Iran is unlikely to make any meaningful nuclear concessions in its upcoming draft proposal to the United States. Iran may calculate that it can delay the strikes if it offers a sufficiently conciliatory proposal, however. US President Donald Trump gave Iran on February 20 a deadline of “10 to 15 days” to agree to a nuclear deal. Current and former US officials speaking to the Washington Post on February 19 said that the United States may be ready to launch an extended military assault on Iran but is waiting for the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford.[1] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with Western media on February 20 that Iran will present a proposal to the United States “in the next two or three days” that can then be “seriously” discussed in a future round of talks to occur “within a week or a little more.”[2] Araghchi also claimed that the United States did not demand zero uranium enrichment during the last round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Geneva on February 17.[3] A US official speaking to MS Now on February 20 clarified that the US negotiating team confirmed Trump‘s zero-enrichment demand but told Iran to present the safeguards it will place on its nuclear program.[4] Araghchi may have been attempting to delay future talks, which is a negotiating strategy the regime has previously adopted with the United States.[5] Iranian negotiators have previously offered to dilute enrichment levels or build a regional enrichment facility on Iranian soil, which clearly do not meet the stated US demand for zero enrichment, in order to continue negotiations without encroaching on Iran's red lines.[6]
Iran could use any delay in talks to continue to prepare for a potential military conflict with the United States or Israel. Iranian military officials have made numerous visits to Iranian air defense and naval bases in recent weeks to inspect their defensive capabilities and combat readiness.[7] Khatam ol Anbiya Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Elhami visited the Khatam ol Anbiya Northwestern Air Defense Zone Base in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on February 10, the Shahid Zarafati Group in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province, on February 18, and the Khatam ol Anbiya Eastern Air Defense Zone Base in Birjand, South Khorasan Province, on February 20.[8] Artesh Navy Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Faramarz Bemani also inspected the Shahid Nezafat Naval Base in Pasabandar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on February 15.[9] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi inspected an unspecified IRGC aerospace underground missile facility on February 4.[10] All of these inspections are presumably last-ditch efforts to ensure that the Iranian armed forces are as prepared as possible.
Iranians held 20 protests on February 20—one more than on February 19—which indicates continued public anger and frustration with the regime for its refusal to address the people's grievances. CTP-ISW recorded 20 anti-regime protests on February 20 across eight provinces at memorials that marked the end of the 40-day mourning period for protesters killed by security forces during the January 2025 protests.[11] Five of these protests involved at least 1,000 individuals.[12] Protests may be occurring beyond what CTP-ISW has recorded due to the regime's severe internet restrictions that continue to limit the information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW observed that some protesters intentionally paused or cut their video recordings before they began chanting anti-regime slogans.[13] US President Donald Trump stated on February 20 that the regime killed 32,000 people during the recent protest wave. Trump added that the regime paused its plan to execute 837 protesters two weeks ago due to Trump's warning that the United States would strike Iran without waiting for negotiations if the regime executes protesters.[14] The regime has reportedly sentenced at least 26 protesters to death at the time of this writing, including one minor, according to Radio Farda, however.[15] CTP-ISW assessed on January 15 that the regime had suppressed the recent protest wave, but not the proto-revolutionary movement that has driven the repeated protest waves over the last decade. The unsustainable nature of the regime's securitization measures and the regime's unwillingness to address the underlying issues make it difficult for the regime to stop future protest waves.[16]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-20-2026/
A senior US official told Axios on February 22 that the United States and Iran may discuss the possibility of an interim deal during the third round of negotiations in Geneva on February 26.[1] An interim deal that only addresses Iran's nuclear program would enable Iran to drag out the current negotiations and likely not meet the United States’ core nuclear demands. An Iranian official told Reuters on February 22 that the “possibility of reaching an interim deal exists.”[2] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson rejected the possibility of an interim deal, however.[3] Israeli media separately reported on February 22 that the United States is pursuing an agreement with multiple “stages” in which the United States will address Iran's nuclear program in the first stage and Iran's ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance in later stages.[4] An interim agreement that only addresses the nuclear issue would enable Iran to drag out the current talks. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian officials may be floating the possibility of talks about non-nuclear issues, including Iran's ballistic missile program, to try to drag out the talks and thereby delay potential US military action.[5] Dragging out the talks would also give Iran more time to prepare for potential military conflict.[6]
An interim deal focused on the nuclear issue would also unlikely meet the United States’ stated demand for zero enrichment. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani will reportedly travel to Oman on February 24 to deliver Iran's official response to the United States’ demands through Omani mediators.[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized in an interview with Face the Nation on February 22 that Iran has “every right to enjoy a peaceful nuclear program, including enrichment.”[8] An Iranian official speaking to Reuters on February 22 said that Iran would “seriously consider” sending half of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad, diluting the rest of its stockpile, and creating a regional enrichment consortium in exchange for the United States recognizing Iran's “right” to enrich uranium and lifting its economic sanctions on Iran.[9] These proposed terms would not meet the stated US demand for zero enrichment. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff confirmed to Fox News on February 21 that US President Donald Trump's “red lines” include zero enrichment.[10]
There are some conflicting reports about the United States’ position on enrichment. Axios reported on February 22 that Witkoff and Jared Kushner told Araghchi during the second round of talks that the United States would be willing to consider an Iranian proposal that includes “token enrichment” if Iran can prove that its proposal would block Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.[11] The New York Times similarly reported that the United States and Iran are considering a proposal in which Iran would have a “very limited nuclear enrichment program” that Iran could only use for medical research and treatments.[12] These reports contradict Witkoff’s statement that Trump's red lines include zero enrichment.
Some Iranian regime officials may calculate that capitulating to the United States in negotiations would harm the regime more than potential military conflict. A Middle Eastern source with knowledge of the US-Iran negotiations told Fox News on February 20 that Iranian negotiators are not authorized to cross Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s red line on ballistic missiles because any Iranian concessions on its missile program would be viewed internally as the equivalent of losing a war.[13] This report is consistent with Iranian officials’ previous statements that ruled out any negotiations on Iran's ballistic missiles.[14] Iran's ballistic missiles are an integral part of its defense and deterrence strategies. Any changes to these strategies would require a strategic rethink that would take months, if not years.[15] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone programs over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[16]
US President Donald Trump is reportedly leaning toward conducting a limited strike against Iran that would aim to pressure Iran to make concessions on its nuclear program, according to sources familiar with the Trump administration's deliberations speaking to the New York Times on February 22.[17] The sources said that Trump told his advisers that he would consider a more comprehensive air campaign aimed at toppling the regime if Iran did not give into US demands after diplomacy or a limited US attack.[18] A senior adviser to Trump told Axios on February 20 that the US Department of Defense has presented Trump with several options, including a plan to kill Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who is widely considered a top contender to succeed his father.[19] The New York Times report is consistent with a February 19 Wall Street Journal report that Trump is considering a limited strike on Iran to pressure the regime to reach a nuclear agreement.[20] The Trump administration's deliberations come amid a large number of US military deployments to the region, including the imminent arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group.[21]
Iranians have held at least 32 protests–the majority of which were student-led anti-regime protests–since February 21, which highlights the Iranian population's continued anger and frustration with the regime for its refusal to address its people's grievances. CTP-ISW has recorded 26 anti-regime protests at 17 universities across Iran since February 21.[22] Twenty of these protests occurred at 14 universities in Tehran City.[23] CTP-ISW also recorded three instances of clashes between pro- and anti-regime students at three different universities in Tehran City on February 22 and 23.[24] BBC Persian reported on February 23 that the regime has highly securitized university campuses.[25] Iranian media also reported that universities have warned students against protesting amid the 40-day mourning ceremonies.[26] The Iranian regime almost certainly views university students as a threat to the regime, given that university students played a key role in sustaining the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement.[27] CTP-ISW observed multiple protests at university campuses in December 2025 and January 2026, but students were not at the forefront of the recent protests.[28]
CTP-ISW separately recorded six anti-regime protests in Fars, Esfahan, and Gilan provinces between February 20 and 23.[29] These protests took place at memorials marking the end of the 40-day mourning period for protesters killed by Iranian security forces during the December 2025 and January 2026 protests.[30] Iranian security forces shot at protesters outside a Law Enforcement Command station in Abdanan, Ilam Province.[31]
Various Western media outlets have reported that senior Iranian regime officials are competing for influence following the Israel-Iran War and ahead of potential renewed conflict with the United States and Israel. Some of the claims in these reports are consistent across Western media outlets, while others are not.
The following claims are consistent across Western media reports:
SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani has assumed a prominent decision-making role within the Iranian regime in recent months. The New York Times reported on February 22 that Khamenei tasked Larijani with “steering the country” during the recent protests and that Larijani has “effectively been running the country” since then.[32] The report cited six senior Iranian officials, including one affiliated with Khamenei’s office, and three IRGC members. An English-language diaspora outlet, IranWire, citing a former regime official, reported on January 18 that Larijani oversaw the regime's crackdown on the recent protests.[33] The New York Times report's claim about Larijani’s influential role within the regime is also consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that moderate and pragmatic hardliners, including Larijani, have driven the regime's restructuring efforts since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.[34] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Larijani as the secretary of Iran's highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the SNSC, after the war, for example.[35] The January 18 IranWire article added that Larijani is preparing to “lead the system after Khamenei’s death.”[36] IranWire, citing an Iranian diplomat, similarly reported in September 2025 that Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are maneuvering to secure their influence in the regime after Khamenei dies.[37] Larijani has also played an important role in developing Iran's relations with Russia, the People's Republic of China, and the Axis of Resistance, in addition to engaging in diplomacy with Western officials.[38] Larijani, alongside Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, has played a central role in the recent US-Iran talks.[39]
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reportedly played a central role in commanding Iranian forces during the Israel-Iran War and has shaped Iran's restructuring efforts after the war. The February 22 New York Times report stated that Ghalibaf is part of Khamenei’s trusted inner circle.[40] The report added that Khamenei designated Ghalibaf as a “de facto deputy” to command the Iranian armed forces if the United States attacks Iran. Ghalibaf previously commanded the IRGC Air Force but has held a senior civilian political post since September 2005.[41] An Iranian official claimed in October 2025 that Ghalibaf assumed a very senior military command during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War after Israel killed several senior Iranian commanders.[42] Ghalibaf has also played a significant role in the regime's restructuring efforts after the Israel-Iran War. Ghalibaf reportedly advocated for the establishment of the Defense Council and for the Defense Council to operate independently of the SNSC, for example.[43] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Ghalibaf’s prominent role within the regime, similar to Larijani, is part of a broader trend of pragmatic regime elements leading the restructuring of Iran's decision-making apparatus following the 12-day war.[44]
President Masoud Pezeshkian has limited influence within the regime. The New York Times reported on February 22 that Pezeshkian appears to have deferred his authority to Larijani and that Larijani has assumed greater influence over the negotiations between the United States and Iran.[45] The Guardian similarly reported on February 22 that US officials believe that Pezeshkian has become increasingly sidelined in negotiations, although the officials did not provide evidence for this assessment.[46] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on February 3 that Araghchi and Larijani have exerted greater influence in negotiations than Pezeshkian despite the president's formal authority over the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the SNSC.[47]
The following claims are inconsistent across Western media reports:
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly been sidelined. The February 22 Guardian report claimed that Khamenei, like Pezeshkian, has been sidelined in the US-Iran negotiations.[48] Some reports after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War similarly suggested that Khamenei was sidelined during and after the war.[49] An X account attributed to Israel's Mossad claimed in October 2025 that Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour had sidelined Khamenei and were “making decisions independently,” for example.[50] The account did not provide evidence for this claim. The February 22 New York Times report identified Hejazi as a member of Khamenei’s inner circle.[51] The New York Times report suggests that Khamenei has played a central role in preparing for a possible renewed conflict with the United States, such as by appointing successors for key regime positions.
The regime is considering choosing former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to lead Iran if the United States or Israel kills Khamenei and other senior leaders in a future conflict. The February 22 New York Times report claimed that “the Iranian leadership,” presumably referring to Khamenei, selected Rouhani as a possible option to govern Iran if the United States or Israel kills Khamenei.[52] Khamenei’s reported support for Rouhani is inconsistent with reports that Rouhani has attempted to sideline Khamenei. A French outlet, citing unspecified sources, reported on February 22 that Rouhani led an effort during the recent protests to remove Khamenei.[53] The source added that Larijani blocked the effort, which further highlights Larijani’s influential role in the regime and close relationship with Khamenei. Rouhani has repeatedly criticized the regime's approach to its relations with the West and domestic unrest.[54] Iranian media outlets have accused Rouhani of fueling division.[55] The French media report, if true, may reflect Rouhani’s efforts since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War to reassert his political influence.[56] Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime's policy regarding the war.[57]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-23-2026/