From the 1990s to 2022, Russia provided, off and on, important military assistance to Iran across the ground, aerospace, and naval domains, largely focused on hardware instead of technology transfers. In addition to Russian support to Iran’s nuclear program, this assistance included the provision of tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, combat aircraft, helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles, among others. Assistance — at least in the 1990s — also entailed unofficial transfers by low-level Russian entities to Iran’s ballistic missile and suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.
Since 2022, Russia’s defense relationship with Iran has taken a big leap forward. Cooperation has moved past the previous patron-client dynamic, with Iran emerging as a key enabler of Russia’s air and ground campaign in Ukraine. Military-technical collaboration has intensified in existing areas, while also advancing to new frontiers such as the joint development of novel uncrewed aerial vehicles. Amid a general weakening of past constraints on cooperation, Iran and Russia have also taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship.
Western states should also worry about less likely — but no less consequential — forms of Russian assistance that would enhance the hedging strategies underpinning Iran’s asymmetric deterrence and compellence. Moscow may, for instance, support Iran’s nuclear hedging capabilities without helping it cross the threshold to building a nuclear bomb. Iran is also suspected of hedging in other areas where it could benefit from Russian know-how: intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic missile-applicable technologies, including solid-propellant space launch vehicles, technologies applicable to direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, and dual-use technologies in the chemical and biological weapons domains to enhance its “on demand” capacity to produce such weapons. Since Moscow’s capabilities in these realms are superior to those of Iran, it could support its partner in honing these hedging strategies.
As you say, Iran’s role with Russia is shifting to a more equal level. The nature of Russia’s relationship with the various Stans seems to be shifting too. If the current Iranian regime were overthrown, Russia could end up without this “partner”, and a likely shift in it’s relationships with Muslim countries. A bitch to be born in “interesting times.”
No wonder Putin seems to be a nervous wreck, uncertain in some decisions. Although he does seem committed to doubling down on moves to increase his countries ability to follow through on his plan/desire to advance Russian world and specifically European power. These are mostly long term plans to change psychology and actions of Russians—educate teens in the Hitlwer Youth mode, motivate young women to reproduce at much higher levels, etc.
Britain and the US have raised fears that Russia has shared nuclear secrets with Iran in return for Tehran supplying Moscow with ballistic missiles to bomb Ukraine.
Britain, France and Germany jointly warned last week that Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium had “continued to grow significantly, without any credible civilian justification” and that it had accumulated four “significant quantities” that each could be used to make a nuclear bomb.
But it is not clear how much technical knowhow Tehran has to build a nuclear weapon at this stage, or how quickly it could do so. Working with experienced Russian specialists or using Russian knowledge would help speed up the manufacturing process, however – though Iran denies that it is trying to make a nuclear bomb.
Western concern that Iran is close to being able to make a nuclear weapon has been circulating for months, contributing to tensions in the Middle East, already at a high pitch because of Israel's continuing assault on Hamas and Gaza. Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, are supporters of Hamas – and Tehran’s nuclear development is therefore viewed as a direct threat by Jerusalem.