Israeli strikes on Iranian internal security forces, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations to some degree. It remains impossible to assess based on the available open-source evidence to what degree internal security operations have been disrupted. The IDF has targeted internal security and political figures at every echelon, from senior leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani, and Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani to low-ranking Basij members manning checkpoints.[1] The IDF has also shifted from targeting high-level headquarters to smaller sites, including checkpoints, roadblocks, and local police stations.[2] Some of the strategic-level strikes are unlikely to have immediate effects on tactical units. It remains unclear, for example, how much Soleimani’s death will affect Basij forces’ ability to operate. But all strikes have both kinetic and psychological effects. The psychological effects include shock and fear caused by a sense that Israel can target any Iranian servicemember at any time and for any reason. Mossad has amplified this sense of fear in some cases by calling individual Iranian officers, but the strikes also generate this effect on their own. Fear and shock have caused some Iranian internal security personnel to abandon established headquarters and bases, set up improvised facilities, and adapt command-and-control structures under pressure, for example.[3] Some Iranian security forces are hiding under bridges, and Soleimani was reportedly operating from a tent in a wooded area before he was killed, for example.[4] Allowing overpasses to dictate one's tactical deployments rather than determining deployments based on tactical realities is certainly suboptimal. Running a headquarters out of a tent rather than an established facility is certainly suboptimal, though not necessarily wholly ineffective. These reports indicate a notable level of operational shock across the regime's coercive apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and suggest that elements of Iran's internal security system are functioning suboptimally at this time.
Israel would need to sustain these psychological effects by continuing to target Iranian security officers in order to achieve its objective of “creating conditions for regime change.”[5] The operational-level disruption caused by this shock and demoralization could “create the conditions for regime change” over time and if desertions or refusal to obey orders spread. But the disruption will not cause regime collapse without an indigenous force to exploit the disruption.[6] The current level of disruption appears limited and is likely insufficient to meet Israel's objectives at this time. Shock will dissipate, potentially quickly, if strikes on internal security targets subside.
These operational-level effects are not causing strategic-level consequences at this time. Strategic-level decapitation strikes, including the killing of senior leaders such as Ali Khamenei, have caused political tensions and infighting within the regime. This infighting has not led to a breakdown within the regime, however, and largely represents ongoing political fights over succession that will persist. The strategic level could become less relevant if shock and disruption become severe enough at the operational level that internal security forces can no longer function and opposition groups exploit the security forces’ shock. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that opposition groups are exploiting security forces’ shock or that opposition forces believe it is possible to exploit the disruption of security forces at this time. Such evidence may be difficult to detect in the open source, however.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck vessels at a major Caspian Sea port in northern Iran that Iran uses to conduct trade with Russia. The IDF targeted “dozens” of vessels, including the Artesh Navy Moudge-class frigate IRIS Deylaman, at the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on March 18.[7] Israeli officials stated that more than five of the targeted vessels possessed anti-aircraft capabilities that could threaten combined force aircraft.[8] An IDF spokesperson confirmed that the IDF also hit a command center and a shipyard.[9] The Bandar Anzali governor stated on March 19 that Israeli airstrikes also targeted a customs building and an unspecified shipping organization.[10] The shipping organization was likely Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries, which an Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) account reported on March 18 that Israeli airstrikes had targeted.[11] Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[12]
Israeli media reported on March 19 that the Israeli strikes in Bandar Anzali “shut down” a critical supply line between Iran and Russia for both basic goods, such as wheat imports, and military equipment.[13] An Israeli journalist separately amplified reports that the IDF may have targeted a vessel that had returned from Russia in the past 24 hours and was suspected of carrying drone-related technology.[14] CTP-ISW is unable to verify this report. Iran and Russia have previously traded military equipment through this Caspian Sea route, however. Former US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby previously announced in June 2023 that Russian ships were transporting Iranian Shahed drones from Amirabad Port, Mazandaran Province, in northern Iran to Makhachkala, Russia, via the Caspian Sea.[15]
India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China are negotiating with Iran to allow their vessels to transit through an IRGC-managed “safe corridor” in the Strait of Hormuz, according to sources “with direct knowledge of the transits” speaking to UK-based shipping intelligence firm Lloyd's List on March 18.[78] Nine vessels have reportedly used this corridor so far, including two Indian-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tankers, six unspecified bulk carriers, a Pakistani-flagged oil tanker, and three US-sanctioned LPG tankers.[79] Lloyd's List reported that, in one instance, a vessel paid $2 million USD to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Ships are required to submit detailed ownership and cargo data through IRGC-linked intermediaries before being approved to transit through the “safe corridor.”[80] Lloyd's List also identified IRGC naval activity on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, where vessels are being diverted around, on satellite imagery.[81] Lloyd's List reported that overall traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped sharply, with only 15 transits taking place between March 15 and 17. Ninety percent of these transits involved Iranian-linked vessels.[82] UKMTO has recorded 21 maritime attacks and incidents since March 1, but the last confirmed Iranian attack on a commercial vessel took place on March 11.[83]
The Iranian regime is continuing to take steps to securitize Iranian society. Iranian authorities arrested dozens of individuals across multiple provinces on March 18 and 19 for allegedly spying for Israel and engaging in other anti-regime activities.[160] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry and IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that they have arrested over 200 individuals since the start of the war.[161] Security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province arrested 13 individuals reportedly linked to anti-regime militant groups on March 19.[162] Iranian authorities claimed that the arrested individuals were collecting intelligence on military movements, security facilities, and air defense sites, and were preparing to conduct “terrorist attacks.”[163] The regime separately executed three individuals in Qom Province on March 19 who had participated in the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[164] The Iranian regime has sustained its internet shutdown and continued to seize Starlink devices to restrict the flow of information.[165]
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Circumstantial evidence suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is still badly injured or otherwise incapacitated. Mojtaba has yet to appear in public or in any new images or videos since becoming the supreme leader on March 8.[1] The regime has instead recycled old images and videos of him and issued only written statements.[2] This continued absence has fueled rumors about Mojtaba’s status. The regime could easily dispel these rumors with a simple video, but has not, despite having many incentives to do so. This comes as US officials have stated that Mojtaba was seriously wounded.[3]
Mojtaba emphasized narrative control, economic resilience, and regional policy in his Nowruz written statement on March 20.
Iranian leaders have said that they will continue to impede international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on X on March 17 that “the Strait of Hormuz situation won't return to its pre-war status.”[12] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that there will be a ”new regime for the Strait of Hormuz” following the war.[13] He said that Iran can use its position along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[14] Iran has recently allowed certain vessels to transit the strait through an IRGC-managed “safe corridor.”[15] A Tehran parliamentarian said on March 19 that the Iranian parliament is considering a proposal to impose fees on vessels that seek to transit the Strait of Hormuz.[16] Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei wrote in his first statement since becoming the supreme leader that Iran will forcefully ”extract reparations from the enemy” and will “take” or destroy US and Israeli assets.[17] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[18]
The IDF reportedly killed Basij Organization Intelligence Chief Esmail Ahmadi.[38] ISW-CTP assessed on March 19 that Israeli strikes targeting the Iranian internal security services, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations to some degree.[39] The IDF also killed Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani and his deputy Ghassem Ghoreyshi in airstrikes in Tehran on March 17.[40] The Basij is a paramilitary force generally designed for social control and civil defense.
The IDF also killed the following individuals in its ongoing decapitation strikes:
IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini.[41] Naeini played a key role in spreading regime propaganda and disinformation. Naeini repeatedly issued threats to attack US and Israeli interests in the region. The United Kingdom sanctioned Naeini following the October 2024 Iranian missile attacks on Israel.[42]
IRGC Aerospace Force Commander in Esfahan Mehdi Ghoreyshi.[43] The IRGC Aerospace Force is the principal operator of the Iranian missile and drone arsenals. The combined force has targeted several missile, drone, and air defense sites in Esfahan Province since February 28 to degrade Iranian capabilities there.
The IDF also killed an Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry official, Mehdi Rostami Shamestan.[44] Shamastan played a role in promoting attacks against Israeli and Jewish civilians across the world.
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