The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It.

Rand Corporation ^ | January 1, 2016 | Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews

[Widget Jr]

Since its 2008 incursion into Georgia (if not before), there has been a remarkable evolution in Russia's approach to propaganda. This new approach was on full display during the country's 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula. It continues to be demonstrated in support of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and in pursuit of nefarious and long-term goals in Russia's “near abroad” and against NATO allies.

In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so. In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets.

Distinctive Features of the Contemporary Model for Russian Propaganda

1. High-volume and multichannel
2. Rapid, continuous, and repetitive
3. Lacks commitment to objective reality
4. Lacks commitment to consistency.

We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”

Contemporary Russian propaganda has at least two other distinctive features. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to consistency.

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Russian Propaganda Is High-Volume and Multichannel

Russian propaganda is produced in incredibly large volumes and is broadcast or otherwise distributed via a large number of channels. This propaganda includes text, video, audio, and still imagery propagated via the Internet, social media, satellite television, and traditional radio and television broadcasting. The producers and disseminators include a substantial force of paid Internet “trolls” who also often attack or undermine views or information that runs counter to Russian themes, doing so through online chat rooms, discussion forums, and comments sections on news and other websites.4 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that “there are thousands of fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and vKontakte” maintained by Russian propagandists. According to a former paid Russian Internet troll, the trolls are on duty 24 hours a day, in 12-hour shifts, and each has a daily quota of 135 posted comments of at least 200 characters.

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Russian Propaganda Is Rapid, Continuous, and Repetitive

Contemporary Russian propaganda is continuous and very responsive to events. Due to their lack of commitment to objective reality (discussed later), Russian propagandists do not need to wait to check facts or verify claims; they just disseminate an interpretation of emergent events that appears to best favor their themes and objectives. This allows them to be remarkably responsive and nimble, often broadcasting the first “news” of events (and, with similar frequency, the first news of nonevents, or things that have not actually happened). They will also repeat and recycle disinformation. The January 14, 2016, edition of Weekly Disinformation Review reported the reemergence of several previously debunked Russian propaganda stories, including that Polish President Andrzej Duda was insisting that Ukraine return former Polish territory, that Islamic State fighters were joining pro-Ukrainian forces, and that there was a Western-backed coup in Kiev, Ukraine’s capital.

Sometimes, Russian propaganda is picked up and rebroadcast by legitimate news outlets; more frequently, social media repeats the themes, messages, or falsehoods introduced by one of Russia’s many dissemination channels.

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Russian Propaganda Makes No Commitment to Objective Reality

It may come as little surprise that the psychology literature supports the persuasive potential of high-volume, diverse channels and sources, along with rapidity and repetition. These aspects of Russian propaganda make intuitive sense. One would expect any influence effort to enjoy greater success if it is backed by a willingness to invest in additional volume and channels and if its architects find ways to increase the frequency and responsiveness of messages. This next characteristic, however, flies in the face of intuition and conventional wisdom, which can be paraphrased as “The truth always wins.”

Contemporary Russian propaganda makes little or no commitment to the truth. This is not to say that all of it is false. Quite the contrary: It often contains a significant fraction of the truth.

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Russian Propaganda Is Not Committed to Consistency

The final distinctive characteristic of Russian propaganda is that it is not committed to consistency. First, different propaganda media do not necessarily broadcast the exact same themes or messages. Second, different channels do not necessarily broadcast the same account of contested events. Third, different channels or representatives show no fear of “changing their tune.” If one falsehood or misrepresentation is exposed or is not well received, the propagandists will discard it and move on to a new (though not necessarily more plausible) explanation. One example of such behavior is the string of accounts offered for the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. Russian sources have offered numerous theories about how the aircraft came to be shot down and by whom, very few of which are plausible.27 Lack of commitment to consistency is also apparent in statements from Russian President Vladimir Putin. For example, he first denied that the “little green men” in Crimea were Russian soldiers but later admitted that they were. Similarly, he at first denied any desire to see Crimea join Russia, but then he admitted that that had been his plan all along.

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What Can Be Done to Counter the Firehose of Falsehood?

Experimental research in psychology suggests that the features of the contemporary Russian propaganda model have the potential to be highly effective. Even those features that run counter to conventional wisdom on effective influence (e.g., the importance of veracity and consistency) receive some support in the literature.

If the Russian approach to propaganda is effective, then what can be done about it? We conclude with a few thoughts about how NATO, the United States, or other opponents of the firehose of falsehood might better compete. The first step is to recognize that this is a nontrivial challenge....

We are not optimistic about the effectiveness of traditional counterpropaganda efforts...

Forewarning is perhaps more effective than retractions or refutation of propaganda that has already been received. The research suggests two possible avenues:

• Propagandists gain advantage by offering the first impression, which is hard to overcome. If, however, potential audiences have already been primed with correct information, the disinformation finds itself in the same role as a retraction or refutation: disadvantaged relative to what is already known.
• When people resist persuasion or influence, that act reinforces their preexisting beliefs.36 It may be more productive to highlight the ways in which Russian propagandists attempt to manipulate audiences, rather than fighting the specific manipulations.

In practice, getting in front of misinformation and raising awareness of misinformation might involve more robust and more widely publicized efforts to “out” Russian propaganda sources and the nature of their efforts.

[lonestar67]

Trump could and did easily do a better job on this.

He has also clarified that he would hit Russia harder

He wouldn’t apologize for Russia as you all are trying to do.

[daniel1212]

"Putin is much like an abusive spouse. He makes threats, acts out violently, and when confronted says “you made me do that!” For over 75 years Russia held half of Europe in abject slavery to a hideous political system that imprisoned and murdered opponents wholesale, not to mention threatening the West with nuclear annihilation. When those countries finally shook off their yoke and decided it wouldn’t happen to them again Putin called it a tragedy. Since then he’s invaded 2 sovereign countries in illegal wars of conquest. Not to mention the fact that his merry band of gangsters has been raping the Russian people to enrich themselves beyond their wildest dreams for decades. The above in NO way constitutes an endorsement of the Ukrainian government. Their corruption differs only in scale. Nor does it mean I approve of handing tens of billions of taxpayer dollars over to them. I don’t. If the Ukrainians want our weapons they can pay cash for them. But If Russia wants the war to stop all they have to do is go home."

Yes, but what of his legacy? I surmise that as a dying man, he wants to go down in Russia history (written by his equivalent of what the Left lust for) as a hero who regained Soviet real estate (and its resources), even though it cost him more than he figured on.

"But for some reason a whole bunch of, I thought anyway, freedom loving Freepers have cast their lot with the Russians because there may or may not have been a few hundred or even a few thousand neo-Nazi goofballs running around."

The latter is used as justification, but I think many are libertarian types who see in Putin a noble rebel against the Left, and even against government authority, and representing the type of militant rebellion they hope for. Yet Putin himself excels in government overreach and oppression, even banning all sharing of faith apart from sanction of his pet state church. As said, both the Left and China-friendly Putin are anti-Christ.

[CodeToad]

“He wouldn’t apologize for Russia as you all are trying to do.”

No, we are not apologizing for Russia. Trump also would not be doing the things driving Russia today.

[bte]

Exactly nonsense. You seem to not be able to see the bigger picture from noise. Let me illuminate Russia will achieve all stated objective through negotiation or militarily.

[MeganC]

bttt

[Widget Jr]

Thanks. This one needed a reminder.