“They (Hezbollah) already had thousands of pagers...but three to four thousand new pagers were needed. They asked an Iranian company to place the order. Hezbollah said they could not make the purchase as it would raise suspicions. The company negotiated with a famous Taiwanese brand that used to produce pagers and placed an order for 5,000 pagers. The pagers were delivered to the Iranian company. They were then given to Hezbollah,” said Asadollahi.
Asadollahi’s comments quickly went viral, fueling speculation across media outlets. However, just an hour after his remarks, the same state TV channel issued a denial.
Noor News, a website outlet closely affiliated with Iran's Supreme National Security Council, also posted a tweet on Saturday refuting Asadollahi’s claims. “The incorrect statements made by an expert on IRIB have ignited new speculations surrounding the incident. Iranian companies had no role in the purchase, transport, or distribution of the pagers,” the tweet stated.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2024
The New York Times reported that Hamas asked for Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah participation in the October 7 attacks in July 2023, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the operation.[11] Hamas initially sought to attack in Fall 2022, according to minutes from Hamas meetings that the IDF captured in the central Gaza Strip in late January 2024. Hamas delayed the planned Fall 2022 attack to convince Iran and Hezbollah to participate. Hamas Political Bureau member and current Deputy Hamas leader Khalil al Hayya met with the head of the IRGC Quds Force Palestinian Affairs Office and a senior Hezbollah official in July 2023. Hayya specifically requested Hezbollah and Iran target sensitive Israeli sites as the Hamas attack began. The IRGC Quds Force official reportedly told Hayya that Iran and Hezbollah supported the attack in principle but needed time to “prepare the environment.”
This meeting demonstrates that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks, but it remains unclear if Iran or Hezbollah had tactical knowledge of the attack's exact timing. Iran and Hezbollah's hesitation may reflect the reality that Iran and Hezbollah would have needed to prepare their own operational plans to support Hamas’ plans successfully, which could take many months. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported the theory of ground attacks into Israel from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and Hezbollah had prepared to undertake such an attack if necessary.[12]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2024