Iranian officials have dismissed reports that Iran seeks Saudi Arabia to mediate between Iran and the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue. Reuters reported on November 20 that Iran asked Saudi Arabia to persuade the United States to “revive stalled nuclear talks,” according to two unspecified regional sources.[31] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a speech on November 27 in which he dismissed “rumors” that the Iranian government had sent a message to the United States through an intermediary country as a “pure lie.”[32] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also denied reports during an interview with French media on November 26 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent letter to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman “had anything to do with” the nuclear issue or US-Iran talks.[33] Araghchi expressed “full confidence” in Saudi Arabia as a partner for regional stability but claimed that “US behavior” is the sole obstacle for nuclear talks rather than a lack of mediators.[34] The Iranian judiciary filed a case against a former Iranian parliamentarian on November 25 for alleging that President Pezeshkian, with Khamenei’s approval, had sent a message to US President Donald Trump through Salman to restart nuclear negotiations.[35] Unspecified Western sources also told Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that Trump gave Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[36] Unspecified sources told anti-regime media on November 28 that the United States recently reiterated its three conditions to restart negotiations in response to Pezeshkian’s letter to Salman.[37] These conditions include zero enrichment, limitations on Iran's missile program, and a halt to Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.[38] US-Iran nuclear negotiations previously stalled, mainly because Iran consistently rejected the US demand for zero Iranian uranium enrichment.[39] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand negotiations to include Iran's missile program or the Axis of Resistance.[40]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly ordered the Iranian Intelligence Ministry to crack down on individuals who violate Iran's mandatory hijab law, according to an Iranian religious propaganda official on November 25.[41] Khamenei reportedly issued this directive after being “shocked” by an Intelligence Ministry report on women's use of the hijab in Iranian society. The report presumably highlighted that Iranian women are increasingly flouting the mandatory hijab law, a trend that has become more prevalent since the Mahsa Amini movement in late 2022 and early 2023.[42] Iranian hardliners, including Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, support stricter enforcement of the mandatory hijab law.[43] A large group of individuals, most of whom were women, attended a demonstration organized by the Islamic Propaganda Organization in support of hijab enforcement at Tehran University on November 28.[44] The Islamic Propaganda Council is responsible for spreading and implementing the Iranian regime's religious propaganda.[45] Moderates, including current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have been reluctant to enforce the mandatory hijab law out of concern that it may spark social unrest similar to the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022 and 2023.[46]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-28-2025/
Mahmoudi said the Karkheh basin has endured several years of drought and low rainfall, urging conservation of water for drinking, farming, livestock, and industrial use. The Karkheh Dam, one of the largest earthen dams in the world and the biggest in Iran and the Middle East, was built on the Karkheh River about 22 kilometers northwest of Andimeshk in Khuzestan province. It has a total generating capacity of 400 megawatts.
The shutdown comes as Iran faces one of its worst droughts in decades, with reservoirs across the country running dangerously low. Domestic media have reported steep drops at Tehran’s Karaj and Latian dams, while officials in Mashhad, Kerman and Yazd warn of collapsing aquifers and forced water rationing.
Iran Update, December 1, 2025
Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario. An Israeli security source told Israeli media on November 30 that Iran is attempting to rearm its regional partners, including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria, for potential action against Israel.[1] The source added that Iran is in “an arms race” because Iran understands that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government fails to meet the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[2] A political council member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Iranian media on December 1 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have worked to develop an “advanced security plan” to improve organizational structure, enhance drone and missile capabilities, and fortify militia headquarters in preparation for “any upcoming military operation“ against Israel.[3] Israeli and Arab media reported on December 1 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel intends to carry out an operation against Hezbollah soon, ”that will continue until [the group] is disarmed.”[4] Barrack reportedly warned Sudani that Israel would strike Iraq if any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias intervene in a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah and urged Sudani to stop any militia activities to ”support Hezbollah… financially or militarily.”[5] US officials have previously warned Iraqi officials that they must deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militia from targeting Israel or the United States. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi on November 4 that the United States would act against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[6]
Iran’s reported preparations for a potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict suggest that Iran could push its Axis of Resistance partners to proactively fight Israel, despite the major defeats that multiple Axis partners and Iran have sustained in the past two years. Iran largely restrained itself and the rest of the Axis from fully engaging Israel and the United States at various points throughout the Israel-Hamas War. Iran only partially activated its Axis partners following the Hamas October 7 attack. Iran did not activate pre-existing plans for Hezbollah to launch ground attacks into northern Israel after the October 7 attacks, for example. Some Iranian officials have recently called for Iranian partners to remove this ”restraint,” which may suggest that Iran views its previous approach against Israel as a mistake. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, for example, urged Hezbollah on November 25 to abandon its ”restraint” and strike Israel for its killing of Hezbollah’s ”de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai on November 23.[7]
Iran is facing several internal issues and is in the process of rebuilding its diminished military capabilities, which may make the regime hesitant to become directly involved in a renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict, however. Iran is reportedly facing increased “turmoil” and infighting within the regime due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[8] Iran has also undertaken efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program and its weapons stockpiles and reshuffle senior military leadership after Israel destroyed key weaponry and killed a significant number of senior Iranian military officials during the Israel-Iran War.[9] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus domestically will limit Iran’s ability to meaningfully rebuild some of its partner forces on a short timeline, however.
Some of Iran’s other partners, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, may also be hesitant to conduct kinetic operations against Israel in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may hesitate to get involved in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions for their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is significant for the Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[10] Iraqi militias could face political repercussions for engaging in a conflict. Some Iraqi parties could decide against aligning with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a war with Israel, for example. Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted attacks targeting Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not claim the attacks to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and causing negative political repercussions ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[11] The militias’ inaction during the war highlights that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may not be willing to engage in activities that could disrupt their political efforts. External militia operations that trigger US or Israeli action in Iraq are generally unpopular in Iraq.
Hezbollah is also likely hesitant to pursue any direct action against Israel that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group’s reconstitution efforts. An Israeli media outlet reported on December 1 that Hezbollah is pursuing the “dual objective” of indirectly retaliating for Tabatabai’s death while ensuring that its retaliation will not warrant an Israeli response that could lead to a “full-scale war” in Lebanon.[12] The Israeli outlet added that Hezbollah may request that the Houthis launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel on Hezbollah’s behalf.[13] The Houthis may be willing to act on Hezbollah’s behalf in this specific situation due to Tabatabai’s role in training Houthi fighters.[14] The Houthis may not be willing to engage in a broader escalation, however. The Houthis did not support Hezbollah kinetically during or after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024, despite Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stating that there is “complete solidarity” between the Houthis and Hezbollah.[15] The Houthis instead have linked their campaign against Israel to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[16] Hezbollah’s continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel, nonetheless, suggests that the group fears escalation because of its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack directly targeting Israel or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a large Israeli response, because Israel has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force.[17] Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks by targeting Hezbollah fighters, military infrastructure, and supply lines.[18]
The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort.[25] The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[26] The Sahand capsized in Bandar Abbas Port on the Persian Gulf in July 2024.[27] The Kurdistan reportedly carries eight Ghadr and Ghadir anti-ship missiles with a 200-kilometer to 300-kilometer range, vertical-launch Navab air-defense missiles with a 25-kilometer range for low-altitude threats, and Kian one-way attack drones with a roughly 2,000-kilometer range.[28] Iran has constructed several forward base ships and other offensive vessels since 2021 to execute expeditionary and out-of-area operations.[29] Iran has sometimes built these vessels by converting old commercial tankers. The Iranian Artesh has also developed a variety of forward-base and long-range surface ships, including the Makran, which was the first Artesh Navy’s forward base ship.[30] The Makran carries drones, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, which enable months-long deployments for out-of-area missions.[31]
These Iranian ships are not likely to survive conventional naval engagements with the United States, but they can support attacks on international commercial traffic. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.[32] Iran would have to deploy naval mines and fast attack crafts to close the Strait. Iran also sees its naval capabilities as another form of deterrence. Senior Iranian military commanders claim that Iran did not use its naval capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because Iran deliberately held those capabilities in reserve and saw no reason to expand the conflict.[33] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani also announced on November 29 that the Artesh Navy will name its next “floating base” Khuzestan, which indicates that the Iranian Artesh is institutionalizing this class of long-endurance support ships as a core element of its future naval force.[34]
Iran is expanding trade with Turkey as part of Iran’s broader strategy of prioritizing regional trade to mitigate the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Araghchi announced that Iran and Turkey have agreed to build the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway between Iran’s East Azerbaijan Province and Turkey’s eastern Aralik border area in the next three to four years.[46] Iran has announced several new trade ventures with neighboring states in recent months.[47] Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its transportation infrastructure completion forecasts, however.[48] Araghchi announced that Iran will open a consulate in Turkey’s eastern city of Van in the ”near future” to facilitate bilateral trade and border cooperation.[49] Araghchi also stated that Iran and Turkey are prepared to extend their existing agreement on Iranian gas exports to Turkey and that the two states are pursuing unspecified cooperation in electricity production.[50] Iranian media highlighted that Iran should capitalize on its engagements with Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form trade mechanisms that circumvent the use of the US dollar and, therefore, international sanctions on Iran.[51]
Iran’s water crisis is affecting the Iranian regime’s ability to provide electricity to its citizens, which could eventually lead to domestic unrest. Iranian authorities stopped electricity production at Karkheh Dam in southwestern Iran on November 29 because of a decrease in the reservoir’s water levels.[52] The dam’s director stated that the reservoir’s water level was too low for electricity production.[53] The Karkheh Dam’s shutdown comes amid Iran’s ongoing energy crisis due to overconsumption, Israeli strikes on energy infrastructure during the Israel-Iran War, and government mismanagement.[54] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in 2025, including a strike by iron market traders in Tehran in May and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[55]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2025/