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Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 12, 2026

The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security, defense industrial, and military targets across Iran. ISW-CTP has observed strikes in 11 provinces since 3:00 PM ET on March 11.

Iran is continuing to target commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to disrupt maritime traffic and threaten freedom of navigation. Suspected improvised Iranian unmanned surface vessels (USV) hit the US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged SAFESEA VISHNU and the Malta-flagged ZEFYROS off the coast of Basra, Iraq, overnight on March 11 and 12.

Iran continued to attack the Gulf States and Israel. Iran launched projectiles targeting civilian and oil infrastructure in the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Hezbollah has claimed 27 attacks targeting IDF forces and positions in northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 3:00 PM ET on March 11. Hezbollah's 27 claimed attacks mark the highest number of attacks claimed by Hezbollah in an 18-hour period that ISW-CTP has observed since the start of the conflict.

The IDF is preparing to expand its ground activity in southern Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Katz and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the IDF to prepare for an “expansion of IDF activity in Lebanon.”

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026/

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 12, 2026

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued his first statement on March 12 after the Assembly of Experts selected him as the new supreme leader on March 8 [1]:

Khamenei reaffirmed the regime's commitment to Iran's war effort in order to achieve Iran's long-standing objectives, including the erosion and eventual expulsion of American influence from the Middle East and the destruction of the Israeli state. A news anchor read Khamenei’s statement on state media. Khamenei made the following key points in his statement:

Reaffirmed Iran's commitment to disrupt international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Khamenei stated that Iran “must continue” to block the Strait of Hormuz. He added that Iran may “[open] additional fronts where the enemy is extremely vulnerable.”[2] Khamenei did not specify what “fronts” he was referring to. The Houthis have not conducted attacks in response to the combined force's campaign in Iran or Israeli operations in Lebanon; they have likewise issued no threats or signaled intent to retaliate for US-Israeli strikes in Iran.[3]

Reaffirmed Iran's intent to attack regional countries that host US bases. Khamenei falsely claimed that Iranian strikes in regional countries target only US facilities rather than the host countries themselves.[4] Iran has struck sites in Middle Eastern countries since the start of the war that are not US bases, including a drone strike on the Hayat Palace Hotel in Bahrain on March 3 and strikes on energy and maritime infrastructure in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[5] Khamenei stated that Iran will continue to attack regional countries.[6]

Reaffirmed Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance. Khamenei described the resistance movement as “an inseparable part of the Islamic Revolution's values.”[7] The “Axis of Resistance” is the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. Iran provides these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for influence or control over their actions. Iran and the Axis of Resistance have carried out numerous attacks on US assets across the region. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah have launched attacks on US and Israeli assets, respectively, since the start of the war on February 28.[8]

Khamenei also emphasized the importance of unity among the Iranian people. He encouraged Iranians to attend Quds Day ceremonies on March 13, likely, in part, to project an image of unity amid the war and concerns about regime stability.[9] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) similarly called on Iranians to attend the Quds Day march.[10]

An Iranian-linked hacker group conducted a cyberattack on a US healthcare company on March 11, which is likely part of an Iranian effort to target the US healthcare system in order to impose political pressure on the US administration. Iran has undertaken a similar effort to impose political pressure on the United States by striking oil infrastructure in the region and oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.

The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian internal security and military sites across Iran. CTP-ISW has observed strikes in ten provinces since 8:00 AM ET on March 12.

Anti-regime media reported that the Iranian armed forces are facing deepening fractures between the Artesh and the IRGC amid severe supply shortages, citing unspecified informed sources.[37] The sources stated that IRGC forces have refused to transport wounded Artesh soldiers to hospitals despite access to medical facilities. IRGC officials have reportedly rejected Artesh requests for additional support because of limited resources. The sources added that the Artesh faces a severe shortage of ammunition and basic supplies such as food and water. The sources stated that even traditionally well-resourced elements of Iran's military, including the IRGC’s missile units, are facing supply shortages. IRGC leadership has reportedly prioritized the delivery of technical components to keep missile systems operational over sending basic resources or individual equipment to forces. The sources also said that the IRGC attempted to mobilize reserve forces earlier this week, but several individuals did not report to military centers. Some Western media reports have indicated that there are no signs of mass defections within the Iranian armed forces or fractures within the regime yet, however.[38]

Recent US Central Command (CENTCOM) operations are attempting to limit Iran's ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM said on March 12 that it has destroyed over 30 Iranian minelaying ships and that it has targeted naval mine warehouses and manufacturing facilities across Iran.

Hezbollah appears to be relying more heavily on drones to attack IDF forces and positions. Hezbollah's reliance on drones is notable given that Hezbollah did not heavily rely on drones during the October 7 War.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/

Just in case you or your friends whom you send info about this war in Iran don’t know the difference between Artesh and the IRGC (Iranian Republican Guard Corp) here is AI info:

“AI Overview:
==The Artesh (Islamic Republic of Iran Army) is Iran’s conventional military, responsible for protecting national borders and territorial integrity. As one of two parallel Iranian militaries—the other being the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—the Artesh focuses on traditional warfare with ground, air, navy, and air defense branches.

Key Aspects of the Artesh:
—Role & Structure: Unlike the ideological IRGC, the Artesh is a conventional force with approximately 340,000–420,000 active personnel. It oversees national security and conventional defense.
—Branches: It comprises the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense Force.
—Leadership: The Commander-in-Chief is appointed directly by Iran’s Supreme Leader, ensuring loyalty.
—Distinction from IRGC: While the Artesh focuses on conventional territorial defense, the IRGC handles asymmetric warfare and protects the Islamic establishment’s internal structure.
—Origins: The Artesh predates the 1979 Islamic Revolution (formerly the Imperial State of Iran army), leading to historical suspicion regarding its loyalty, although it has since been deeply integrated with political ideological officers.

==The Artesh works under the general supervision of the Armed Forces General Staff and is heavily involved in managing border areas.”

Given that the IRGC seems to be holding on to the goodies itself, and not supplying Artesh with needed food and other supplies, how likely is a rift between the two bodies? Has any of the top leadership of Artesh been deliberately killed as compared to top leadership of the IRGC? I believe the Israelis made a point of hitting top IRGC command. Below is more info on the IRGC from AI, with some [additions] by me:

“AI Overview
==The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Artesh are parallel military branches in Iran. The IRGC is an elite, ideologically driven force tasked with protecting the regime and expanding its influence, while the Artesh is the conventional army responsible for defending national borders. The IRGC holds superior funding, political influence, and control over missile and, through the Quds Force, foreign operations, whereas the Artesh holds more traditional military roles.

Key Differences:
*Role and Mission:
—IRGC (Guardians of the Revolution): Created in 1979 to prevent internal threats and protect the Islamic system, it holds high ideological, political, and economic power.
—Artesh (Conventional Army): Focused on conventional defense of Iran’s territory, borders, and airspace.

*Command Structure & Loyalty:
—IRGC: Reports directly to the Supreme Leader, functioning as his personal army.
—Artesh: Operates separately but is seen as less ideologically aligned than the IRGC.

*Funding and Resources: The IRGC is better funded and equipped, controlling major parts of the economy, whereas the Artesh often operates with older, conventional hardware.

*Structure and Units:
—IRGC: Comprised of ground forces, navy, air force, and the Quds Force (foreign operations), along with control over the Basij militia. [AI did not include numbers of troops, but I saw a while ago something like 1/2 million.]
—Artesh: Traditional military structure (Navy, Army, Air Force).

*Influence: The IRGC has a widespread presence across provinces and wields significant influence in regional conflicts, while the Artesh is generally more limited to conventional, domestic defense. [IRGC also controls the Basij, formed in 1979 by Khomeini and comprised of volunteer young Iranians and loyalists to the regime. Basij claims to have a presence in many public institutions including factories, universities, and schools, according to Wikipedia. (numbers unknown)]

Note: The two organizations are intentionally kept as rivals by Iran’s leadership to prevent coups, resulting in overlapping responsibilities but separate operations, say videos on Facebook from Aljazeera.”

I suspect a lot of the future of this war in Iran will depend on whether the Artesh can be convinced to support a possible pre Islamic style new government with more freedom for the people.

Here are additional thoughts looking at the likelihood of a split between the national Iranian army Artesh and the Mullah’s army IRGC. I further asked about the likelihood of Artesh supporting Reza Palavi’s efforts to help form a nationally approved democracy-based Iranian government.

“AI Overview:
==As of March 2026, the likelihood of a serious split between Iran’s Artesh (regular army) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has increased due to intense, ongoing conflict, with reports suggesting the deepest fractures in four decades. While the regime has historically managed to keep these forces divided and loyal, severe operational pressures and resource shortages have heightened tensions, potentially making Artesh support for a transition, such as one supported by Reza Pahlavi, more plausible than in previous years, though still difficult to execute.

*Likelihood of a Split Between Artesh and IRGC:
—Deepening Rifts: Reports from March 2026 indicate that the IRGC’s prioritization of its own resources, such as missile components, over supplying the conventional army has led to significant anger within the Artesh.
—Widespread Desertions: The intensifying rivalry is resulting in “group desertions” from the Artesh, with soldiers losing faith in the command structure and leaving posts.
—Operational Friction: The Artesh has reportedly refused to assist with certain IRGC, “suicidal” missions and has in some cases, refused to participate in suppressing street protests.
—Structural Safeguards: Despite these issues, the regime has for decades ensured that senior Artesh commanders are heavily vetted, with many being ex-IRGC personnel, making a united coup against the IRGC difficult. The IRGC also retains a “counter-coup” capacity should the Artesh act.
—Outcome Uncertain: If the regime shows signs of imminent collapse, some Artesh elements might seek to side with the population to avoid being targeted in a post-regime scenario.

*Artesh Support for a Reza Pahlavi-Supported Government:
—Direct Appeals: Reza Pahlavi has actively targeted military personnel, asking them to “separate from the remnants of the regime and join the side of the nation”.
—A “National Salvation” Positioning: As the regime falters, the Artesh may see itself as an “institution of national salvation”. However, this does not guarantee backing for a Pahlavi-led government, as some military elements might prefer a military-led transitional government (like a “Bonapartist” solution) to ensure stability.
—Challenges of Support: For the Artesh to support an opposition leader like Pahlavi, they would need to break with the supreme leader and the hardline IRGC, which would likely lead to internal armed conflict.
—Conditional Support: While many in the rank-and-file may favor a change, top commanders’ loyalty is linked to the regime’s survival. Support for Pahlavi would likely only materialize if the IRGC’s dominance is clearly broken first.

Conclusion on the Power Shift:
==The most likely scenario if a split occurs is not an immediate, united move by the Artesh to back a new government, but rather a chaotic period of “split loyalties” where different commanders make local decisions. While Pahlavi’s “National Cooperation Campaign” aims to bridge the gap with the military, the success of such support remains dependent on the level of destruction inflicted upon the IRGC leadership by external forces.”

Since IRGC has already angered Artesh by refusing to help wounded Artesh soldiers into hospitals for treatment, and further refused other supplies, probably including food and ammunition, it should almost certainly get worse as fighting continues. IRGC’s greed for the nations electrical power to monopolize it for the production of Bitcoin and their own wealth and power must certainly have angered the population as IRGC denied electrical power to hospitals and parts of cities. This will only get much worse as drought conditions complete drying up the reservoirs that power the electrical systems.

Suggestions of moving water short cities like Tehran and it’s 10 million people to coastal regions which will be served by desalinated sea water will not happen quickly or cheaply. Lack of water to provide for Tehran people’s physical or electrical needs can only get worse during an ongoing war, as will happen in many other areas. Soon even people who favor Islam will tire of IRGC’s fanatical selfishness and disregard for the people’s most basic needs for water, food, and medical care. This crisis will occur in many areas of Iran. At that point the Artesh will face serious decisions of it’s own.

Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 13, 2026

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck multiple internal security sites in Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran overnight on March 12 and 13, including the Khuzestan Province Law Enforcement Command Headquarters, Artesh Ground Forces 292nd Armored Brigade, and an unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces headquarters.

The US and Israeli combined force has continued to target Iranian air defense systems in order to degrade Iran’s ability to defend against combined force attacks. Bloomberg, citing Israeli assessments, reported on March 12 that US-Israeli strikes have destroyed up to 80 percent of Iran’s air defenses.

The combined force has also continued to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure. Two Western assessments on March 12 estimated that combined force strikes have destroyed around 60 percent of Iran’s missile launchers, with one of the assessments estimating that the combined force has degraded up to 80 percent of Iran’s “offensive capability.”

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on March 12 that six US servicemembers died in an incident involving a US KC-135 refueling tanker and another aircraft in “friendly airspace” in western Iraq. CENTCOM noted that the incident was not caused by hostile or friendly fire.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-13-2026/

Iran Update Evening Special Report, March 13, 2026

The US-Israeli combined force continued to target Iranian internal security infrastructure on March 13 in order to degrade the regime’s repressive capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on March 12 during his first press conference since the war started that Israel is “creating the optimal conditions for toppling the regime.”

The combined force has continued to target Iranian defense industrial sites across Iran. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on March 13 that US and Israeli strikes have “functionally defeated” Iran’s ballistic missile production capacity by destroying Iran’s defense companies and production lines across Iran that manufacture missile components.

Iran is selectively allowing some ships to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian attacks against civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz since Iran struck a Chinese-state-owned Liberian-flagged vessel at 10:19 PM ET on March 11. Iran seems to be trying to disrupt commercial shipping with missiles and drones while avoiding the economic and political consequences of mining the Strait completely.

Israeli officials are reportedly discussing the potential expansion of Israeli ground operations in Lebanon. Israeli media reported that Israeli security and defense officials are examining several options, ranging from an expansive ground operation reaching the Litani River to more limited actions in southern Lebanon.

details + maps: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-13-2026/