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Iran Update, January 2, 2026

The rate and geographic scope of protests in Iran increased on January 1 and 2. ISW-CTP recorded 56 protests on January 1 and 70 protests on January 2, compared to 31 protests on December 31.[1] Protests took place in 17 out of Iran’s 31 provinces between December 28 and 31 and have since spread to five additional provinces, including Ghazvin, Kohgiluyeh and Boyerahmad, Mazandaran, North Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces.[2] Protests have also spread to a greater number of cities within individual provinces. ISW-CTP recorded one protest in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province on December 31 and three protests in three cities in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province on January 1, for example.[3] Protests have primarily taken place in small and medium-sized towns instead of in major cities. ISW-CTP has not observed significant protest activity in provinces with large Kurdish populations, such as Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan Province. The lack of protest activity in these provinces thus far is notable, given that a significant portion of protests during the Mahsa Amini movement took place in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[4]

The protests in Iran have become more violent since January 1, primarily in less populated and more rural areas. Iranian security forces have killed protesters in at least the following locations: Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province; Fuladshahr, Esfahan Province; Marvdasht, Fars Province; Azna, Lorestan Province; and Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province.[5] Security forces previously fired live ammunition at crowds of protesters in Fasa, Fars Province, and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, on December 31.[6] The concentration of the use of lethal force in more rural areas reflects Iranian security forces’ reduced capacity to suppress unrest and impose control in these areas.

The Iranian regime claimed that a protester whom security forces killed during protests in Kuhdasht was a member of the Basij, likely in an effort to obfuscate the regime’s use of violence and lethal force against protesters.[7] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that largely focuses on producing and disseminating propaganda, suppressing domestic dissent, and conducting civil defense activities.[8] A Kurdish human rights organization reported that the regime refused to hand over the protester’s body to his family or allow his family to hold a funeral until they publicly stated that their family member was a member of the regime.[9] The protester’s father confirmed that his son was not a member of the Basij, however.[10]

Several funerals for killed protesters transformed into anti-regime protests on January 2. Funerals for killed protesters transformed into anti-regime protests in Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, and Marvdasht, Fars Province, with protesters chanting slogans such as “I will kill, I will kill whoever killed my brother.”[11] Attendees at the funeral in Kuhdasht threw stones at and pushed back security forces.[12] The Iranian regime has historically sought to prevent Iranians from holding funeral and commemoration ceremonies for killed protesters, given that these ceremonies can often turn into protests against the regime.[13]

Protesters have, in some instances, responded violently to security forces’ use of violence and force. Social media users circulated a video of protesters throwing a Molotov cocktail at security forces in Arak, Markazi Province, on December 31.[14] Protesters have also reportedly set fire to regime property in multiple cities, including a security vehicle in Lorestan Province, a Basij building in Hamedan Province, and a seminary building in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province.[15] Iranian media claimed that 13 Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij members were injured by stones thrown by protesters in Kuhdasht.[16] The regime previously claimed that three security forces members were injured in Fasa, Fars Province, on December 31.[17] The Lorestan LEC Deputy for Cultural and Social Affairs claimed that LEC officers arrested a protester who had a “pistol” on January 1, although there is no evidence that the protester used or intended to use the weapon against security forces.[18]

Iranian officials have threatened that Iran could attack US interests in the Middle East if the United States intervenes in the ongoing protests. US President Donald Trump stated on January 2 that “If Iran [shoots] and violently kills peaceful protesters…the United States of America will come to [protesters’] rescue.”[19] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf responded to Trump’s statement, warning that US “adventurism” would make US bases and forces in the Middle East “legitimate target[s].”[20] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately stated that any “hostile action” would “destroy” Israel, US bases, and regional stability.[21] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani similarly warned that US interference in the protests would destabilize the Middle East and destroy US interests, adding that the United States should “be mindful of [its] soldiers’ safety.”[22]

Anti-regime protests spread to Sistan and Baluchistan Province in southeastern Iran on January 2.[23] Protesters gathered after Friday prayers in Zahedan, which is the largest city in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid addressed the ongoing anti-regime protests in his sermon on January 2, stating that peaceful protests constitute a legal and legitimate right.[24] Abdol Hamid criticized how Iranian officials handle the economy and stated that “Iranians’ lives have reached a dead end.”[25] Abdol Hamid urged protesters to keep the protests peaceful and urged security forces not to use violence against protesters. Zahedan residents began holding weekly protests after Friday prayers in late September 2022, after security forces violently suppressed protesters in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.” Zahedan residents continued to hold weekly Friday protests even after the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in other parts of the country.[26]

The Iranian regime has reportedly offered to sell advanced weaponry to foreign governments for cryptocurrency within the past year to circumvent Western sanctions, according to a Financial Times investigation. The Financial Times reported on January 1 that Iran’s Defense Ministry Export Center offered to sell ballistic missiles, drones, and warships to foreign governments for cryptocurrency at an unspecified time in the past year.[70] The Defense Ministry Export Center advertises Emad ballistic missiles, Shahed drones, Shahid Soleimani-class warships, and short-range air defense systems. The Financial Times analyzed Defense Ministry promotional documents and payment terms and found that the ministry was willing to receive cryptocurrency payments in addition to rial payments and “barter arrangements.”[71] It is unclear if Iran would be willing to sell ballistic missiles to foreign countries in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran War, given the degradation of its ballistic missile program during the war and Iran’s recent prioritization of the reconstitution of its ballistic missile capabilities over other defense priorities.[72] Iran fired Emad ballistic missiles at Israel during the Israel-Iran War.[73] The Financial Times report did not specify which countries Iran tried to sell weapons to. Iran’s Defense Ministry claims that it has 35 foreign countries as sales clients. Iran has sold weapons, such as Shahed and Mohajer-series drones, to key US adversaries like Russia and Venezuela, respectively, in the past.[74]

The Iranian regime continues to face internal security challenges in southeastern Iran. IRGC intelligence agents arrested several individuals in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on December 31, whom the IRGC claimed are affiliated with “terrorist and hostile groups.”[75] The IRGC arrested the individuals as part of a counterterrorism exercise in southeastern Iran.[76] The Iranian regime has been particularly concerned about internal security threats since the end of the Israel-Iran War, and these concerns have been heightened after the formation of the Mobarizoun Popular Front in early December 2025. The Mobarizoun Popular Front is a coalition of multiple anti-regime groups that includes the Baloch Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl.[77]

The Iranian regime likely views its illicit sanctions evasion networks with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as crucial to keeping the Iranian economy afloat as it faces immense economic challenges. Iranian state media outlet Mehr News assessed on December 31 that the Iran-Russia-PRC sanctions evasion mechanism of using “shadow fleets” is an indication of an “emerging economic-political bloc” between Iran, Russia, and the PRC.[78] Mehr News argued that Russia, the PRC, and Iran have developed a “deep strategic synergy” in the use of shadow fleets to evade sanctions.[79] Iran has historically relied on Russia and the PRC as key sanctions evasion partners. Iran heavily relies on the PRC to purchase sanctioned Iranian oil, for example.[80] The PRC purchases Iranian oil and promotes the use of alternatives to the US dollar and SWIFT banking system, which increases the network’s resistance to US sanctions.[81] Mehr News’s reference to Iran’s deep economic partnerships with Russia and the PRC comes at a moment when Iran continues to face extremely challenging economic circumstances. Iranian oil revenue – its main source of government revenue – has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025, according to the Parliamentary Budget and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman.[82] This article also follows the US seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela on December 10 that had illicitly transported Iranian oil.[83]

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