Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iran Update, August 27, 2024
Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his newly formed cabinet. Khamenei focused the meeting on addressing economic issues. Khamenei also expressed openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.
more https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-27-2024
Iran Update, August 28, 2024
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri restated on August 28 the Iranian intent to attack Israel in retaliation for killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[14] Bagheri said that Iran will conduct a “calculated” retaliation against Israel. Bagheri and other senior Iranian military officials have repeatedly said in recent weeks that Iran would conduct such an attack.[15] These statements are especially noteworthy given that these officials would be involved in the planning and execution of an attack CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran will likely attack Israel directly. Iran has likely delayed its attack until now in part to stoke anxiety and fear among the Israeli public.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2024
Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency report obtained by the Associated Press.[19] The Associated Press reported on August 29 that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, citing an unreleased IAEA report.[20] This amount marks a 22.6 kilogram increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last report in May 2024.[21] The IAEA report also verified that Iran has completed the installation of eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[22] The Fordow cascades are not yet operational. The IAEA noted that the installation of two new cascades at Natanz is ongoing and that Iran continues to increase the number of operating cascades of IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.[23] Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, which increases the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[24] These diplomats and the IAEA report are presumably referring to the same cascades of centrifuges. The IAEA report said that Iran's overall stockpile of enriched uranium is 5,751.8 kilograms as of August 17.[25] This report follows continued statements from senior Iranian officials since early 2024, including a statement from a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, that have begun to normalize discussions about Iran's ability to procure nuclear weapons.[26]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2024
An unspecified Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) official told Iraqi media that Iran is attempting to use its nuclear program to pressure Western countries as part of nuclear negotiations, which would be consistent with statements by the supreme leader and other Iranian officials indicating interest in renewed negotiations. It is not clear why this unspecified AEOI official would speak with Iraqi media before speaking to Iranian media. The level of access this official has within AEOI and Iranian policymaking is also unclear. The source told Iraqi media on August 30 that Iran does not aim to build a nuclear weapon but continues to pursue a nuclear program to pressure Western countries into reaching a new nuclear deal, which is consistent with statements from senior Iranian officials indicating the regime's willingness to reengage in nuclear negotiations with the West to relieve sanctions pressure on Iran.[7] International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi indicated on August 30 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.”[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-30-2024
Iran Update, August 31, 2024
The Houthis claimed an attack targeting Liberian-flagged container ship M/V GROTON in the Gulf of Aden on August 31.[45] The Houthis claimed to target the M/V GROTON for transporting goods to Israel.[46] The Houthis claimed to launch drones and missiles at the vessel.[47] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two missiles exploded in proximity to the GROTON 130 nautical miles east of Aden, Yemen, on August 31.[48] The Houthis previously targeted the GROTON with two missiles on August 3, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[49]
US Central Command destroyed two Houthi drones in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on August 30.[50]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-31-2024
Lebanese Hezbollah Representative to Iran Abdallah Safi al Din met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Iran on September 1.[7] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that Safi al Din and Araghchi discussed the “latest situation of the anti-Israel front in Lebanon.”[8] Safi al Din and Araghchi likely discussed the Hezbollah drone and rocket attack targeting Israel in some capacity, though neither official would be responsible for planning or executing military operations against Israel. The United States sanctioned Safi al Din in May 2018 for acting as a conduit between Iran and Hezbollah and serving as an interlocutor between Iran and Hezbollah on financial issues.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2024
Low risk of attack on Israel from Iran until November 6. Such an attack would lead to the election in the USA being largely about Iran and they are afraid of that.
On the other hand, there will be varying attacks from Hezbollah, but no big ones.
xxx
Right or wrong, we'll know in November.
Iran Update, September 2, 2024
Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[8] An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia “within a matter of days.”[9] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[10] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran on how to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving Russia’s own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[11]
Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.”[12] Moghaddam claimed that Iran will have a “wise reaction” to Ismail Haniyeh’s death. Moghaddam’s statements are consistent with those from senior Iranian officials discussing Iran’s “psychological war” against Israel.[13] Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing “psychological warfare” against Israel.[14]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2024
An outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) published on September 2 an analytical report examining the possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[16] The report assessed that the most likely course of action in the coming months is a continuation of limited fighting around the Israel-Lebanon border. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into southern Lebanon due to:
Israeli forces being already stretched by militia activity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
The threat of an Iranian attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh;
Internal divisions within the Israeli government; and
The United States opposing an all-out war ahead of its presidential election.
The report ignored the repeated statements from senior Israeli officials vowing to drive Hezbollah forces out of southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006.[17]
It is unclear to what extent this report reflects Iranian leaders’ thinking about attacking Israel while deterring Israel from launching an offensive into Lebanon. The report nevertheless suggests that at least some in the Iranian security establishment are considering how the threat of an attack on Israel could shape Israeli decision-making vis-a-vis Hezbollah. Iran has repeatedly signaled its opposition to an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] Iran relies on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the Levant. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years.
Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood, according to a report by the Associated Press.[19] The report cited experts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The report found that some of the Emad medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran used had a circular error probable of around 1.2 kilometers.[20] The circular error probable is a measurement of the median error radius of a weapon system. Tehran previously advertised that the Emad missile has a circular error probable of 50 meters, while international observers estimated that it was closer to 500 meters.[21] Both measurements suggest a much greater degree of accuracy than demonstrated in the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel. Analysts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed that Iran tried to strike Israeli F-35I fighter jet hangars at the Nevatim airbase with the Emad missiles.[22]
Iran using Emad missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States. The inaccuracy of these missiles would risk causing severe collateral damage, including civilian casualties, even if Iran does not intentionally target civilian areas in Israel.[23] Iranian military commanders have reportedly considered attacking military targets around Haifa and Tel Aviv, where the risk of harming civilians would be particularly high given the population density.[24]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-3-2024
The Iranian foreign minister called regional stability a pillar of Iranian national security on September 5, stressing that any attempts to redraw borders will be a “red line” for Iran. Araghchi’s comments were in reference to an earlier statement by the Russian foreign minister that supported the Turkish-Azerbaijani Zangezur Corridor project.[19] Araghchi’s warning follows a meeting between Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou and Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2 in which Demirchi Lou expressed the need respecting internationally recognized borders.[20] Both the meeting and Araghchi’s comments were likely triggered by a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[21] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[22]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-5-2024
Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, according to the Wall Street Journal.[1] An anonymous European official told the outlet that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected.[2] Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[3] Ababil missiles have a range of around 86 kilometers and can carry a payload of 45 kilograms, while Fateh-360 missiles have a range of around 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[4] It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Iran has meanwhile expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran throughout 2024 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia, according to Reuters.[5] Russia has recently intensified drone and missile attacks into Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.[6] Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and to disrupt Ukraine's defense industrial base.
The missile shipment is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Moscow and Tehran have expanded their economic, media, military, and political cooperation since Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022.[7] That cooperation has included, among other things, the heavily scrutinized sale of Iranian drones to Russia to use against Ukrainian civilian and military targets.
Iran seeks to benefit economically and militarily from its expanding partnership with Russia. Iran has sought cash for its ailing economy in return for selling weapons to the Kremlin, as CTP-ISW reported in September 2023.[8] Iran has also sought to procure Russian Su-35 fighter jets.[9] Iranian officials “pressed” for the delivery of Su-35s during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Tehran in August 2024.[10] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power, given that the current Iranian air fleet is outdated and poorly maintained.[11] Iranian leaders have separately sought Russian support in upgrading their cyber capabilities and missile and space programs as part of the expanding military collaboration.[12]
US and European officials have threatened in recent months to impose sanctions on Iran in response to the sale of missiles to Russia.[13] The United States and unspecified European countries have reportedly prepared a sanctions package against Iran for this contingency.[14] These sanctions could include banning Iran Air from flying to European airports.[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024
Iran Update, September 7, 2024
Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on September 6.[11] Lebanese Hezbollah claimed a drone attack on the IDF’s 91st Division headquarters in Ayelet HaShahar on September 7.[12] Israel Army Radio confirmed that 2 to 3 drones “exploded” in the Ayelet HaShahar area on September 7 but did not cause any casualties.[13]
more + maps
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-7-2024
From the 1990s to 2022, Russia provided, off and on, important military assistance to Iran across the ground, aerospace, and naval domains, largely focused on hardware instead of technology transfers. In addition to Russian support to Iran’s nuclear program, this assistance included the provision of tanks, armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles, combat aircraft, helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles, among others. Assistance — at least in the 1990s — also entailed unofficial transfers by low-level Russian entities to Iran’s ballistic missile and suspected chemical and biological weapons programs.
Since 2022, Russia’s defense relationship with Iran has taken a big leap forward. Cooperation has moved past the previous patron-client dynamic, with Iran emerging as a key enabler of Russia’s air and ground campaign in Ukraine. Military-technical collaboration has intensified in existing areas, while also advancing to new frontiers such as the joint development of novel uncrewed aerial vehicles. Amid a general weakening of past constraints on cooperation, Iran and Russia have also taken steps to further institutionalize their defense relationship.
Western states should also worry about less likely — but no less consequential — forms of Russian assistance that would enhance the hedging strategies underpinning Iran’s asymmetric deterrence and compellence. Moscow may, for instance, support Iran’s nuclear hedging capabilities without helping it cross the threshold to building a nuclear bomb. Iran is also suspected of hedging in other areas where it could benefit from Russian know-how: intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic missile-applicable technologies, including solid-propellant space launch vehicles, technologies applicable to direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, and dual-use technologies in the chemical and biological weapons domains to enhance its “on demand” capacity to produce such weapons. Since Moscow’s capabilities in these realms are superior to those of Iran, it could support its partner in honing these hedging strategies.
As you say, Iran’s role with Russia is shifting to a more equal level. The nature of Russia’s relationship with the various Stans seems to be shifting too. If the current Iranian regime were overthrown, Russia could end up without this “partner”, and a likely shift in it’s relationships with Muslim countries. A bitch to be born in “interesting times.”
No wonder Putin seems to be a nervous wreck, uncertain in some decisions. Although he does seem committed to doubling down on moves to increase his countries ability to follow through on his plan/desire to advance Russian world and specifically European power. These are mostly long term plans to change psychology and actions of Russians—educate teens in the Hitlwer Youth mode, motivate young women to reproduce at much higher levels, etc.
20 years ago, the FSB/SVR was worried about Iran having a nuclear bomb, but I haven’t heard them say anything about it in recent years.
This is from 2001:
Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran:Policy Challenges for the United States
Iran Update, September 8, 2024
Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi claimed on September 7 that Iran will “certainly” conduct a “second True Promise Operation,” in reference to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[9] Naghdi claimed that Iran will retaliate “at the right time” to ensure that its retaliation generates “more effects.”[10] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran fired toward Israel in April 2024, and the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage on Israel than Tehran intended.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[12]
Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Richard Moore stated on September 7 that he still expects Iran to retaliate against Israel the killing of Haniyeh.[13] Moore stated that “we won’t be able to let our guard down for the type of activity that the Iranians might try and prosecute in that direction.”
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-8-2024
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