Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
18JUL2024 ... or prevent the Paydari group and Mirbagheri from getting more power.
22JUL2024 The shadowy Iran ayatollah who is being ‘vilified’
Ayatollah Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri who endorsed ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili in Iran’s recent snap elections has come under attack for his extreme views. Such attacks may relate to his alleged leadership ambitions.
Mirbagheri is largely seen as the successor of the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, the spiritual father of Iran’s ultraconservatives, whom Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei held in very high esteem.
As a member of the Assembly, Mirbagheri contends that the Assembly’s role must be “supporting” the Supreme Leader, not “supervising” him as the Constitution dictates. He has always strongly supported Khamenei as the absolute authority and the Supreme Islamic Jurist (Vali-ye Faghih).
Mirbagheri teaches that fighting “infidels” and overcoming them is a prerequisite for the “emergence” of the hidden Imam, Mahdi, who the Shiittes believe has been in occultation by divine for centuries.
Mirbagheri’s views about the “world order” are similar to those of Alexander Dugin, the Russian ultranationalist philosopher, who has regularly been invited to visit Iran in recent years and met with Mirbagheri and other hardliners in Qom, the bastion of ultra-hardliners.
Opponents highlight Mirbagheri’s extreme views about women’s education “in the Western style”, hijab, social freedoms, his refutation of “Western sciences” as well as his advocacy of the “clash of civilizations”.
An article Wednesday by Mehrdad Khadir, deputy editor of the reformist Ham Mihan newspaper, suggested that Jalili’ defeat has saved Iranians from the danger of domination of Mirbagheri’s extreme views.
Some hardliners who now present Mirbagheri as a danger to the foundations of the Islamic Republic’s political and religious establishment allege that his supporters have plans to pitch him as the country’s future Supreme Leader. They also warn that under his leadership religious fundamentalism and extreme anti-Western views will prevail in the Islamic Republic.
Some others allege that Mirbagheri’s vilification is another “Khamenei gambit” meant to make him and his son Mojtaba look “moderate” in comparison and to eliminate him as a leadership contender and rival to Mojtaba.
Supporters of Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf blamed Jalili and his political sponsors, the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the recently established Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (MASAF), for the defeat of the ‘revolutionary front’ in the elections. They were among the first to condemn Mirbagheri and his views on social media post elections.
Paydari and MASAF members often reiterate Mirbagheri’s apocalyptic, anti-western political, and anti-modernity views in their speeches and propaganda. Members of both groups have taken over many top and sensitive positions in the government in the past few years and formed a very influential minority in the parliament.
full article + links https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407187944
Dugin believes that Ayatollah Khamenei is the “best solution” for confronting the West. “If he helps to defeat the West I am sure we will emerge from this arena victorious and proud,” he said, because “in the center of the Guardianship of [the Islamic] Jurist, God's will is at work.” But while he wants Ali Khamenei’s help in defeating the West, Dugin concedes that he has not been successful in bringing Iran and Russia closer. “Young Iranians are not very interested in getting to know Russia. Perhaps we should search for a key to open this door between the two countries,” he said.
Iran Update, July 24, 2024
The United States and Iraq continued discussing their bilateral security partnership, which is in conflict with Iranian-backed efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. US and Iraqi delegations concluded their two-day Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, DC, on July 23.[23] The dialogue covered ending the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning the US presence in Iraq to part of a bilateral security relationship.[24] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that the United States will continue to develop and strengthen its security partnership with Iraq.[25] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted around over 160 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began in order to compel Washington to withdraw its troops.[26] The militias paused attacks in February 2024 but announced on July 19 that they would resume attacks since Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani had failed to set a timeline for the complete withdrawal of US forces.[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024
Iran Update, July 25, 2024
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran had exported nuclear materials and expertise to various unspecified countries in an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on July 22.[17] Eslami stated that Iranian nuclear experts had “exported services” to unnamed countries during an unspecified timeframe. Eslami added that an AEOI technical group had travelled to an unspecified Latin American country within the past four months for “consultations” and that Iran was “continuously receiving” similar requests from other countries. Eslami also stated that Iran had exported domestically-produced heavy water—a substance that serves as a moderator and coolant in nuclear reactors—without providing further details. Eslami‘s statements focused on the development and export of Iranian pharmaceutical nuclear capabilities. Khamenei publicly called on the AEOI in June 2023 to commercialize nuclear products—specifically heavy water and nuclear isotopes—and services.[18] Khamenei.ir published Eslami’s interview on a new page titled “A Strong Iran with an Advanced Nuclear Industry,” underscoring the extent to which the supreme leader seeks to promote Iranian indigenous nuclear capabilities.[19]
It is unclear to what extent Iran has previously provided nuclear expertise to other actors, although Iranian officials have previously expressed their readiness to do so. Eslami stressed Iran’s willingness to help Saudi Arabia develop its nuclear program in May 2024.[20] Iran sold heavy water to the US in 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[21] Iranian officials have since claimed that the US purchased and requested the purchase of Iranian heavy water in recent years.[22] One Iranian official stated that Iran discussed heavy waters sales with Russia in 2016, although it is unclear if these discussions resulted in the purchase of such materials.[23]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2024
Iran Update, July 26, 2024
A new Iranian-backed Iraqi militia claimed two rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on July 25. The al Thawriyyun group took responsibility for attacking Ain al Asad Airbase in Iraq and the Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria.[1] US and Iraqi officials confirmed that the attack targeting Ain al Asad Airbase caused no damage.[2] CTP-ISW reported this rocket attack on July 25.[3] A BBC journalist said that unspecified officials confirmed that rockets targeted the Conoco Mission Support Site but did not reach the base.[4] CTP-ISW noted on July 17 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[5]
The al Thawriyyun group asserted that it is connected to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has mounted attack campaigns against US forces and Israel since October 2023.[6] The militia created a Telegram channel on the day of the attacks to claim responsibility for them.[7] Al Thawriyyun said that their attacks on US forces would persist and become more advanced until US forces withdraw from Iraq.[8] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq paused its attack campaign in February 2024 but militias within the coalition recently threatened to resume their attacks against US forces.[9] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on or before June 5 to attack US forces in Iraq if the Iraqi prime minister failed to set a date for US troop withdrawal within 40 days, and the militias’ coordinating body also threatened to resume attacks on June 19.[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-26-2024
The IDF assessed that Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a rocket attack that killed at least ten Israeli children and “youths” and wounded 30 other Israeli civilians in Majdal Shams, northern Israel, on July 27.[9] The IDF assessed that Hezbollah conducted the attack using at least 40 projectiles in three separate barrages.[10] Hezbollah denied responsibility for the attack.[11] The rockets struck a soccer field in Majdal Shams, which is a Druze village in northern Israel.[12] Israeli media reported that many the wounded civilians are children.[13] Israeli media reported that this attack caused the most civilian casualties in northern Israel since October 2023.[14] The IDF’s preliminary investigation concluded that while there was a rocket alert, the warning was too short.[15] The attack followed an IDF attack that killed four Hezbollah fighters in Kfar Kila, Lebanon on July 27.[16] Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah previously threatened to strike new locations inside Israel in a televised speech on July 27.[17] Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah would hit new Israeli targets if Israel “continues to target civilians” in Lebanon. Hezbollah—not Israel—initiated the war on the northern border by conducting near daily attacks into northern Israel beginning on October 8.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-27-2024
Hezbollah likely conducted the July 27 rocket attack that killed 12 Israeli children in Majdal Shams, Golan Heights. The IDF published a graphic on July 28 showing the Falaq-1 rocket's flight path, which passed several hundred feet west of the IDF position at Maale Golani, 2km north of Majdal Shams.[1] Hezbollah fired the rocket from north of Shebaa village, southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed two attacks targeting Maale Golani on July 27, including one attack in which Hezbollah said that it fired a Falaq-1.[2] Hezbollah claimed the Falaq-1 attack targeting Maale Golani at 1229 ET, roughly one hour after the first reports of a rocket impact at Majdal Shams.[3] Hezbollah attack claims frequently lag behind reports of the actual attack. Hezbollah denied that it conducted the attack on Majdal Shams and falsely claimed that the attack was the result of an Israeli Tamir Iron Dome interceptor that hit Majdal Shams.[4] The IDF found debris of an Iranian-made Falaq-1 rocket in Majdal Shams, and the IDF reported that only Hezbollah uses the Falaq-1.[5] The IDF did not fire an Iron Dome interceptor at the rocket.[6] Other militias operating in southern Lebanon—such as Hamas elements or Jama’a al Islamiyah—could have acquired and used a Falaq-1, but CTP-ISW has not previously observed these militias using the Falaq-1.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-28-2024
Iran Update, July 29, 2024
Iran and its revisionist partners are continuing to try to legitimize and bolster one another. Iranian officials congratulated Nicolas Maduro on July 29 on his re-election as the president of Venezuela.[45] Local and international observers have noted that the Maduro regime likely rigged the election to ensure Maduro’s victory.[46]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2024
Iran gave its “full blessing” to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces if Israel conducts a “massive retaliatory assault” targeting Hezbollah and/or non-Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, according to a senior Iraqi militia leader who spoke to BBC on July 30.[16] The militia leader emphasized that “Lebanon, and not only Hezbollah, is our red line.”[17] It is unclear whether Israel's retaliatory strike targeting Fuad Shukr on July 30 constitutes a “massive retaliatory assault.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted over 160 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and February 2024.[18] The group suspended attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US personnel in northeastern Jordan in late 2024.[19] The militia leader told BBC that senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders are currently in Tehran to attend Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration ceremony.[20] He added that the militia leaders have met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC Quds Force commanders on the sidelines of the ceremony.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-30-2024
https://www.iranintl.com/en/liveblog/hamas-leader-killed-iran
10,000 personnel of IRGC & their relatives, several thousands of Basij militiamen & women & over 5,000 Afghan nationals from Fatemiyoun division of Quds Force were brought to Tehran to attend funeral of Hamas terrorist, IsmailHaniyeh. These are core force of Khamenei’s terrorists who suppress anti-regime protests in Iran.
https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1818943346624094610
i.e. the regime falls if only about 10k people are relocated.
Israel found the whereabouts of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran through his non-Iranian phone line and that of his bodyguard, Abbas Khamehyar, a university professor and regime insider suggested during a Wednesday program aired by the IRGC-affiliated Ofogh TV Channel. “It’s not hard to locate the mobile phone of the Hamas political leader using technology,” he said.
https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1818879232694476929
Iran Update, July 31, 2024
The United States conducted a self-defense strike on July 30 targeting Iranian-backed militants in Iraq, who were preparing to launch a one-way attack drone.[23] The United States deemed the drone to be a threat to US and International Coalition forces given the recent Iranian-backed militia attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria.[24] The US strike comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have resumed their campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi militants whom the United States struck were affiliated with prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[25] The United States killed four Iraqi militants and wounded another four, according to Reuters.[26] Kataib Hezbollah claimed that the United States struck ”drone experts,” who were working to implement new security measures for Shia pilgrims.[27] Kataib Hezbollah also claimed that the United States launched the self-defense strike from Kuwait and warned Kuwait against allowing the United States to launch attacks from its territory.[28]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-31-2024
Iran is likely now planning for its next attack in order to establish deterrence with Israel while still avoiding a large-scale war. One of the most dangerous but increasingly likely scenarios is that Iran and the Axis of Resistance launch a combined, large-scale drone and missile attack that incorporates lessons from the April 2024 attack. Iranian leaders, in this scenario, could increase the volume of projectiles fired at Israel by launching more from Iran, from the surrounding countries, or both. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria could launch simultaneous attacks to further strain Israeli air defenses as well. Drones and missiles launched from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria would be much harder to intercept than the ones from Iran given the shorter distances and flight times to Israel. US and Israeli forces would have significantly less time to intercept those projectiles. It would take Hezbollah drones around 15 minutes to reach Haifa and around 40 minutes flying on direct paths to reach Tel Aviv, for instance (although many drones will likely fly indirect and longer routes).[10] Iran could alternatively exploit the short flight times to concentrate a smaller volume of fire against a single target in Israel rather than against two. Shorter flight times for the drones could make it easier to coordinate them with ballistic missiles fired from Iran, whose flight times are generally less than 10 minutes. If Iran and its partners and proxies can concentrate drones and missiles on Israeli targets simultaneously, they may have reason to expect that the distractions caused by the one can facilitate penetration by the other.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance will also benefit from the fact that they have probed Israeli air defenses extensively since April 2024 and thus learned how to attack them more effectively. Hezbollah and the Houthis have both conducted attacks that have successfully bypassed Israeli air defenses since April 2024. The most notable example was the Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv on July 19 that killed an Israeli and injured four others.[11] Israeli air defenses have similarly struggled to intercept Hezbollah drones in recent months because of the short flight time and mountainous terrain.[12] The success that Israel and its allies and partners had in defeating the April 2024 strike should not be cause for complacency in the face of a new attack. But Israel and its supporters have multiple systems to engage various kinds of targets and are aware of the capabilities Hezbollah's drones have shown, so neither is there cause for pessimism.
Iran could inadvertently trigger an expanded conflict with Israel and even the United States if Iran launches an attack along the lines described here. Launching hundreds of projectiles is inherently risky, particularly given the failure rate that Iranian missiles have shown.[13] Technical errors could cause severe collateral damage, as demonstrated by the recent Hezbollah attack that killed 12 Israeli children in the Golan Heights.[14] This risk is higher given reports that Iran is planning to target locations near Haifa and Tel Aviv.[15] Both cities are far more populated than the two remote locations that Iran targeted in April 2024. The risk of civilian casualties is thus very high even if Iran does not mean to strike civilian targets around Haifa and Tel Aviv. Iran could trigger an expanded war if it kills Israeli civilians or inflicts severe damage—regardless of whether Iran intends to avoid an overt war. It may not be immediately obvious to Israeli leaders that a large strike aimed at one or two targets is not, in fact, aimed at a much wider target set, moreover. Drones have long ranges and often fly far beyond their targets before turning to hit them from the rear. The risk of miscalculation in a strike such as the one described is very high.
The Israeli airstrike targeting Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30 also killed an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer, Milad Beydi.[27] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami released a statement mourning the killing of Beydi and blaming Israel for his death.[28] Salami described Beydi as one of the Iranian military advisers in Lebanon and Syria.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it killed Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, in an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone on July 13.[29] The IDF confirmed that the airstrike killed Deif in a statement on August 1.[30] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF received definitive intelligence that confirmed Deif’s death in the hours prior to the announcement.[31] The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas‘ military wing—has not released a statement acknowledging the IDF statement as of this writing.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-1-2024
Former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed by an explosive device that was secretly smuggled into his guesthouse in Tehran, and not by an airstrike, The New York Times reported and The Jerusalem Post has independently confirmed.
The bomb was hidden in June and used cutting-edge remote technology as has been used in the killing of Iran nuclear chief Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, according to the report and the Post’s sources. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps were directly responsible for security at the guesthouse in a large compound called Neshat in a high-end neighborhood of northern Tehran.
Haniyeh has visited Tehran numerous times and stayed at the same guest house all or most of those times, providing the assassins a clear target to plan for. It appears that the IRGC or those close to it initially circulated rumors that the attack was a drone strike as this could shift more responsibility for the failure of Haniyeh’s security to other bodies like the Air Force.
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-812941
+ checking his phone https://freerepublic.com/focus/chat/4099233/posts?page=992#992 (note that the source for this is IRGC!)
A controversial Tajik Taliban commander, Abdul Hamid Khorasani of the Afghan Taliban’s Badri Unit, has accused Iran of orchestrating the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh.
Iran and Israel are essentially two sides of the same coin. Iran cannot be trusted. The hand of Khamenei and his non-Islamic regime are responsible for the assassination of the martyr Haniyeh,’ he stated.
https://x.com/Defence_PK99/status/1818842633864663338
see video
That is normal Shia-Sunni stuff
If this is true:
Iran’s outgoing intelligencd minister Esmail Khatib six days ago said “breaking up Mossad’s infiltratation network” was the ministry’s biggest accomplishment under his tenure.
https://x.com/KianSharifi/status/1818570796358369321
Then it is impossible that Mossad planted a bomb in the house. Thus, the Iranians did this themselves.
Did minister Khatib “break up Mossad’s infiltration network” before the 2 months ago date suggested for the planting of the bomb or afterwards? If his success was less than 2 months ago, then it is less likely that Iranians were responsible for the bomb.
Iran Update, August 2, 2024
The following indicators would support the hypothesis that Iranian-backed militias are preparing to attack US forces in eastern Syria.
Iranian-backed militias massing additional forces in or around eastern Syria
Iranian-backed militias leaving their stations in western Iraq or other parts of Syria
Iranian or Iranian-backed militia leaders meeting in eastern Syria
Iranian-backed militias flying ISR drones around US forces in eastern Syria
Iranian-backed militias in eastern Syria conducting exercises simulating attacks on US forces
Iranian or Iranian-backed militia leaders in eastern Syria taking heightened security precautions
Iranian or Iranian-backed sources signaling publicly the possibility of intensified conflict in eastern Syria
Iranian-backed militias rapidly increasing the dissemination of anti-US disinformation in eastern Syria
CTP-ISW has not independently observed confirmation of any of these indicators, and many of them are unlikely to be observable in the open-source environment.
Anonymous Western intelligence sources told Sky News Arabia that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13 in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh.[8] Tisha B’Av commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples and is widely considered a day of sadness and tragedy. An Iranian-Hezbollah attack on this date would come about 12-13 days after Israel killed Haniyeh on July 31. Iran similarly waited 13 days before retaliating against Israel in April 2024 for killing senior IRGC commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-2-2024
Arab states in the Persian Gulf will be closely monitoring US military support for Israel as the regime in Iran—a common enemy—threatens to attack. If they perceive this support to be weak, this will further undermine the US as a reliable partner & push them further towards China.
https://x.com/KasraAarabi/status/1819682095586808013
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced in its announcement No. 3: According to the investigations and investigations, this terrorist operation was carried out by firing a short-range projectile with a warhead of about seven kg, accompanied by a strong explosion, from outside the settlement area of the guests’ house.
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