The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm. Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm on its own accord and has historically evaded previous disarmament efforts. US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack said that the Lebanese government will focus on persuasion to encourage Hezbollah disarmament after his meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on August 26.[1] Barrack announced that Lebanon will present a plan on August 31 that aims to encourage Hezbollah to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[2] Hezbollah's threats to encourage violence if efforts to disarm it persist suggest that the group is attempting to test the government's willingness to disarm it. A plan based on persuasion is therefore unlikely to disarm Hezbollah successfully, because the group will face few negative consequences if it declines to disarm. Barrack is attempting to build an ”economic zone” in southern Lebanon to court Hezbollah's supporters, which is an incentive for the rank-and-file of Hezbollah fighters, but would probably not court ideologically motivated Hezbollah fighters and leadership.[3] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including jobs, salaries, pensions, and benefits, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians and to recruit young fighters.[4]
Hezbollah will likely respond to an explicitly “persuasive” approach by continuing to threaten military action if the government continues to pressure the group politically to disarm. Purely persuasive actions enable Hezbollah to threaten escalation as it needs, while rejecting government overtures because the government's resort to persuasive actions indicates to Hezbollah that it has deterred the government. Hezbollah's ability to threaten military action while the government condemns itself to a publicly political approach cedes the initiative to Hezbollah and indicates to Hezbollah that the government lacks sufficient will to disarm Hezbollah.
Hezbollah continues to view its weapons as the group's core and has previously referred to its weapons as its ”soul,” which further demonstrates its commitment to arms.[5] Hezbollah has consistently initiated wars against Israel while using the excuse that Lebanon needs Hezbollah to “defend” against Israel to refuse disarmament. Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, arguing that its weapons remained a critical element of national defense against any future Israeli operations.[6] Hezbollah later attacked Israel in July 2006, kidnapping three Israeli soldiers and triggering a major Israeli ground operation. Hezbollah subsequently similarly used national defense as justification to retain its arms after the 2006 war despite the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, which called for the disarmament of all armed factions in Lebanon under UNSC Resolution 1701.[7] Hezbollah also entered the war against Israel on October 8, 2023, by conducting offensive indirect and direct fire against northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have also stated that Hezbollah would ”confront” whoever attempts to disarm the group.[8] Hezbollah has consistently rejected calls for disarmament, stating that it will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[9] Hezbollah has called for negotiations on a national defense strategy once Israel withdraws, which Qassem previously suggested would entail Hezbollah retaining its weapons and acting alongside Lebanese security forces.[10]
Iran is very unlikely to meet the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) conditions to extend the snapback mechanism deadline before the E3’s end-of-August deadline. The E3 set a deadline for Iran to reach a “substantial deal” by the end of August before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to re-impose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.[14] The snapback mechanism is set to expire on October 18, marking the end of the ten-year period outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[15] An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with E3 officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 26 to discuss potential snapback sanctions and a snapback mechanism deadline extension.[16] An unspecified source told an Axios reporter on August 26 that the Iranians “have [not] put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table.”[17] Another source added that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.[18] The E3 previously proposed on July 25 to extend the snapback mechanism's deadline in exchange for full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a resumption of nuclear talks with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[19] Iran has repeatedly rejected this proposal.[20] Iran has reiterated its right to enrich uranium domestically, continued to deny the IAEA access to Iranian nuclear facilities struck in the 12-day Israel-Iran War, and set maximalist preconditions for resuming nuclear talks with the United States.[21]
Iran continues to consult Russia over mutual concerns over the southern Caucasus after the US began efforts to broker a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[22] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin on August 26 to discuss security concerns in the southern Caucasus and Russo-Iranian military cooperation.[23] They likely discussed the recent US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus. This meeting comes after Iranian officials criticized a US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously discussed Russo-Iranian concerns about the deal with Russian Foreign Minister Special Representative to the Caucasus Region Igor Khayev in Tehran on August 13.[24] Iranian officials have also recently held meetings with Armenian officials, likely to try to dissuade Armenia from agreeing to the proposed trade corridor.[25]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei denied reports in Western media that reported that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani proposed lowering Iran's uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to advance negotiations with the United States.[26]
Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi met with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir on August 26 to discuss enhancing border security along Iran's southeastern border.[27] Mousavi stated that there has been an increase in terrorist activity on the Iran-Pakistan border and expressed Iran's willingness to cooperate with Pakistan to address the issue.[28] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on August 23 that Iranian security forces destroyed a terrorist cell that had entered Iran from the Pakistan-Iran border and was armed with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, grenades, explosive vests, and large quantities of ammunition.[29] Iranian security forces have recently conducted several counterterrorism operations against the Baloch Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl in southeastern Iran.[30]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-26-2025
In an interview with the Synergyir channel, https://www.aparat.com/v/mwr4ynn Seyed Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council, claimed that during the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel in June, Russia passed Israel intelligence on the locations of Iranian air defense systems. Sadr said the events showed that “a strategic alliance with Moscow is useless.” “Russia merely said it did not approve of Israel's attack on Iran, but in practice it helped,” he added.
He also pointed to Moscow's cooperation with other countries: “Turkey is a NATO member. What is NATO? It is against Russia. Russia agreed to sell Turkey the S-400. This is not the strategic partnership we talked about for years.” Sadr stressed that ties between Moscow and Tehran should continue, but “Russia cannot be trusted.”
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov previously said Moscow's readiness to provide Iran with military assistance in a conflict with Israel would depend on an official request from Tehran, but he did not say whether Russia was prepared to supply air defense systems such as the S-300 or S-400. Notably, on January 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Moscow, intended to strengthen bilateral ties and military cooperation. At the same time, Russia sold advanced S-400 air-defense systems to Turkey, a NATO member, while refraining from supplying those systems to Tehran and dragging its feet on Su-35 fighter jets. “Turkey is a NATO member, an organization that openly opposes Russia. This has nothing to do with the strategic partnership we've talked about for so long,” the Iranian official said.
Separately, Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, called Russia's Vladimir Putin “a man with a thousand faces.