Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iran Update, March 2, 2024
US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.[21] Houthi fighters also launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea on March 1. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi attack did not damage any vessels.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-2-2024
Iran Update, March 3, 2024
Italian destroyer Caio Duilio intercepted an unspecified drone flying towards the ship in the Red Sea on March 2
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2024
Iran reportedly requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. The Wall Street Journal reported the Iranian request on March 3, citing a senior Sudanese intelligence official.[1] Ahmad Hasan Mohamed—an intelligence adviser to the Sudanese military leader—said that Iran offered “a helicopter-carrying warship” in exchange for Sudan allowing Iran to establish the base. Mohamed stated that Iran wanted the base to gather intelligence on maritime traffic around the Suez Canal and Israel and to station warships at the base. The Wall Street Journal report is consistent with Iranian leaders advocating for building a naval base along the east African coast in recent years.[2] Mohamed added that Sudan rejected the Iranian request. Both the Iranian and Sudanese foreign affairs ministries have refuted the Wall Street Journal report.[3] The report follows Sudanese Armed Forces-affiliated Foreign Affairs Minister Ali al Sadiq Ali traveling to Tehran and meeting with senior Iranian officials in early February.[4]
The Iranian request to establish a naval base in Sudan is part of growing military cooperation between the two countries. Western media previously reported in January that Iran had recently supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with Mohajer-6 multirole drones.[5] The Iranian effort to establish a naval base likely reflects how Tehran views its defense exports as a means of facilitating the expansion of its overall military influence abroad.
Iran may be attempting to compete with other rival Gulf Arab states in Sudan. The United Arab Emirates is the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) owing to various ties between the RSF head (Hemedti) and the emirates.[6] Abu Dhabi has invested in Sudan as part of its larger strategic effort to expand its influence along the Red Sea with friendly states and client ports.[7] The United Arab Emirates has funded and supplied the RSF with weapons and used neighboring Chad as a logistics hub for these efforts.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2024
FBI launches urgent manhunt for Iranian secret agent, 42, accused of plotting to assassinate Trump-era officials including Mike Pompeo in revenge for killing of Qasem Soleimani
Federal agents say Majid Dastjani Farahani has been trying to recruit allies in the country to murder current and former US government officials
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/4221878/posts
Iran Update, March 5, 2024
Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament.[1] The majority of Tehran province’s 14 confirmed candidates were hardliners.[2] Incumbent hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected to parliament for Tehran province.[3] Parliamentarians will vote for the next parliament speaker after run-off elections conclude in late April or early May.[4] Forty-five candidates will compete in the run-off election.[5]
Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.[6] Approximately 25 million Iranians out of 61 million eligible voters voted for 290 candidates for Parliament and 88 candidates for the Assembly of Experts.[7] The Assembly of Experts is the body responsible for choosing the supreme leader’s successor. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi reported an official voter turnout of 41%.[8] This figure is likely inflated, given the Iranian regime’s historical tendency to exaggerate voter turnout.[9] Iran reported a 43% voter turnout in its 2020 parliamentary election.[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2024
Iran Update, March 6, 2024
RGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani said on March 6 that Iran’s proxies and partners have taken a more “offensive stance” in the Israel-Hamas war, which frames the war in terms consistent with Iran’s regional military doctrine.[1] Ghaani issued this statement during a speech to the Assembly of Experts. Iran and the Axis aim to seize the operational initiative to dictate the tempo and terms of action in conflict and force Iran’s adversaries to react constantly.[2] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas’ decision to conduct a ground attack into Israel on October 7 may have been based on what Salami outlined in August 2022.[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2024
Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi—a senior military adviser to the Iranian supreme leader—stated on March 6 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy and Aerospace Force should “focus” on the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.[3] Safavi described the Mediterranean Sea as part of Iran's strategic depth and that Tehran must accordingly “increase [its] strategic depth [by] 5,000 kilometers,” which would extend to the Strait of Gibraltar.[4] Safavi’s remarks come after IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi threatened in December 2023 that Iran's so-called “Axis of Resistance” could someday disrupt maritime traffic in the Mediterranean Sea and around the Strait of Gibraltar.[5] The Iranian desire to develop a military presence, especially a naval one, around the Mediterranean Sea and its periphery is not entirely new, as senior military officials have discussed the idea since at least 2016.[6]
The remarks from Safavi and Naghdi are noteworthy, nevertheless, given recent Iranian efforts in the area. Western media reported on March 3 that Iran requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping.[7] Separately, Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an IRGC Navy colonel around the coastal city of Baniyas, Syria, on March 1.[8] An Israeli social media account observed that the naval officer may have worked on coastal missile defenses and/or electronic warfare.[9]
Iran would probably use an expanding military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea to threaten commercial traffic, as Iran has long done so around the Persian Gulf and is currently supporting Houthi attacks on global commerce. Iran has invested in recent years in building surface vessels that are capable of hosting fast attack craft, drones, helicopters, and missiles. These vessels would not likely survive conventional engagements against the US Navy or other modern militaries—but they are optimized for the sort of commerce raiding that has long been a feature of Iranian regional strategy.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2024
INSKolkata deployed for Maritime Security Operations, arrived on location at 1645 hrs & rescued 21 crew, incl one Indian national, using integral helicopter & boats. Critical medical aid provided to injured crew.
The crew of True Confidence were subsequently evacuated to Djibouti
https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1765605384784593275
3 min video
CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on March 7.[11] Kurilla added that in his estimation, the United States will need to impose a “cost” on Iran to stop the Houthis from continuing attacks.[12] Kurilla highlighted the importance of targeting Iran's ability to resupply the Houthis.
Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla reported that there has not been an attack on US forces in Iraq or Syria in 32 days.[13] US forces struck 85 Iranian-backed targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2 and killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad on February 7 who was responsible for the deaths of US servicemembers. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.[14] Iranian-backed militias have conducted attacks targeting US service members prior to October 7. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq can resume attacks at a time, place, and for reasons of their choosing, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[15] ran has continued to send arms and funds to its militias despite the pause in attacks.
Kurilla also said that Iran continues to support Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and armed groups in the West Bank.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-8-2024
Iran Update, March 9, and 10, 2024
no significant activity to report
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-9-2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2024
Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.[43] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia's Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran's Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[44] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe combined naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[45] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[46] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2024
Iran Update, March 12, 2024
Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah met with a delegation of Hamas officials in Beirut, Lebanon, on March 12.[40] Hamas’ Deputy Political Bureau leader for the Gaza Strip Khalil al Hayya led discussions on Hamas’ operations in the Gaza Strip as well as on the Israel-Hamas negotiations. Nasrallah and the Hamas delegation discussed the developments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the ”multiple support fronts,” likely referring to the Iranian-backed attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen targeting Israel.
Western media reported on March 12 that the European Union is prepared to impose “new and significant measures” against Iran in response to reports that Iran may transfer ballistic missiles to Russia.[73] Reuters reported that EU leaders expressed concern in a draft conclusion for their upcoming March 21-22 summit that “Iran may transfer ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.” Reuters also reported that the European Union in the draft text called on unspecified third parties to cease “providing material support to Russia” and that the European Union “is prepared to respond swiftly. . . with new and significant measures against Iran,” including further sanctions.
Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January 2024.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that Ukraine does not possess any information confirming that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[75] The US National Security Council spokesperson similarly said on February 22 that the United States has yet to confirm that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[76]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2024
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf
Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.[47] Iran uses its defense exports to expand its military influence abroad and to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[48] Ashtiani separately stated that Iran seeks to develop greater defense cooperation with Armenia, Qatar, Russia, and Turkey.[49] Ashtiani recently held separate meetings with the Qatari and Armenian defense ministers in Doha on March 4 and in Tehran on March 6, respectively.[50] Ashtiani attended the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference during his visit to Qatar.[51] Iran displayed its drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and air defense systems, among other military equipment, in the exhibition. Iran has also reportedly supplied drones to Armenia since at least July 2023.[52]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2024
Iran Update, March 14, 2024
The Financial Times reported that the United States held secret, Oman-brokered talks with Iran in January 2024 to convince Tehran to pressure the Houthis to stop attacking ships in the Red Sea.[64] White House Middle East adviser Brett McGurk and acting Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley led the American delegation. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Ali Bagheri Kani led the Iranian delegation. Iranian state media denied the report, citing an “informed” source.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024
Iran Update, March 15, 2024
The G7 countries warned Iran on March 15 that it should not transfer missiles to Russia.[54] The G7 countries threatened “new and significant measures against Iran,” including new sanctions, if Iran transfers missiles to Russia. Western media reported that the G7 is considering banning Iran’s national air carrier, Iran Air, from conducting flights to Europe.[55] American and European officials told Western media on March 15 that they have no evidence confirming that Iran has supplied missiles to Russia.[56] Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-15-2024
Iran Update, March 16, 2024
Nothing special
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-16-2024
Iran Update, March 17, 2024
Nothing special
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2024
Iran Update, March 18, 2024
Local Syrian opposition media reported on March 18 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) seeks to expand its military infrastructure at al Hamdan Airport in eastern Syria.[49] This reporting is consistent with Iran’s long-standing efforts to secure a permanent presence there. The IRGC has previously conducted training exercises at the airport.[50] The same Syrian opposition source claimed that the Lebanon-based construction company Jihad al Binaa will help the IRGC expand its operations at the airport.[51] Jihad al Binaa is a Lebanese Hezbollah-run and Iranian-funded construction company subject to secondary sanctions as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.[52] Iran uses military infrastructure in eastern Syria to secure a safe route through which it can facilitate Iranian weapons shipments to its proxies and partners in the region.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2024
Iran Update, March 19, 2024
Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call on March 19.[1] Raisi told Putin that Iran is “ready to maintain stability” and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.[2] Iran’s interests in the Caucasus include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from using Azerbaijan’s territory to operate against Iran, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority.[3] Russian readouts of Raisi and Putin’s phone call notably did not mention that the pair discussed the Caucasus.[4]
Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit the Russian focus on Ukraine to increase Western influence in the Caucasus. Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[5] Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt stretching from Istanbul to Xinjiang that would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”[6]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2024
The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[59] This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.[60] Houthi military spokesperson Yahye Saree said that the expanded operation would target all Israel-associated commercial vessels traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[61] The Houthi’s maximum weapon range is 2,200km, which encompasses only some parts of the shipping routes toward the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, suggesting that the supreme leader's statement is largely aspirational.[62] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50% since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[63] The Cape of Good Hope has seen a 74% increase in traffic compared to 2023 after Houthi attacks forced ships to re-route from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.[64] The Houthis have not conducted an attack outside the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the announcement on March 15. Iran did target a vessel 200km off the Indian coast in the Indian Ocean on December 23.[65]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government's shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech on March 20.[66] Khamenei announced “controlling inflation and” economic production as Iran's new year's slogan at the beginning of the last Persian calendar year in March 2023.[67] Khamenei stated on March 20, 2024 that the state of inflation and economic production in Iran is “relatively far from what we wanted.”[68] Khamenei said in a separate Nowruz message on March 20, 2024 that Iranians should not expect the regime to address “big issues” such as inflation and production growth “within a year.”[69] Khamenei also described the economy as Iran's “main weakness” and announced a new slogan, “a leap in [economic] production with [the] people's participation,” for the upcoming Persian calendar year.[70]
Iran's inflation rate is approximately 44 percent, according to Iranian media.[71] The actual inflation rate is likely higher given Iranian officials and media's tendency to fabricate economic statistics, however. Western and diaspora media recently reported that many Iranians refrained this year from buying goods that they normally would for Nowruz, such as new clothes and sweets, due to high prices.[72]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2024
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