Iran Update, November 25, 2025
nspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran.[1] The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however. The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance.[2] The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”[3] These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy.[4] Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[5] Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.[6] Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran’s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance “makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.[7]
The Iranian officials also mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An unspecified senior Iranian official told the Telegraph on November 25 that “it’s not just the Houthis,” noting that some Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are also behaving as though Iran has “never had any contact with them.”[8] The source added that some Iraqi militias have repeatedly ignored Iranian directives to pause training until “tensions subside.”[9] The source’s statements obscure the reality that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias demonstrate varying degrees of responsiveness to Iran rather than total independence. Iraqi groups operate on a spectrum of alignment with Iranian objectives and directives. Kataib Hezbollah is Iran’s most tightly controlled Iraqi militia and the closest Iraqi group to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[10] The Badr Organization is often described as Iran’s “oldest proxy in Iraq” and is a powerful paramilitary actor.[11] The Badr Organization is also a major Iraqi political party whose leader, Hadi al Ameri, plays a central role in Iraq’s political system, giving the organization more overt Iraqi political interests and constraints than Kataib Hezbollah.[12] Asaib Ahl al Haq identifies as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance yet “stubbornly maintains a degree of independence” and has openly disobeyed Iranian instructions.[13]
These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand the talks to its missile program or Axis of Resistance.[14] Iran, by claiming its relationship with the Houthis no longer exists, would be able to assuage some Saudi concerns about the threat that the Iranian-supported Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia. Unspecified Western sources told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that US President Donald Trump gave Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[15] The sources stated that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to convene a high-level meeting in Paris in the coming days.[16] The report stated that bin Salman previously asked Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani about Iran’s position on Saudi mediation. Larijani reportedly responded positively but emphasized that Iran cannot offer unspecified concessions.[17] Unspecified sources added that Saudi officials also discussed with US officials the need to reach an understanding with Iran to facilitate Yemeni reconciliation.[18] Saudi Arabia seeks an end to the Yemen conflict that would weaken the Houthis, which Riyadh views as a threat. Iranian officials could calculate that by casting the Houthis as unassociated with Iran, they would secure Saudi Arabia as a mediator and the resumption of negotiations without needing to make concessions on the Yemeni civil war.
IRGC Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.[31] The PKK-linked fighters attempted to smuggle the weapons into Iran via the Kurdish-populated Tergever border near Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province. The PKK is a Kurdish militia group based in the Kurdish-majority areas of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[32] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May 2025 that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve, however.[33] Iran and Turkey recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation amid concerns about Kurdish fighters operating along their shared border.[34] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[35]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-25-2025/
A Financial Times investigation unveiled that an Iranian company claimed to possess Western-origin nuclear-related technology, which highlights how Iran continues to adapt its procurement network to advance its nuclear program despite sanctions. The Financial Times reported on November 25 that an Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) front company, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, claimed that it uses US and European equipment in some of its products.[1] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[2] Imen Gostar Raman Kish said that it uses radiation-detection tubes from United Kingdom-based company Centronic and components from United States-based company Elijen Technology for its radiation-detection devices.[3] The Financial Times stated that there is no evidence that Elijen or Centronic were aware that they sold technology to Iranian entities.[4] The United States sanctioned Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chairperson and vice chairperson in October 2025 for contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[5] Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chief executive, Javad Ghasemi, was part of an Iranian delegation that secretly traveled to Russia in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes specializing in dual-use technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons development.[6] A second Iranian delegation traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[7]
Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.The sites where Iran has conducted clean-up activities include:
Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) Headquarters, Tehran City: Iran is demolishing the top floors of the SPND headquarters on Fakhrizadeh Street, according to satellite imagery taken on October 23.[10] The Institute added that there are piles of rubble and salvaged equipment around the headquarters. Israel launched several airstrikes targeting the headquarters’ main building in June 2025.[11]
Shahid Meisami Research Center, Alborz Province: The Institute reported that Iran has cleaned up several damaged buildings at the Shahid Meisami Research Center, according to satellite imagery taken on October 21.[12] The Institute assessed that the clean-up efforts may be a “possible prelude to rebuilding” the center.[13] The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran's chemical weapons program and is a subsidiary of SPND.[14] Israel launched airstrikes during the war that targeted a small building in the southwest of the Shahid Meisami complex that was likely used as a laboratory or administrative center.[15] Israel also struck a nearby hangar-looking building.[16] The hangar-looking building's “high bay metal frame” remains intact, and Iran has collected piles of debris next to it.[17] Israeli intelligence previously assessed that the hangar-looking building housed “plastic explosives and advanced material for nuclear detonation testing.”[18]
CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran has conducted limited clean-up and rebuilding activities at other nuclear sites, including Lavisan 2 (Mojdeh) and Taleghan 2.[19] Iran has also continued construction at the Mount Kolang Gaz La Facility near Natanz following the war.[20] The Institute assessed that Iran has conducted “little activity” at Iran's main nuclear sites — Natanz, Fordow, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center — since the war.[21]
Iranian media outlets affiliated with hardliners and pragmatic hardliners are spreading rumors about fissures within President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration amid ongoing efforts by these political factions to increase their influence in the regime. Some hardline outlets have recently circulated reports claiming that First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref resigned due to disagreements with Pezeshkian. Media outlets affiliated with pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, including Sobh-e No and Khorasan, are amplifying rumors about Aref’s reported resignation.[22] Sobh-e No claimed on November 19 that Aref resigned because the Pezeshkian administration was making major decisions without coordinating with him.[23] Khorasan claimed that Aref resigned due to “structural incoherence” between Aref, Pezeshkian’s Chief of Staff, Ali Haji Mirzaei, and Vice President for Executive Affairs Jafar Ghaem Panah.[24] These reports come as different factions within the Iranian regime, including a faction centered around Ghalibaf, are fighting for influence in Iran to determine Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-26-2025/