The rate of protests across Iran declined slightly on January 5 and 6 compared to the rate of protests between January 2 and 4. CTP-ISW recorded at least 43 protests across Iran between January 5 at 2 PM ET and January 6 at 2 PM ET, and 37 protests between January 4 at 2 PM ET and January 5 at 2 PM ET.[1] The day-by-day breakdown of protests since January 1 illustrates that the protest rate has declined since January 4 at 2 PM ET:[2]
· 81 protests occurred across 23 provinces between January 3 at 2 PM ET and January 4 at 2 PM ET.
· 62 protests occurred across 18 provinces between January 2 at 2 PM ET and January 3 at 2 PM ET.
· 70 protests occurred across 22 provinces between January 1 at 2 PM ET and January 2 at 2 PM ET.
The Iranian weekend — which is on Friday and Saturday — may have driven the higher rate of protests from Friday, January 2, to Sunday, January 4. CTP-ISW observed an increase in protests across Tehran on January 5 and 6, in contrast to the declining national rate on January 5 and January 6. Nineteen protests took place in Tehran between January 5 and 6, while only eight protests occurred in Tehran between January 4 and 5.[3] A medium sized protest occurred in Abadan, Ilam Province, during which Iranian Law Enforcement Command personnel waved at protesters from the rooftop of a nearby police building.[4] Iranian authorities have arrested nearly 1,000 people and killed at least 25 people, including four minors, since the protests started on December 28, according to a Norway-based Kurdish Iranian rights group.[5] CTP-ISW has not observed a demographic or geographic change in protests since its last data cutoff at 2 PM ET on January 5.
The Iranian regime warned on January 6 that it would take unspecified preemptive measures to counter any US and/or Israeli attempts to exploit the ongoing protests across Iran that threaten Iranian regime security, almost certainly to deter US and Israeli activity against Iran.[6] The Defense Council condemned Iran's adversaries’ “intensifying threatening language and interventionist threats” on January 6 in the council's first official statement since its establishment in August 2025.[7] The council is presumably referring to US President Donald Trump's January 2 warnings that the United States could intervene if Iranian security forces shoot or kill Iranian protesters.[8] Iran's highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council, established the Defense Council to restructure Iran‘s defense strategy and restore deterrence through “hard power” following the Israel-Iran War.[9] The Defense Council warned on January 6 that “Iran does not consider itself limited to reacting after the action and considers objective signs of threat as part of the security equation,” which implies the possibility of Iranian preemptive action.[10] A preemptive action is taken to prevent an imminent attack or threat from an adversary, whereas a preventive action is taken to avert a future, non-imminent threat.[11] A political analyst close to the Iranian regime, Mostafa Najafi, stated on January 6 that the Defense Council issued the January 6 statement after receiving ”multiple signals regarding the urgency of potential threats.”[12] Najafi assessed that Iran is “highly unlikely” to launch a preemptive strike, however, and that the only way for Iran alter the current position that Iran, the US, and Israel are in is through the “restoration of deterrence.”[13] An unspecified Iranian official separately told Reuters on January 5 that these external pressures have narrowed the regime's room to maneuver between protests and hardening US demands, leaving Iranian leaders with the perception that there are “few viable options and high risks on every path.”[14] Mahdi Mohammadi, an advisor to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, similarly stated on X on January 5 that the “boundary” between the current state of the unknown and war, as well as “psychological operations and physical operations, and preemption and response, has become extremely faint” and even “intertwined.”[15]
The Iranian regime is likely trying to appease protesters by approving economic reforms, such as subsidies for basic goods. The Iranian Parliament approved the revised second edition of the 2026-2027 budget bill on January 5.[16] The bill mandates that the Iranian government will increase public sector salary raises from 20 percent up to 43 percent, keep the value added tax (VAT) rate at ten percent, and provide $8.8 billion (USD) in subsidized credits for the purchase of basic goods like eggs, oil, and red meat.[17] It is noteworthy that the first edition of the budget bill only increased public sector salaries by 20 percent, which some Iranian officials criticized as being insufficient to keep up with the current 42.2 percent inflation rate in Iran.[18] The updated subsidy will reportedly provide about 80 million Iranians approximately seven dollars a month per person for four months, which is still extremely low.[19] The average Iranian monthly wage is around $200.[20] It is unclear if the approved budget will appease protesters demanding economic reform, as some Iranian social media users mocked the subsidy amount as wholly insufficient.[21]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-6-2026/
Iranian Rial https://www.bonbast.com/graph/usd
Therefore, unfortunately, it is simply foolish to talk about whether we should come to the rescue or not given the current configuration of power. Nothing of the sort will be done. And if it is done, it will again be as foolish and ineffective as possible.
As for Iran, Iran suffered a defeat in the war, a powerful defeat not only militarily, but also militarily and politically. Iran is in a state of internal struggle between its elites. Moreover, the elites most beneficial to Russia and China were wiped out during this war. Therefore, most likely, after some time, against the backdrop of defeat, Iran will face further internal destabilization with foreign intervention, including military intervention. There is no doubt that in the event of serious political upheaval in Iran, it will be subjected to additional strikes from Israel and the United States. In fact, the probability of this happening is 9 to 1.
Only Iran's own elite can save Iran, if it follows the example of Tiananmen Square in China. Unfortunately, I cannot predict whether it is capable of doing so or whether it has the necessary strength to do so.