Small-scale protests demanding that the Iranian government address the devaluation of the Iranian rial and high inflation rates have continued for the second consecutive day in Tehran and Hamadan City, western Iran, on December 29, amid a rapid collapse of the Iranian currency since November 2025.[1] The value of the Iranian rial has deteriorated rapidly after November 2025, though its value has fallen for years due to sanctions and Iran's general international isolation. Protests initially began in Tehran on December 28.[2] Groups of less than roughly 100 civilians, who were reportedly Iranian ”businessmen,” marched from Lalezar Street toward the Imam Khomeini Square on December 29, demanding that the Iranian government intervene in the economy and address the high inflation rate and devaluation of the currency. Iranian security forces halted and clashed with the protesters at the Istanbul intersection on December 29, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media and geolocated footage.[3] Iranian security forces also launched tear gas and clashed with protesters on Boali Street in southern Hamedan City on December 29.[4] A BBC Persian journalist reported that economic protests also occurred in Malard City, Tehran Province, and on Gheshm Island in the Persian Gulf, but did not provide footage of the protests at the time of this writing.[5] Tehran merchants announced that they will continue to protest on December 30.[6] The protests come amid a drop in the value of the Iranian rial. The value of the Iranian rial reached 1,445,000 rials per one US dollar as of December 28, which marks its lowest value in 2025.[7] The rial appreciated slightly to 1,371,000 rials to one US dollar on December 29, however.[8]
Current economic-related protests come as the Iranian regime is deliberating on Iran's 2026/27 budget, which is set to increase taxes to relieve Iran's budget deficit as state oil revenue decreases, but will put additional economic pressure on the Iranian people. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian defended his proposed budget in front of the Iranian Parliament's budget oversight committee on December 28, in which Pezeshkian proposed a tax increase by 62 percent.[9] This increase in the tax rate will worsen the economic challenges caused by inflation that are plaguing Iranians. Iranian outlets on December 28 and 29 criticized the budget for not adjusting salaries in accordance with the current 42.2 percent inflation rate.[10] The proposed 2025 budget reportedly reflects a decrease in dependency on oil revenue. Iranian oil revenue–its main source of government revenue–has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025, according to the parliamentary Budget and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman on November 6.[11] The parliament's budget oversight committee rejected Pezeshkian’s proposed 1405 March 2026 to March 2027 budget on December 29 and is set to provide feedback to Pezeshkian’s cabinet on December 30.[12]
Iranian regime-affiliated media recognized the protesters’ grievances as legitimate but warned that these protests could escalate into “unrest” or be exploited by Iran's adversaries. “Unrest” in this context presumably refers to anti-regime protests specifically, rather than protests over economic grievances.[13] IRGC-affiliated media acknowledged that Iranian merchants have been unable to pay rent for their shops due to the increase in the prices of imports and basic goods and drop in their sales, and even called on the government to take these economic protests seriously.[14] The regime's anxieties over these protests spiraling out of control and escalating into anti-regime protests are valid because previous economic protests have escalated into nationwide anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[15] Iranian regime-affiliated outlets also warned that these could be exploited by Iranian adversaries, namely Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has repeatedly blamed Israel and the United States for anti-regime protests over the past decade.[17] The IRGC published an official statement on December 29, calling on the Iranian people to stay united amid the United States and Israel's efforts to undermine public trust and conduct “cognitive warfare.”[18] Mostafa Najafi, a political advisor close to former IRGC Commander and Expediency Discernment Council member Mohsen Rezaei, separately assessed on December 29 that Israel could exploit Iran's weakened position and attack Iran, and added that Israel could even convince the United States to attack Iran as well during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to the United States.[19] Najafi noted that the Iranian regime needs to address external perceptions of internal unrest in Iran.[20]
The Iranian regime's attempts to address economic issues are unlikely to provide immediate relief to the economy, however. Pezeshkian replaced Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin with former Economy Minister Abdol Nasser Hemmati on December 29, following pressure from “almost everyone in government,“ according to Najafi.[21] Hemmati previously served as Central Bank governor during US President Donald Trump's first round of maximum pressure between 2019 and 2021, when inflation rates increased from around 40 percent to 45 percent and the rial‘s value more than halved.[22] Pezeshkian claimed that his budget involved a 20-point plan, which involved controlling energy consumption and relying on trade with regional partners to ensure people's livelihoods, in an interview with the Supreme Leader's official outlet on December 27.[23] Pezeshkian held an emergency meeting with the government's economic team at the Central Bank on December 29 to discuss foreign exchange, trade, and livelihood policies after Parliament's budget oversight committee rejected his budget proposal.[24] One hundred sixty-five out of 290 Iranian parliamentarians separately signed a letter to Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei on December 25, in which they expressed their concern over severe price and foreign exchange rate fluctuations.[25] The letter presented five solutions to remove all competitor currencies to the rial from transactions (such as gold, cryptocurrencies, and foreign currencies) to strengthen the rial.[26] The Central Bank previously proposed and may have recently implemented other mechanisms, including exporting transactions to a secondary market to encourage exporters to return foreign currencies faster and increase the foreign currency reserve to help stabilize the foreign exchange market.[27] These mechanisms mean that, in theory, the Central Bank does not need to rely as much on building foreign reserves to control the exchange rate and subsequently inflation.[28] It remains uncertain whether any of these mechanisms would work in practice, as it would require public trust in the rial to stabilize inflation and the government's handling of the economy, which is currently lacking.
Russia is continuing to support the development of the Iranian space program. Russia launched three indigenous Iranian remote sensing satellites named Paya, Zafar 2, and Kowsar into orbit on December 28 using the Russian Soyuz space launch vehicle.[77] The Paya satellite is designed to deliver imagery with a resolution of around five meters in black and white and 10 meters in color.[78] The Kowsar satellite is the second model of the previously launched Iranian Kowsar satellite, which Russia launched into space in November 2024.[79] Russia has launched five Iranian-made satellites into orbit since 2022, including the Khayyam satellite in August 2022, the Pars-1 satellite in February 2024, the Kowsar and Hodhod satellites in November 2024, and the Nahid-2 satellite in July 2025.[80] IRGC-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran's military forces.[81] Five- and ten-meter resolution imagery is very low resolution compared to commercially available 0.5m or 3m resolution imagery. Western media outlets, for example, commonly publish full-color satellite imagery at 0.5m resolution.
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled Defa Press warned on December 28 that Iran could use its “Hadid 110” drones to attack US military bases in the region, possibly to try to deter US and Israeli military action against Iran.[82] Iran showcased the Hadid 110 drone during the 2025 Sahand counterterrorism exercise in early December 2025.[83] The Hadid 110 is a fixed-wing, jet-powered, one-way drone that can fly up to 510 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 9 kilometers and can reach targets around 350 kilometers away.[84] It is the fastest Iranian drone (though it prioritizes speed over durability) and maintains a low radar visibility.[85] Defa Press stated that Iran could use the Hadid 110 to attack US military bases during a “full-scale conflict” between Iran and the United States.[86] Defa Press may have published this article in response to reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would brief US President Donald Trump on options for the United States to “join or assist” an Israeli military operation against Iran's ballistic missile program during his December 29 meeting with Trump.[87] Trump responded on December 29 to a question about whether he would allow Netanyahu to strike Iran again, stating, “for ballistic missiles, yes.”[88] Defa Press also published the threat to attack US military bases in English, which suggests that it was also intended for an English-speaking audience.[89]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-29-2025/
Iran Update, December 30, 2025
Protests in Iran have expanded geographically and demographically since December 28. Small protests broke out in Tehran on December 28 in response to worsening economic conditions. These protests were primarily concentrated near markets and shopping centers in Tehran.[1] The protests have since spread to other locations across Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least nine provinces on December 30, including in Tehran, Alborz, Kermanshah, Markazi, Hamedan, and Esfahan provinces.[2] Students also participated in protests on December 30 at multiple universities across Iran, including at universities in Tehran, Yazd, and Zanjan.[3] Merchants went on strike in Shiraz, Fars Province, Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and Tehran Province.[4] The Iranian Truck Drivers Union declared support for striking shopkeepers and protesters on December 29.[5] Iranian truck drivers previously went on strike in May 2025.[6] CTP-ISW has recorded a total of 24 protests across Iran, including 13 protests in Tehran Province, since its last data cutoff on December 29.
Many of the recent protests adopted an explicitly anti-regime tone. Protesters and students chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Death to the dictator” and “No Gaza, No Lebanon, I will sacrifice my life for Iran,” as well as slogans that praised the Pahlavi dynasty.[7] The anti-regime tone of many of the protests comes as the regime is trying to frame the protests as driven solely by economic grievances. Economic-related protests and strikes have the potential to transform into explicitly anti-regime protests. Demonstrations against an increase in gasoline prices morphed into anti-regime protests in Iran in 2019, for example.[8]
Iranian government officials and some Iranian media outlets have likely adopted a relatively soft tone toward the protests thus far to prevent the protests from expanding and becoming more overtly anti-regime in nature. Iranian government officials have acknowledged Iranians’ economic hardships and emphasized the need for dialogue with protesters during the first three days of the protests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on December 29 that the livelihoods of Iranians are his daily concern and that his administration will pursue monetary and banking reforms to preserve purchasing power.[9] Pezeshkian added that he tasked Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni to “hear protesters’ legitimate demands” through dialogue with the protesters’ representatives.[10] It is unclear what representatives Pezeshkian was referring to. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani separately stated on December 30 that the government recognizes public protests, supports peaceful gatherings, and listens to “harsh and critical voices.”[11] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on December 30 that officials must respond fully and responsibly to public concerns over livelihood problems and that executive authorities must prioritize dialogue, especially with representatives of merchants.[12] Government officials’ relatively soft tone toward the protests is not completely unusual, given that the Iranian regime has historically been slightly more tolerant of economic-driven protests as compared to protests driven by sociocultural grievances, such as the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement.
There are several other factors that could also explain the Iranian government’s relatively soft tone toward the protests thus far. The Pezeshkian administration includes more moderate figures than the administration of Pezeshkian’s hardline predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, who was serving as president during the Mahsa Amini movement. The Iranian regime is also concerned about a potential new conflict with Israel and may seek to avoid worsening its internal security situation so that it does not have to confront external and internal threats simultaneously. An adviser to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on December 29 that Israel could exploit Iran’s weakened position to attack Iran. The adviser called on the Iranian regime to address external perceptions of internal unrest in Iran.[13]
Some elements of the Iranian security apparatus have adopted a more hardline tone toward the protests, however. The Armed Forces General Staff published a statement on December 29 in which it called on the government to address economic problems but also warned that Iran’s adversaries “will receive blows that are much stronger, more crushing, and more damaging” if they “make another mistake.”[14]
Iranian security forces have responded in a relatively restrained manner to the protests thus far. CTP-ISW has observed limited reports of engagements between security forces and protesters thus far. Social media users circulated a video from December 29 that showed security forces firing tear gas at a small crowd in Hamedan Province.[15] Security forces also arrested protesters in Tehran Province on December 30.[16] The Amir Kabir University newsletter reported clashes between security forces and student protesters at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran on December 30.[17]
Iran will likely continue to rebuild its ballistic missile program despite rising Israeli concerns about Iranian reconstitution. Iranian officials emphasized that Iran will not make any concessions regarding its ballistic missile program after US President Donald Trump suggested after his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on December 29 that the United States could support an Israeli strike on Iran’s ballistic missile program.[18] Israeli officials have become increasingly concerned about recent Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile production facilities.[19] One of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, stated on December 29 that Iran’s missile capabilities are not “permission-based” and warned that Iran would respond to any threats before they materialize.[20] An Iranian analyst close to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately claimed that any path to negotiations with the United States would be based on Iran strengthening its “hard power, military capability, and…deterrence levers.”[21] Missiles, in addition to Iran’s Axis of Resistance, have long acted as the central pillar of Iran’s regional defense strategy, and Iranian officials have long considered the regime’s ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.[22]
UK-based Amwaj Media reported on December 29 that Iran and Israel have recently exchanged secret messages through Russia to deescalate tensions, citing informed regional and political sources.[23] One unspecified regional source claimed that Netanyahu asked Russia to convey to Iran that Israel does not seek further confrontation with Iran.[24] A separate unspecified source in Tehran claimed that Iran and Israel told a Russian intermediary—believed to be President Vladimir Putin—on an unspecified date that they do not intend to conduct new strikes on the other country.[25] The source reported that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani engaged with the unspecified Russian intermediary, rather than the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry.[26] This report contrasts recent reports that Netanyahu was planning to brief Trump on options for the United States to “join or assist” an Israeli military operation against Iran’s ballistic missile program during his December 29 meeting with Trump.[27]
The United States sanctioned 10 individuals and entities on December 30 for their involvement in Iranian drone exports and Iran’s missile and drone programs.[87] The US Treasury Department sanctioned a Venezuelan company and its chair for acquiring Iranian-designed drones.[88] Iran has provided drone technology to Venezuela since at least 2006.[89] The US Treasury Department also sanctioned two Iranian individuals and an Iranian entity for procuring chemicals for Iran’s ballistic missile program.[90] The chemicals include sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[91] The People’s Republic of China has transported sodium perchlorate to Iran both before and after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War to help Iran reconstitute its ballistic missile program.[92] The US Treasury Department lastly sanctioned two individuals and three entities with links to Rayan Fan Kav Andish, which is a holding company that has supported the Iranian defense industry.[93] Rayan Fan Kav Andish owns a company that has produced components for the IRGC’s drone program and software for the IRGC’s aerospace program, for example.[94]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-30-2025/