The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime. Certain Iranian media outlets have amplified reports of HTS fighters interfering with the Sayyida Zeinab shrine and the Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine, while other Iranian media reports claimed that HTS engaged respectfully during a visit to the shrine in recent days.[19] The fact that the Iranian media is not pursuing a clear messaging campaign about the Shia holy sites in Syria may indicate that the Iranian defense and political establishment has not yet decided how best to interact with the new HTS-led interim government. The rapid pace in which the Assad regime fell, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars for the Iranian regime, has almost certainly forced Iran to re-evaluate its strategy in regard to Syria and the region at large.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-14-2024
Iran Update, December 15, 2024
Turkey will likely continue to back the SNA’s ground operation against the SDF to destroy the SDF. The Turkish foreign minister said on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective in Syria is to ”destroy” the SDF, meaning that any ceasefire between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups is presumably temporary.[5] It is unclear when large-scale operations will resume, however. Turkish-backed fighters have also executed injured SDF fighters at hospitals in northern Syria and reportedly looted civilian areas in Manbij.[6] These crimes risk triggering ethnically motivated violence and upsetting Syria’s current relative stability, especially if Turkish-backed fighters enter Kurdish areas and begin killing Kurdish civilians.
The SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF is the key US partner in Syria against ISIS. Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. The SDF also controls al Hol IDP camp and a network of prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters. Turkish violence—including the threat of ethnically motivated killing—would almost certainly cause the SDF to mobilize its forces against Turkish-backed groups. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria. It is unclear if the SDF would be able to secure these key facilities if it faces a severe threat from Turkish-backed forces to Kurdish civilian areas.
Israel and Jordan reportedly held secret talks on December 13 to discuss the situation in Syria and the threat of Iranian weapons smuggling to Palestinian militias in the West Bank. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Israeli and Jordanian officials discussed the growing threat of Iranian-backed groups smuggling weapons into the West Bank via Jordan.[33] Two Israeli officials stated that the talks covered Israel and Jordan’s ”engagement” with the HTS-led transitional government in Syria. One official added that Jordan is acting as a ”mediator” between Israel and the Syrian rebel groups. HTS seized control of the Nassib border crossing into Jordan on December 14.[34] Iranian-backed elements have historically used this crossing and the areas surrounding it to smuggle weapons into Jordan and then into the West Bank to arm Palestinian militias.[35] Iran will almost certainly attempt to find new ways to smuggle weapons into Jordan, however.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024