The protests are in cities across the country
Iran Update, December 31, 2025
Protests continued to expand geographically across Iran on December 31. Small protests broke out in Tehran on December 28 and have since spread to 17 out of Iran’s 31 provinces.[1] Protests spread to Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Ilam, Khuzestan, Khorasan Razavi, and Lorestan provinces on December 31.[2] CTP-ISW recorded a total of 31 protests in Iran on December 31, compared to 24 protests on December 30. The protests took place across 12 provinces, including the five mentioned above.[3]
Iranian security forces shot live fire to disperse protesters in at least two instances on December 31, as protests continued across Iran for the fourth consecutive day. Security forces fired live ammunition at crowds of protesters in Fasa, Fars Province, and Kuhdasht, Lorestan Province, on December 31.[4] The regime appears to be using live fire to suppress protests in less populated areas of Iran. The regime has historically struggled to impose control in more rural areas.
The regime also deployed water cannons in an attempt to suppress protests on December 31.[5] Security forces used a water cannon against protesters in Hamedan. The weather in Hamedan is currently two degrees below zero degrees Celsius.[6] Security forces also reportedly used a water cannon against protesters in Arak, Markazi Province.[7] The regime’s use of water cannons against protesters comes amid Iran’s unprecedented water shortage crisis.[8] The regime’s deployment of water as a tool to suppress protests amid Iran’s water crisis highlights the regime’s prioritization of its security and survival.
The regime also continued to arrest protesters on December 31.[9] Security forces arrested four Kurdish individuals in Asadabad, Hamedan Province, four individuals in Fasa City, Fars Province, and four individuals in Behbahan, Khuzestan Province.[10] The Intelligence Ministry separately arrested seven individuals who allegedly have ties to Reza Pahlavi, son of former Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[11] The ministry claimed that the individuals had smuggled 100 Colt revolvers into Iran.[12] An informed source told Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency that these individuals intended to incite violence at protest gatherings in Iran.[13]
The Iranian regime is taking steps to prevent further protests at universities. The regime likely views university students as a serious threat to regime stability given that students played a significant role in the Masha Amini protests. The regime directed some universities on December 31 to do remote learning until the end of the semester, citing “cold weather.”[14] The decision is very likely meant to prevent students from organizing and participating in protests, however. Students from at least 10 universities across Iran participated in protests on December 30, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[15] Iranian authorities separately released five Tehran University and Sharif University of Technology students whom security forces arrested on December 30 for participating in protests.[16] The Science, Research, and Technology Ministry additionally dismissed the “security managers” of several universities in Tehran on December 31, following the security forces’ “mistreatment of students,” possibly in an effort to appease university students and prevent further student protests.[17] An Iranian human rights organization reported on December 31 that security forces violently arrested a student protesting at Sharif University of Technology.[18] The regime likely regards university protests as a more serious threat to its stability than demonstrations organized by other segments of the population given that university students were a key demographic of the Mahsa Amini movement between September 2022 and January 2023.[19]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC deputy commander on December 27 only two months after appointing him as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[20] Vahidi replaced Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, who had served as the IRGC deputy commander since May 2019.[21] Khamenei neglected to promote Fadavi as IRGC commander after the killing of former IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami in June 2025.[22] Khamenei instead appointed former IRGC Ground Forces Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC commander.[23] Vahidi is a long-time IRGC member who previously served as the IRGC Quds Force commander, defense minister, interior minister, and AFGS deputy chief.[24] Khamenei emphasized in Vahidi’s appointment decree that Vahidi should prioritize improving the readiness of the Iranian armed forces and addressing IRGC personnel’s livelihood concerns in coordination with the AFGS.[25] Iranian media has not reported who will replace Vahidi as AFGS deputy chief at the time of this writing. Iranian media reported Vahidi’s appointment on December 31, but Khamenei issued the appointment decree on December 27 based on a recommendation from Pakpour.[26]
Vahidi’s appointment as IRGC deputy commander reflects the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to reconstitute Iran’s military leadership following the war. Unofficial reports allege that Vahidi was removed from the AFGS deputy chief position due to internal disputes between Vahidi and Artesh leadership over post-war air defense priorities, including Vahidi’s opposition to the acquisition of airborne early warning and control systems.[27] This internal debate highlights the challenges that Khamenei faces in trying to cohere and unite Iran’s new generation of military commanders. Israel killed numerous commanders during the Israel-Iran War, many of whom were part of the IRGC Command Network. The IRGC Command Network was one of the most influential networks in Iran for decades. Khamenei must now fill this void with a new cadre of military leaders, which presents challenges as Khamenei appoints individuals with different personalities and factional ties to senior positions.[28]
The regime’s decision to remove Vahidi from the AFGS deputy chief position and elevate him within the IRGC reflects his status within the security elite and may reflect the regime’s confidence in his ability to manage internal security challenges. The timing of Vahidi’s appointment is notable given the expanding protests in Iran and his prior role in suppressing demonstrations.[29] The United States and European Union sanctioned Vahidi in 2022 for his role in directing the Law Enforcement Command during the Mahsa Amini protests.[30]
Khamenei is also reportedly considering restructuring the relationship between the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, according to unspecified social media reports.[31] The AFGS is responsible for crafting strategic guidance and military policy and does not have operational responsibility.[32] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is a parallel organization to the AFGS and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[33] Unverified reports have suggested that Khamenei could merge the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters. The AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters previously operated as a single institution, but Khamanei separated the institutions in 2016.[34]
Iran reportedly conducted a missile launch in an unspecified location in Ilam Province, near Iran’s western border with Iraq, according to an Iranian media outlet with ties to the regime and footage circulated on social media on December 30.[35] CTP-ISW cannot verify that a launch took place or the purpose of the reported missile launch at the time of this writing. Open-source intelligence X accounts circulated a video on December 30 of an alleged missile test in Ilam Province.[36] Iranian outlet Nameh News published the same footage but claimed that the Iranian regime conducted a missile attack targeting a Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) “headquarters,” citing unconfirmed reports on December 30.[37] PJAK is a Kurdish anti-regime group that operates in the border region between Iran and Iraq.[38] Nameh News is owned by Ali Pour Mohammadi, who is related to Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Mostafa Pourmohammadi previously served as interior minister under hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and is reportedly well connected within the Iranian regime’s intelligence apparatus.[39] The reports about a missile launch in Ilam Province come after the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reportedly recently conducted a missile exercise across multiple bases in Iran.[40]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-31-2025/