Iran Update, January 11, 2026
Some Iranian regime officials have framed the ongoing protests as the next phase of the Israel-Iran War. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attributed the ongoing protests to Israel and the United States on January 11, arguing that the “riots” have killed hundreds of people and are an “extension of the 12-day war” with the United States and Israel.[1] The IRGC claimed that the United States and Israel have equipped and armed “terrorists” to cause chaos in Iran.[2] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian similarly claimed on January 11 that the United States and Israel aim to incite internal unrest in Iran under the pretext of economic issues.[3] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared on January 11 that Iran is at war with the United States and Israel on four fronts: cognitive, economic, military, and terrorism.[4] The “military” front likely refers to the 12-day kinetic conflict in June, while “terrorism” likely refers to the regime's view of the ongoing protests. Ghalibaf warned the United States against “miscalculations” and threatened that Iran could target US military bases in the region or Israel if the United States attacks Iran.[5] He noted that Iran will not limit itself to being reactive and will respond based on its threat perception.[6]
The regime may be labeling Iranian protesters as “terrorists” and connecting the ongoing protests to the United States and Israel as a tactic to motivate hesitant security officers to forcefully crack down on the protests. The IRGC Intelligence Organization released a statement on January 10 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment.”[7] This statement suggests that some Iranian security forces may have already defected or that the regime is very concerned about this possibility. A Kurdish human rights organization previously reported on January 8 that the regime had arrested “dozens” of security officers in Kermanshah City who refused to fire on protesters.[8] The regime may be framing protesters as “terrorists” and linking them to the United States and Israel to increase security forces’ willingness to use lethal force against protesters and reduce the risk of defections. The regime's framing of protesters as “terrorists” and characterization of the protests as a continuation of the Israel-Iran War further indicate that the regime is approaching the ongoing protests as a military issue rather than a law enforcement one.
Ghalibaf’s threat to attack US bases or Israel is likely a response to recent Western media reports that US President Donald Trump is considering various options to intervene in the ongoing protests. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 11 that Trump and senior officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan Caine, will receive a briefing on January 13 about response options to Iran's protests, though the officials are not expected to make a final decision during that meeting.[9] The New York Times separately reported on January 10 that Trump is “seriously considering” military strikes against Iran in response to the Iranian regime's violent crackdown on the protests, but “has not made a final decision.”[10] Unspecified US officials said that advisers presented Trump with a range of potential strike targets, including unspecified non-military sites in Tehran and facilities linked to Iranian security services involved in suppressing protests.[11] Axios similarly reported on January 11 that Trump has considered military strikes, a carrier strike group deployment to the Middle East, and cyber or information operations to support protests in Iran but has not yet made a decision, according to US officials.[12]
CTP-ISW recorded a lower rate of protest activity across Iran on January 11 compared to recent days. The lower rate of protests that CTP-ISW recorded is likely due to the regime's nationwide internet shutdown and crackdown on the use of Starlink satellites. CTP-ISW has recorded 22 protests across nine provinces since 0000 local time on January 11, 11 of which were medium-sized (100-1,000 participants) and six of which were large (>1000 participants).[13] The decrease in recorded protest activity is at least partly due to the regime's nationwide internet shutdown that has been in effect for over three days.[14] The Iranian regime has also begun jamming Starlink signals to prevent Iranians from being able to use Starlink satellites.[15] About half of the protests that CTP-ISW has recorded since its last data cutoff took place in Tehran, which may be explained by Iranians’ ability to access tools like Starlink more readily in larger cities than in less urban areas.[16] Reports of arrests, deaths, and violence from regime and anti-regime outlets in Lorestan, Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan, South Khorasan, and Golestan provinces suggest that protests are taking place across Iran, but that protesters in these areas have been unable to share footage of protests with foreign media.[17] State media reported that the Mashhad anti-narcotics police head was killed in protests in Mashhad on January 11, demonstrating the intensity of protests there despite limited footage of the demonstrations.[18] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Kermanshah Province since January 9, despite the province experiencing intense and violent protest activity before that date.[19]
More Iranian security officers have died during the current protests than in any other protest wave in Iran. IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 11 that at least 114 regime security personnel from the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC have been killed since the start of the protests on December 28.[20] The LEC is the regime's main internal security service and is responsible for conducting ordinary policing activities and maintaining social control.[21] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that largely focuses on disseminating regime propaganda, suppressing domestic dissent, and conducting civil defense activities.[22] The regime has also deployed the IRGC Ground Forces in some areas during the current wave of protests, although it is unclear whether all of the IRGC deaths reported by IRGC-affiliated media are deaths of IRGC Ground Forces members. Iranian media reported that Esfahan Province has the highest number of LEC and IRGC deaths at 30, followed by 9 Basij and IRGC deaths in Ghazvin Province.[23] The data indicates that the IRGC has mainly been active in western Iran, which is consistent with recent reports of IRGC Ground Forces deployments in Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan provinces.[24] The actual death count for Iranian security personnel is likely higher than the number that IRGC-affiliated media reported, given that CTP-ISW has observed reports of security personnel casualties in areas, such as Tehran Province, that IRGC-affiliated media did not include in its death count.[25] Over 70 regime security personnel died in the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement, which was the deadliest wave of protests until this wave.[26]
Recent Baloch anti-regime activity and reported Iranian efforts to use Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suppress the protests indicate that the regime may be facing significant security bandwidth constraints. Baloch anti-regime coalition Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF) fighters killed one Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer and injured another in an attack on an LEC patrol vehicle in Dashtiari County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 11.[27] The MPF announced that it conducted the attack in response to Iranian security forces’ continued suppression of protests across Iran.[28] The MPF conducted a similar attack and killed an LEC commander in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 7 in response to ”the killing and suppression of protesters in various parts” of Iran.[29] CTP-ISW has observed protests in Zabol, Iranshahr, Zahedan, and Chabahar in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the start of the protests on December 28.[30] Regime forces used live fire, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse a medium-sized protest in Zahedan on January 9.[31] That the MPF continues to be able to conduct attacks targeting Iranian security personnel in southeastern Iran suggests that security forces may not have the bandwidth to confront this group while it faces widespread protests across the country.
Iran has reportedly asked Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, for assistance in suppressing the protests, according to a Fox News correspondent citing unspecified sources on January 11.[32] Anti-regime media and social media users previously claimed on January 6 that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters have deployed to Iran since January 2 through border crossings in Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces.[33] The Iraqi fighters are reportedly members of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and the Badr Organization, among other militias.[34] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad between January 6 and 8, according to informed Iraqi sources speaking to regional media on January 8.[35] Iran likely seeks to use Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to bolster the number of forces it has to suppress the current unrest. Iran's use of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suppress the protests suggests that Iranian security forces may face bandwidth constraints and difficulties in suppressing the protests on their own.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-11-2026/
Iran Update, January 12, 2026
Non-Protest Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET. Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET.
CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8.[1] We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 14 protests across six provinces on January 12, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[2] CTP-ISW recorded protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Karaj, on January 12.[3] The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas and it would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.[4] Iranians are also likely able to access tools like Starlink satellites more readily in urban areas and use these tools to share videos of protests with foreign media.[5] The regime's internet shutdown therefore likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8.[6]
There are several indications that protests continue to take place in areas where we did not record protests on January 12. Fox News's chief foreign correspondent reported on January 12 that he was able to contact a source in Esfahan who confirmed that protests continue to take place in the city.[7] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Esfahan since January 9, which suggests that protesters in Esfahan have been unable to share videos of protests due to the internet shutdown. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately updated its security personnel death count on January 12 from 114 to 121.[8] Tasnim recorded seven additional security personnel deaths in Fars Province on January 12, which suggests that protests, or at least the regime's crackdown on anti-regime dissidents, have continued to take place in this province. CTP-ISW last reported a protest in Fars Province on January 10.[9] Tasnim’s death count likely does not account for the full scale of security personnel deaths, given that CTP-ISW has recorded three security personnel deaths in Tehran Province, while Tasnim has not reported any deaths in this province.[10]
It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has decreased due to the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. A Norway-based human rights group reported on January 11 that the regime has killed at least 544 people and arrested more than 10,681 people since the beginning of the protests on December 28.[11] Some estimates suggest that the protester death count is in the thousands. CTP-ISW has recorded 83 incidents across 24 provinces of security forces shooting live ammunition at protesters since December 28.[12] Hospitals and medical centers in Iran have also reported being overwhelmed by the number of wounded protesters. The regime's brutality could discourage some individuals from participating in the protests and thereby reduce the rate of protests.[13]
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests.[14] The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. AFGS-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised the ability of the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade to “confront terrorists in any situation,” suggesting that the IRGC could deploy these units to suppress protests.[15] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly described protesters as “terrorists.” The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces, is considered the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[16] Brigadier General Amanollah Goshtasbi has commanded this base since March 2025.[17] The United States sanctioned Goshtasbi for his role in suppressing and killing Baloch citizens during the Mahsa Amini movement while serving as the IRGC Ground Forces Salman Corps commander in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[18] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought in Syria to defend the Assad regime in 2015 and suppressed protests in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement.[19] Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Feizollahi has commanded the Saberin Special Forces Brigade since June 2023.[20] Feizollahi previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar-e Rasoul Special Forces unit and reportedly ordered forces to shoot directly at protesters in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province, in November 2022.[21]
IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province, on January 8.[22] The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division operates under the IRGC Ground Forces Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamedan provinces.[23] IRGC Ground Forces Command Brigadier General Mohammad Karami recently appointed Brigadier General Mohsen Najaf Karimi as the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base commander in November 2025.[24] The United Kingdom and European Union sanctioned Karimi for perpetrating serious human rights violations in his role as commander of the IRGC Ruhollah Corps in Markazi Province during the regime's crackdown on the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.[25] A Kurdish human rights organization separately reported a “large deployment” of IRGC forces to Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 10.[26] It is possible that the IRGC forces in Bukan operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base given that this base is headquartered in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province.[27] A BBC Persian journalist additionally circulated unverified reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam Province on January 8.[28] IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 12 that protesters killed IRGC Colonel Mehdi Rahimi in Ilam City, Ilam Province, which could corroborate the recent reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam.[29]
The Iranian regime is likely encouraging pro-regime demonstrations as a counter-protest tactic to broadcast public support for the regime, discredit the protest movement, and possibly even directly confront protesters in the streets. The regime called on the Iranian people on January 12 to participate in pro-regime protests.[30] IRGC-affiliated media reported that pro-regime protesters demonstrated in at least 13 cities, including Tehran.[31] Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian attended a pro-regime rally in Tehran on January 12.[32] The call for regime supporters to take to the streets inherently creates a risk that anti-regime protesters will encounter pro-regime supporters, many of whom are likely members of Iranian security institutions, such as the Basij.[33] The regime is almost certainly aware of this risk and may seek to frame any engagements between pro- and anti-regime protesters as an attack by protesters on civilians and perpetuate its narrative that anti-regime protesters are “terrorists” and “rioters.” The presence of additional security members in public areas could also help the regime quickly quell protests and prevent them from becoming large-scale demonstrations. The regime lastly likely seeks to use the pro-regime rallies to demonstrate that it maintains public support and to retain its legitimacy.
The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States. Two sources “with knowledge” told Axios on January 12 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently contacted US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in an effort to “de-escalate” tensions with the United States or “buy more time” before potential US military action against Iran.[34] Araghchi and Witkoff discussed the possibility of meeting “in the coming days,” according to the sources.[35] Trump confirmed on January 11 that Iran reached out to the United States to propose negotiations for a nuclear deal.[36] The Axios report comes after Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Araghchi in Tehran on January 10.[37] Political insiders in Tehran told UK-based Amwaj Media on January 12 that Albusaidi may have relayed a message from the Trump administration during his visit.[38] Oman has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the United States. The Pezeshkian administration's efforts to de-escalate tensions with the United States come as Trump has warned that the United States could intervene in the ongoing protests. Trump stated on January 11 that the United States is “looking at” options to support Iranian protesters.[39] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 12 that Trump is weighing diplomacy against military strikes but currently “favors” using military action against Iran.[40] Iran has refused to negotiate its ability to enrich uranium, support the Axis of Resistance, and develop its ballistic missile program in negotiations with the United States.[41] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran is willing to make concessions on these issues.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-12-2026/