There's this little place called Umatilla. You may not have heard about it or the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, one of 8 such locations across the U.S.
You apparently also never heard of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
Thus, you probably don't know (or are in denial) of the genesis of CSEPP.
Permit me to elaborate and save you the 15 seconds of effort on your part:
CSEPP was created to address the risk posed by the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons.Insofar as domestic incidence of the "risks" (i.e., leakage):
BLUE GRASS ARMY DEPOT, Ky. - The M55 rocket reported leaking GB (Sarin) agent vapor within its shipping and firing tube yesterday has been overpacked into a leak proof stainless steel container.This event was unintentionally overstated in the initial news release headline yesterday as an accident. There was no accident. Chemical Activity workers discovered the leaking rocket during routine monitoring actions in the chemical weapons stockpile. This leaking rocket is the third leaking munition discovered in 2008, which falls within the normal range of leaking munitions for the stockpile.
Encapsulated within special steel cases locked away in a remote storage igloo at this desert base are 784 reasons why the United States wants to destroy its aging chemical weapon stockpile.Chemical weapons age. Chemical weapons leak. Old chemical weapons are more dangerous to their host than to the enemy.Tooele Army Depot has 784 chemical arms that are leaking deadly nerve gas, Army officials say. Among them are a variety of bombs, land mines and projectiles made between the 1940s and the late 1960s. But most of the leaky weapons are old M55 rockets, said Tooele Public Affairs Officer Susan Voss.
Ironically the M55s could no longer be used in combat because the Army now lacks any device to fire them, Voss said. The M55s' only potential threat now is against friendly troops because of their leaking.
Thus facilities must be maintained for the unforeseen rate of attrition.
The US Army acknowledged as much publicly in the wake of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the US was happy to be party to for the reasons cited.
Once again, I cite what you conveniently ignored:
The CIA had issued fierce warnings before the war: Saddam's regime was churning out poison gases and lethal germs, and was racing to build a nuclear bomb. President George W. Bush had launched the war to rid the world of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But postwar searches found no such arms, no such threat. And week by week, as CIA-led weapons hunters based at Slayer dashed back and forth across the baking desert, the doubts and disappointments grew more palpable. Few believed all the prewar warnings were 100 percent accurate; intelligence rarely was. But inside the smoky HVT Bar, in beach chairs along the lakeside, even back in the cubicles at Langley, some CIA officers quietly began voicing darker suspicions. How much of the intelligence was wrong?Furthermore, the Senate Intelligence Committee's bipartisan Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence cites the following:
> Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.I don't know why this "Iraq WMD" BS still gets passed around by so-called Conservatives, but go ahead: Post your evidence in forum.> The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.
(my 2nd challenge)
Better yet: