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Iran Update Evening Special Report: March 16, 2026

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s reported inner circle is dominated by long-standing hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders. Their influence will almost certainly drive Iran toward more hardline, anti-Western policies and deepen existing patterns of regime corruption and securitization. The New York Times reported on March 16 that former IRGC Intelligence Organization head Hossein Taeb, de facto IRGC Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, and Parliament Speaker and former IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf were the main campaigners to get the Assembly of Experts to elect Mojtaba as supreme leader.[1] All four of these IRGC commanders worked for decades under former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[2] The first generation of Iranian revolutionaries and long-time IRGC leaders thus remain at the top of the Iranian regime‘s hierarchy despite decapitation strikes in recent years. The New York Times article cited interviews from five senior Iranian officials, two clerics, two Iranians affiliated with the supreme leader's office and three IRGC members with knowledge of the selection process.[3] Mojtaba also selected former IRGC commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei as his military adviser on March 16.[4] Mojtaba has had strong ties to the IRGC that date back to when he fought in the Iran-Iraq War in the Habib Ibn Mazahir Battalion within the IRGC 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Division.[5]

Hossein Taeb helped Mojtaba engineer the 2005 presidential election in favor of hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[6] Taeb later led the Basij‘s suppression of subsequent protests in the 2009 Green Movement as the Basij commander.[7] The United States sanctioned Taeb in 2010 for his involvement in protest suppression.[8] Taeb went on to serve as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the parallel organization to the Intelligence Ministry, from 2009 to 2022, and then served as adviser to the IRGC Commander.[9] Taeb reportedly pressured all 88 Assembly members to vote for Mojtaba as Supreme Leader, resulting in 59 members ultimately voting in his favor.[10]

Ahmad Vahidi is a long-time hardliner who has held some of the regime's top security posts, including IRGC Quds Force commander, defense and armed logistics minister, interior minister, and Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[11] The United States sanctioned Vahidi for his role in directing Law Enforcement Command during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[12] Vahidi’s abrupt reassignment in December 2025 from AFGS deputy chief to the IRGC deputy commander followed reported clashes with Artesh leaders over post-June 2025 Israel-Iran War air defense priorities.[13]

Ali Jafari similarly has consistently pursued an uncompromising hardline domestic policy, treating reformists and protest movements as “internal enemies” of the regime and deploying IRGC, Basij, and plainclothes units to suppress dissent and intimidate political rivals.[14] The United States also sanctioned Jafari in 2010 for his role in suppressing the 2009 Green Movement protests as IRGC commander.[15] Jafari adopted asymmetrical and extra-territorial warfare that positioned the IRGC to project power beyond Iran's borders.[16]

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is a veteran IRGC hardliner whose deep ties to senior commanders – dating back to his service as IRGC Air Force chief, Law Enforcement Command (LEC) chief, and in the Iran-Iraq War – have anchored his aggressive approach to domestic security and regime preservation.[17] Ghalibaf reportedly assumed an emergency senior military command after Israeli killed top commanders at the start of the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, an unprecedented move for a sitting civilian parliament speaker that underscored his entrenched influence and the unprecedented damage Iran's command and control network suffered in June.[18]

Mohsen Rezaei is a senior regime insider and long-standing member of the Supreme Leader-appointed Expediency Discernment Council, whose hardline worldview was shaped by his tenure as IRGC commander from 1981 to 1997 – including through the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 – and his continued role advising core strategic polices.[19] Rezaei is also implicated in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina that killed 85 people. He remains the subject of an Interpol Red Notice.[20]

IRGC commanders reportedly view the conflict with the United States and Israel as a unifying national struggle that also reduces pressure on the regime to address Iran's mounting economic problems. An informed source told anti-regime outlet Iran Wire on March 16 that an IRGC official told President Masoud Pezeshkian that the US and Israeli airstrikes have united the Iranian population behind the regime as the Iran-Iraq War once had, at a meeting where Pezeshkian had asked about the IRGC’s plans for post-war economic recovery.[21] Pezeshkian warned that such thinking amounted to planning for renewed repression rather than genuine post-war recovery or governance, according to the source.[22] The president's question to IRGC about plans about domestic policy, if accurate, reinforces recent reporting on the command the IRGC holds in current foreign and domestic policy decision-making.[23]

The Iranian regime has taken steps to further restrict the flow of information out of Iran, which will almost certainly limit ISW-CTP’s ability to observe strikes in Iran. Internet monitor NetBlocks reported on March 16 that the regime has further tightened internet restrictions. A BBC reporter stated on March 15 that the regime has reportedly started to target individuals with Starlink access and reduced the availability of VPNs.

The combined force targeted a likely Iranian drone facility in South Khorasan Province in one of the combined force's easternmost strikes since the war began. The strike indicates that combined force aircraft can operate deep inside Iranian territory.

Iran has not attacked any vessels in the Strait of Hormuz since March 12. Anti-regime media also published footage on March 12 that shows a US Navy F/A-18 Hornet engaging targets with its auto cannon at extremely low altitude in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, which is on the Iranian coast on the Gulf of Oman. This suggests that US forces have at least local air dominance along certain segments of the coast, which would enable US aircraft to engage drones and anti-ship cruise missiles at low altitudes to protect shipping if ordered to do so.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-16-2026/