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Iran Update, February 4, 2026

Iran and the United States are expected to hold talks in Oman on February 6, despite the brief cancellation of the meeting on February 4.[1] Iran continues to show inflexibility toward addressing US demands, which reduces the likelihood that Iran and the United States will be able to reach a diplomatic solution.[2] The United States and Iran had previously agreed to hold talks in Istanbul, Turkey, on February 6, with other regional states participating.[3] Iran's refusal to show flexibility over the location and format of the talks prompted a brief cancellation of the planned US-Iran talks on February 4, according to two unspecified US officials.[4] The Iranian regime also pushed for bilateral US-Iran talks and restrictions that would limit the talks to the Iranian nuclear program, instead of broader negotiations desired by the United States that would address the ballistic missile program and Iran's support for regional proxies.[5] Unspecified officials separately told Axios on February 4 that at least nine regional countries urged the United States not to cancel the talks in ”high-level” messages, which led to a US decision to hold the February 6 talks despite the earlier cancellation.[6] The sources added that the Trump administration remains “very skeptical” that negotiations will proceed.[7]

The administration's skepticism is in response to Iran's efforts to limit the scope of the negotiations. The Trump administration seeks to discuss Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and support for its proxy network. Iran has signaled that it intends to limit US-Iranian discussions to nuclear issues, almost certainly because it is unwilling to make concessions on either of those two priorities.[8] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program or support for its proxy and partner network, which constitute the main pillars of Iran's deterrence and defense strategies.[9] Supreme Leader Representative to the Supreme National Security Council's Defense Council Ali Shamkhani told a Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated outlet on February 2 that Iran will “definitely continue” to support the Axis of Resistance.[10]

A UK-based Middle East-focused outlet reported on February 3 that some Iranian regime policymakers believe that the only credible deterrent against US military action is the threat of a prolonged, costly war. The outlet reported that Iranian regime members have concluded that limited retaliatory Iranian military action can no longer deter the United States from taking military action against Iran.[11] Previous Iranian strikes that targeted US assets in the region failed to deter US military action, such as Iran‘s strikes targeting Ain al Assad airbase in Iraq in 2020 (in response to the United States’ targeted killing of former IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani) and al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in June 2025 (in retaliation for the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program).[12] Iran now finds itself under threat of potential US military action once again, despite its strike on al Udeid in June 2025. Iranian officials appear to be reckoning with the concept that threatening similarly limited retaliatory strikes targeting US assets will not deter the US from striking Iran again.

This report about the beliefs of some Iranian policymakers corroborates CTP-ISW’s previous assessment that Iran is attempting to deter US military action against Iran by forecasting that it will escalate into a prolonged regional war.[13] Iranian policymakers have almost certainly seen and internalized the ongoing discussion in Western media about the Trump administration's fears about a broader war. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on February 1 that a US attack on Iran would lead to a regional war.[14] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also warned on February 1 that Iran would target US bases and that the ensuing conflict would extend to the region if the United States attacks Iran.[15]

Iranian senior political insiders also confirmed to the same outlet that Araghchi is overseeing Iranian nuclear negotiations with the United States, and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Larijani is supervising Iran's coordination with Russia.[16] Araghchi, who has served as foreign affairs minister since August 2024, has been the main point of contact with the United States, specifically US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, throughout the US-Iran negotiations process since 2025.[17] Araghchi also led the Iranian nuclear negotiating team as deputy foreign minister under the Hassan Rouhani administration between 2017 and 2021.[18] Senior political insiders told the outlet that Araghchi has won “internal battles” within the Iranian regime regarding Iran's nuclear negotiations at ”key junctures” over the past year.[19] Araghchi has also coordinated with Larijani, who oversees Iran's relationship with Russia, according to the insiders.[20] Araghchi attended Larijani’s ”frank and fruitful” meeting with Qatari officials in Doha on January 31, according to a senior Iranian political insider with knowledge of the meeting.[21] Larijani has held several meetings with Russian officials over the past year as the Supreme Leader‘s advisor on international affairs and during his second tenure as SNSC Secretary since August 2025.[22] Larijani also spent nearly 20 years working on Iran's nuclear file, as SNSC Secretary between 2005 and 2007 and particularly as parliament speaker between 2008 and 2020, when he oversaw the passage of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[23]

An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel reported that Iran operated a Russian Mil Mi-28 attack helicopter in Tehran on February 4.[40] Iran received at least one Mi-28 on January 28 as part of a November 2023 Iranian-Russian military agreement.[41] Russian Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters are unlikely to be useful to Iran in conventional aerial warfare against adversaries like the United States and Israel, given that US and Israeli long-range missiles and aircraft can target the helicopters long before the helicopters can attack US or Israeli aircraft. CTP-ISW assessed on January 13 that Iran likely acquired these systems for use against internal disturbances and threats, including protests.[42] Low-flying helicopters can have a deterrent effect against protesters even if the helicopters do not attack the protesters with their weapon systems.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-4-2026/