The United States and Israel are currently attempting to use force to prevent Iran from disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Such an operation will also demonstrate that the regime cannot hold the strait hostage in the future to secure strategic victories at relatively limited cost. A “very senior Israeli political source” enumerated a series of war aims to Israeli Channel 12 that included preventing Iran from disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and denying Iran's ability to do so in the future.[1] Accomplishing this objective would demonstrate that Israel and the United States have the ability to prevent Iran from trying again in the future. The US objectives are consistent with the Israeli objectives regarding the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Admiral Brad Cooper said on March 11, for example, that the United States aims to degrade Iran's ability to interrupt shipping in the Strait and “end their ability to project power and harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.”[2]
A weakened regime that remains in power after this war would be able to disrupt shipping whenever and for however long it pleases with little effort if its current, relatively limited, strike campaign on shipping proves sufficient to cause the US and Israel to surrender. A failure to demonstrate the will and ability to deny Iran the ability to disrupt traffic will make it enormously harder to deter Iran from future disruptions. Stopping the war in current conditions would thus represent a major strategic challenge that the United States or Israel would need to contend with in future rounds of conflict with a regime that will continue to be a committed adversary. Iranian Parliament Speaker and former military official Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, for example, said that the strait will never return to its pre-war state.[3] Ghalibaf is presumably suggesting that Iran will continue to use the Strait of Hormuz and threats against it to coerce its adversaries and deter future military action. Ending Iran's ability to disrupt shipping would demonstrate to Tehran that the United States and its partners can and will stop Iran by force if needed. It remains unclear whether military action will stop Iran from threatening the Strait. But ending the war without taking all feasible action to destroy Iran's ability to disrupt traffic would communicate Iran that it can use threats to the strait to defeat its adversaries, including the United States, in any future conflict.
The list of objectives also included “creating conditions for regime change.” It does not follow that “conditions for regime change” will create regime change.[4] The conditions for regime change may or may not exist after the war, but executing regime change would require a sufficiently strong, large, and organized force to topple the regime nationwide and then take control nationwide in order to avoid chaos or a large-scale indigenous movement to overthrow the regime. It is premature to forecast the likelihood of such an uprising, as the air campaign is not complete, and people are very unlikely to rise against the regime in the midst of an active air campaign.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy headquarters in Tehran on March 16.[5] It stated that commanders used the headquarters to direct IRGC Navy forces and plan operations against Israel and other regional countries. The IRGC Navy is primarily responsible for the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Iranian leaders have historically viewed the IRGC Navy as their main tool to disrupt commercial traffic near Iran's coast and around the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC Navy Commander Alireza Tangsiri implicitly threatened on March 1 to attack any vessels that transit the strait without permission from Iran.[7] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization has reported more than 20 maritime incidents in and around the strait since March 1.[8] The IRGC Navy also transports military equipment and other resources to Iranian proxy groups.[9]
Russia continues to expand its intelligence sharing and military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Russia has been providing Iran with satellite imagery and drone technology and advice to support Iran's strike campaign against Israeli and the US forces.[10] Anonymous sources familiar with the matter, including a senior European intelligence officer, told the WSJ that Russia provided Iran with modified Shahed drone components meant to improve communication, navigation, and targeting, and specific advice for conducting drone strikes, including at what altitude and how many drones Iran should launch. A senior European intelligence officer and a Middle Eastern diplomat reported that Russia provided Iran with satellite imagery, which another official said came from satellites the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) manage, to assist recent Iranian strikes on US forces in the Middle East and US allies in the region. ISW continues to assess that Russia sees aiding Iran's strike campaign as an opportunity to weaken the US, as Russia has self-defined the US as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[11]
The IDF conducted a strike in Tehran killing Ali Larijani. Larijani has long been a major figure in the Iranian ruling establishment as a member of the powerful Larijani family and key player in the inner circle of recently killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[12] He has held numerous key posts over decades, including parliament speaker and most recently Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary. The SNSC is the seniormost foreign and defense policy decision-making body. In that capacity, Larijani has overseen Iranian strategy in the current war and the brutal crackdown that killed 30,000 protesters in January 2026.[13] The New York Times reported in February 2026 that Larijani had “effectively been running the country” by that time.[14]
Larijani was a relative pragmatist, occasionally supporting more restrained behaviors compared to the more uncompromising hardliners. Larijani supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action championed by moderate President Hassan Rouhani, for instance. Nevertheless, Larijani was a long-time regime operative who had long endorsed and helped implement some of the regime's most aggressive and authoritarian policies.
Larijani’s death likely weakens a key faction in the intra-regime competition with the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei-IRGC nexus but will not end the ongoing competition. The New York Times reported on March 17 that Larijani had been lobbying the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for selecting the supreme leader, to change their vote in favor of a more moderate choice.[15] Anti-regime media reported on March 6 that Larijani had wanted his brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, to become the next Supreme Leader.[16] Anti-regime media reported in September 2025 that Ali Larijani was maneuvering to secure his influence in the regime after Khamenei dies.[17]
Competition within the regime over its future trajectory will continue despite Larijani’s death. Key factions continue to disagree over succession and governance after the combined force killed Ali Khamenei. Anti-regime media, citing unspecified sources, reported on March 13 that some clerics in Iran have raised concerns about Mojtaba’s physical condition and capacity to govern, for example.[18] Larijani’s death is also unlikely to be the last casualty from among Iran's top leaders as decapitation strikes continue. Each loss will alter the nature of the competition and the power of the various factions. Mojtaba will likely face several immediate challenges even after the war and after the decapitation strikes stop or slow. These challenges will include establishing his legitimacy and attempting to unite and gain the support of various regime factions.[19]

The IDF also killed Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani and his deputy Ghassem Ghoureishi during strikes on a “makeshift headquarters” in Tehran where, according to anti-regime media, they were reportedly coordinating protest suppression efforts.[20] The strike occurred overnight on March 16 and 17. Sources told anti-regime media that senior Basij commanders held a meeting that night to discuss plans to counter potential protests during the Iranian Chaharshanbe Suri holiday on March 17.[21] The report added that the Israeli strikes overnight killed around 300 Basij commanders and field officers.[22] Israeli strikes targeting senior Basij commanders are part of a broader US-Israeli effort to degrade repressive institutions in Iran. The Basij is a paramilitary organization that the Iranian armed forces use to recruit, indoctrinate, organize, and control regime loyalists.[23] The Basij focuses largely on producing and disseminating propaganda, social policing, suppressing domestic dissent, and conducting civil defense activities. The Basij maintains elite units that receive advanced military and “ideological-political” training and function as a manpower reserve for the IRGC Ground Forces. The IRGC Ground Forces incorporates these Basij units into its ranks, especially during times of war or domestic crisis. The Basij also cooperates extensively with the IRGC Intelligence Organization to monitor the Iranian population. Israeli airstrikes overnight killed the following individuals, among others:
· Gholamreza Soleimani. Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Soleimani as Basij Organization commander following the 2019 protests as part of a broader reshuffling of internal security leadership.[24] The United States sanctioned Soleimani in January 2020 for the Basij’s involvement in recruiting and sending child soldiers to fight in regional conflicts.[25] Soleimani previously commanded IRGC Ground Forces units and has an extensive history of repression.[26]
· Ghassem Ghoureishi. Former IRGC Commander Hossein Salami appointed Ghoureishi in 2021 during the same reshuffling period of internal security officials.[27] He previously served as the coordination deputy to the supreme leader's representative to the IRGC.[28] The European Union sanctioned Ghoureishi on March 16 for his role in protest suppression and human rights violations.[29]

more + maps: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/
Khatib is eliminated as well
Seventeen days in, Iran's supreme leader is dead, his successor is reportedly wounded and every principal instrument of Iranian power projection – missiles, nuclear infrastructure, air defences, the navy, proxy command networks – has been degraded beyond near-term recovery. The campaign's execution has been imperfect, its public communication poor and its post-conflict planning incomplete. War is never clean. But the strategy – the actual strategy, measured in degraded capabilities rather than cable news cycles – is working.
long article
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/3/16/the-us-israeli-strategy-against-iran-is-working-here-is-why
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iran's most important energy infrastructure, including facilities linked to the South Pars natural gas field and the Asaluyeh processing hub in Bushehr Province on March 18.[1] These facilities are central to Iran's domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system, which supports a significant portion of Iran's economic activity and regime revenue.[2] Iran consumes roughly 94 percent of its natural gas production internally, according to data by the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, meaning disruptions will primarily strain domestic supply.[3] Damage to these facilities will likely disrupt Iran's electricity generation capacity, given their role in supplying fuel to the power sector. Over 90 percent of Iran's electricity is generated by gas-powered thermal plants.[4] Israeli media reported on March 18 that the strikes reportedly damaged up to one-fifth of Iran's gas processing capacity.[5] Israel previously struck Iranian energy infrastructure, including gas processing facilities linked to the South Pars field and the Fajr-e Jam Gas Refinery in Bushehr Province, during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[6]
Iran exports a small share of its natural gas, primarily to Iraq and Turkey, meaning disruptions will also affect regional energy consumption.[7] An Iraqi official reported that Iranian gas flows to Iraq stopped completely following the strikes.[8] Disrupting natural gas supplies accounts for more than one-third of Iraq's gas and electricity needs, according to Iraq's electricity ministry.[9] Iran has repeatedly reduced gas exports to Iraq due to domestic shortages, which have previously caused electricity crises that contributed to unrest and protests in Iraq.[10] The United States has issued sanctions waivers since 2018 to allow Iraq to continue importing Iranian gas and electricity to mitigate such instability.[11] An unspecified Israeli official told Axios on March 18 that the strike was meant to signal that Israel could expand attacks on Iran's energy sector if Iran continues disrupting maritime trade and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.[12]
The IDF killed Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in an airstrike on March 18.[13] Both Iranian officials and the IDF confirmed his death on March 18.[14] Khatib was responsible for coordinating the regime's repression of the Iranian population in his role within the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, including overseeing the regime‘s crackdowns on the Winter 2025-2026 protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[15] The United States sanctioned both Khatib and the ministry in 2022 for engaging in cyber attacks against the United States and allies.[16] Khatib’s killing follows Israel's March 17 assassinations of prominent regime officials, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Larijani and Basij Commander Gholamreza Soleimani.[17] It is unclear how or where the IDF targeted Khatib, but the Wall Street Journal reported on March 18 that tips from Iranian civilians led to the strikes that killed Soleimani.[18]
The combined force's decapitation campaign and targeting of security services is reportedly causing paranoia among Iranian regime officials and members of Iranian security services. Israeli strikes targeting internal security services are reportedly hurting “rank-and-file morale” and are driving security forces to sleep in vehicles, mosques, or sports facilities in order to avoid targeting.[19] Israel reportedly learned of an Iranian effort to shield security forces in local sports complexes in the event of targeting, according to the Wall Street Journal.[20] Israeli strikes on sports complexes hosting security forces have reportedly been among the “deadliest” of the war and killed hundreds of security services and military personnel.[21] Some residents also reported that some Tehran police stations have been abandoned.[22] Tips from Iranian civilians have contributed to Israeli targeting of locally positioned security personnel as the war has continued.[23] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 18 that Israeli intelligence officers have been placing individual calls to Iranian commanders to threaten them to stand aside during civil uprisings.[24] Israel employed a similar tactic during the June 2025 12-Day War.[25]
The combined force struck multiple Iranian internal security targets on March 18, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) facilities in Tehran, Alborz, and Lorestan Provinces.[26] The LEC is Iran's primary uniformed police force responsible for law enforcement and crowd control.[27] The Basij is a paramilitary organization subordinate to the IRGC that the regime uses extensively to suppress protests and enforce internal security. The IDF stated on March 18 that Israeli aircraft struck the LEC logistics and support division and an IRGC security unit headquarters responsible for suppressing protests in western Tehran Province.[28] The LEC logistics and support division is responsible for sustaining police operations, including equipment supply, vehicle maintenance, storage, distribution of riot-control gear, and general logistical support to internal security forces. The combined force previously struck the main building on March 3.[29] These strikes will likely degrade the regime's internal security capabilities by disrupting the sustainment, mobility, and operational readiness of forces responsible for protest suppression. An unspecified Israeli official told anti-regime media on March 18 that Israeli drones targeted Basij and LEC patrols attempting to approach locations where Chaharshanbe Suri celebrations were taking place.[30] The official added that the attacks disrupted Iran's repression apparatus and effectively created “an air umbrella” for civilians during the celebrations.[31] Footage circulating on social media shows LEC and Basij personnel taking cover under bridges or establishing checkpoints in tunnels in order to avoid aerial surveillance and drone strikes.[32]
The combined force has widely targeted elements of Iran's internal security apparatus that contribute to the repression of the Iranian population, as CTP-ISW has extensively documented. The IDF has reportedly dropped at least 2,200 munitions on targets affiliated with the IRGC, Basij, and other internal security forces.[33] The combined force has targeted internal security institutions at the highest level – such as the Basij Organization Headquarters – down to Basij street checkpoints and local police stations, particularly in Tehran, since the war began. An Israeli targeting list seen by the Wall Street Journal included LEC computer equipment, vehicles, and police gear, for example.[34] The IDF reportedly targeted motorcycle units involved in protest suppression on an unspecified date, likely referring to the Imam Ali Battalions.[35] The Imam Ali Battalions are Basij security units trained and equipped to suppress urban protests and conduct anti-riot operations and intimidate and arrest protesters under IRGC direction.[36]
Israeli strikes on Iran's internal security apparatus have not only been concentrated in Tehran, however. The combined force has targeted numerous internal security installations throughout Iran's northwestern provinces, which are home to Kurdish-populated areas and are also hotspots for protests and civil unrest. Documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal confirmed that the IDF has recently struck around 34 distinct internal security targets in Ilam Province.[37] CTP-ISW has observed at least 14 strikes on internal security sites in Ilam Province in northwestern Iran since the beginning of the war (see below).[38]


more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/