April 5 that Israel must expend “large resources” to prevent Iranian forces from hiding in mountainous areas.[21] The official added that the IDF blocks the tunnel entrances to prevent Iranian forces from entering or exiting the tunnels.[22] Iran buries important missile sites underneath mountains and in tunnels to conceal the sites and to make it difficult for airstrikes to damage them.[23]
Iran has slightly altered its strike packages to include more cruise missiles. Iran has previously not used cruise missiles at the rate it did on April 5, but it is unclear whether this represents experimentation with new tactics, an effort to manage the remaining missile reserves, or something else. Iran launched four cruise missiles at Kuwait, two at Qatar, and one each at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.[24]
The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security forces. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the Ahvaz International Airport in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[28] It is unclear what the target of the strikes was. The 51st Hazrat-e Hojjat Independent Armored Brigade is based near the airport and operates under the Karbala Operational Base in Ahvaz.[29] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the IRGC Ground Forces 14th Imam Hossein Division and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Provincial headquarters in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[30] The Imam Hossein Division operates under the Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base in Esfahan, which the combined force struck on March 8.[31]
The combined force has continued its decapitation campaign against Iranian military officials. The combined force killed IRGC Brigadier General Mostafa Azizi on April 5.[32] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 5 that Azizi served in the IRGC Navy's 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District in Khuzestan Province.[33] The 3rd Imam Hossein Naval District controls the northwestern Persian Gulf and Khuzestan’s maritime borders and coastal waters, and includes key naval infrastructure such as the Arvand Naval Base and associated surface combat brigades.[34] The IDF separately killed Mohammad Reza Ashrafi Ghahi in Tehran Province.[35] The IDF reported that Ashrafi Ghahi served as the head of commerce in the IRGC Oil Headquarters and managed oil sales that generated billions of dollars annually.[36] Iranian media reported on April 5 that the combined force killed Artesh Air Defense Academy Commander Brigadier General Masoud Zare during recent strikes.[37] US President Donald Trump stated on Truth Social on April 4 that “many of Iran's military leaders” were killed in a large strike in Tehran Province.[38] An OSINT reported that the video Trump shared shows explosions from strikes in northern Tehran conducted on April 3.[39]
Anti-regime media reported on April 5 that Iran's Bank Sepah experienced another major computer network disruption that reportedly prevented the bank from paying IRGC personnel and regime military officials.[40] The combined force previously struck a Bank Sepah building on March 11, in which Bank Sepah said that the strike destroyed the building and disrupted in-person and online services.[41] Bank Sepah is responsible for paying IRGC and Artesh personnel.[42] Repeated disruptions are notable because they could interfere with the regime's ability to pay military personnel, which could exacerbate the challenges the regime is facing with desertions.
The Houthis claimed that they launched a ballistic missile and several drones targeting Ben Gurion Airport, central Israel, and unspecified “vital [IDF] military targets” in southern Israel on April 4.[86] The Houthis noted that they conducted their operation in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah.[87] ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of impacts at Ben Gurion Airport at the time of this writing. This attack marks the seventh time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[88] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis’ involvement in the war thus far appears calibrated to try to avoid an immediate escalation with the United States and Israel.[89]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to blame Kuwait for attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure, likely to obfuscate responsibility for these attacks to a domestic Iraqi audience. Unspecified actors also launched six drones targeting a China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)-operated oil field in Maysan Province on April 4, igniting a fire.[97] This is the second time an Iraqi militia has targeted a partially or fully Chinese-owned asset since the beginning of the war. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have repeatedly attacked other foreign-operated energy sites in Iraq since the start of the conflict, however.[98] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds attempted to obfuscate militia responsibility for the attacks on Iraqi energy infrastructure by blaming the Kuwaiti government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in an April 4 statement.[99] This statement will not fool Western governments, the Iraqi government, or others, but the Iraqi groups still need to answer to a popular domestic constituency.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-5-2026/