Link and quote of me saying those words, please. As you have phrased it, I consider it an absurdity.
Neither the original Constitution nor the 14th Amendment affected the meaning of the legal terms of art, natural born subject, and natural born citizen.
This is how I responded.
Very glad we can agree on that point. So why bring 14th amendment stuff into this discussion? It seems our nexus point lies around the 1776-1787 time period.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not use the term natural born citizen.
No it doesn't, and that is telling. What man could argue that former slaves could be "natural born citizens" when they were clearly not "citizens" prior to 1868.
Persons who becomes citizens by virtue of the circumstances of their birth are natural born citizens.
So long as those "circumstances" aren't created by man made law. We already know from Rogers v Bellei that congress created citizenship is not the same as natural citizenship, because you can lose congress created citizenship by not adhering to the myriad of rules required to retain it.
You cannot lose "natural citizenship" by doing nothing. You *can* (at that time) lose congress created citizenship by doing nothing.
Persons naturalized were born aliens.
Unless congress, using their power of naturalization, naturalizes them at "birth" and calls them "citizens" at birth.
You have not quoted a word of Trumbull so I will do it for you.
Senator Trumbull stated:
Your two Trumbull quotes do not cover the statement he made about "temporary allegiance."
Several years ago I could have put my fingers right on it, but I have since changed computers and browsers and so do not have ready access to the bits of knowledge I acquired on this topic.
From memory, Trumbull said that the original wording they used was more like the Civil Rights act of 1868, but because he was informed of this concept of "temporary allegiance" (expected of legal aliens during times of war or disaster) he said they changed the verbiage to it's current form.
Perhaps you can find that particular Trumbull quote for me?
It matters not what Senator Trumbull may have said. The words were approved by the Senate as a body and ratified by the people as an amendment and they have been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Well sure, after Trumbull and company changed their meaning to reflect his newly acquired understanding of "temporary allegiance" but with the rest of Congress understanding it's meaning in light of the original language.
This is why I said the later adopted language made the meaning less clear rather than more clear.
The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning.
Which they don't. The 14th is about the worst written amendment in the entire list. It has become the most abused amendment precisely because it can be interpreted so many different ways.
You willfully do not understand that which you choose not to understand.
When I have found evidence that contradicts the normal widespread belief, this makes me question the common understanding. It isn't a matter of refusing to understand, it is a matter of refusing to go along with a claim simply because other people believe it.
This applies to men in dresses, Covid nonsense, "Global Warming" and a whole host of other silly ideas which people attempt to force me to believe simply because everyone else believes them.
You are entitled to your opinion that the term natural born citizen cannot be comprehended.
That is not my opinion. I believe "natural born citizen" can easily be comprehended, but due to forces and people deliberately misleading posterity, the original understanding of it's meaning has been lost, except for certain clues and references that have been left behind.
From memory of Minor v Happersett, (I think that is the one) the court acknowledges that some authorities use Jus Soli and other authorities use Jus Sanguinus but for the purposes of that decision, it was not necessary to address that question.
I do not just believe it, I showed it to be a fact.
I must have missed that. I only recall you asserting it as fact. I do not recall reading anything where you "showed it to be fact."
The Framers were instilled with the language of the common law of England. They used that language when writing the Constitution.
Except where they broke from it, such as Debtor's prison, corruption of blood, and the usage of this newly promulgated word "citizen." There is no "citizen" in the common law of England.
Actually, the Legislature or Courts can define the terms any time they choose, they do not need your permission, and their definition would be quite enforceable.
To quote Lincoln, "Just because you call a tail a leg, doesn't make it so."
Lincoln enforced a lot of crap law too, so I draw a distinction between "enforceable" and "correct."
Again with the 14th amendment! You already said, and I already agreed, that the 14th amendment has nothing to do with "natural born citizen" as meant by the framers in 1787.Link and quote of me saying those words, please. As you have phrased it, I consider it an absurdity.Neither the original Constitution nor the 14th Amendment affected the meaning of the legal terms of art, natural born subject, and natural born citizen.This is how I responded.
Very glad we can agree on that point. So why bring 14th amendment stuff into this discussion? It seems our nexus point lies around the 1776-1787 time period.
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The Fourteenth Amendment does not use the term natural born citizen.No it doesn't, and that is telling. What man could argue that former slaves could be "natural born citizens" when they were clearly not "citizens" prior to 1868.
Your argument, such as it is, is telling.
Not even the Founders and Framers would argue that they, themselves, were natural born citizens of the United States. They were not born citizens of the United States. They were born subjects of the king.
The Fourteenth Amendment did not declare freedmen to be natural born citizens of the United States. Nothing did that. They were clearly not born citizens of the United States.
The non-use of the phrase only signifies that nothing in the 14th Amendment converted non-citizens into natural born citizens.
The 14th Amendment declared that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United States...."
Persons who becomes citizens by virtue of the circumstances of their birth are natural born citizens.So long as those "circumstances" aren't created by man made law.
Unsupportable, ridiculous bullcrap. The Constitution is man made law and stikes down anything and everything in conflict with it. 14A made the freedmen citizens by a mass naturalization process.
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.
Naturalization clause. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1, provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. See Jus soli.
Whatever your opinion of your suggested non-manmade law, United States statute law takes precedent.
We already know from Rogers v Bellei that congress created citizenship is not the same as natural citizenship, because you can lose congress created citizenship by not adhering to the myriad of rules required to retain it.You cannot lose "natural citizenship" by doing nothing. You *can* (at that time) lose congress created citizenship by doing nothing.
We already know that you have no regard for court opinions and that you miscontrue them to say whatever you want.
Read the Syllabus to Rogers v. Bellei to see what it held.
Held: Congress has the power to impose the condition subsequent of residence in this country on appellee, who does not come within the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of citizens as those “born or naturalized in the United States,” and its imposition is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful. Afroyim v. Rusk, supra, and Schneider v. Rusk, supra, distinguished. Pp. 401 U. S. 820-836.
With a statute law, Congress imposed a condition subsequent on naturalization. Congress did not violate the Constitution is so doing. The law is constitutiional, whether you agree with it or not.
Or, you can read the opening of the Opinion of the Court:
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.Under constitutional challenge here, primarily on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, but also on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, is § 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 236, 8 U.S.C.§ 1401(b).
Section 301(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), defines those persons who “shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth.” Paragraph (7) of § 301(a) includes in that definition a person born abroad “of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States” who has met specified conditions of residence in this country. Section 301(b), however, provides that one who is a citizen at birth under § 301(a)(7) shall lose his citizenship unless, after age 14 and before age 28, he shall come to the United States and be physically present here continuously for at least five years.
Citizenship of those born abroad is controlled by Federal statute law. The 14th Amendment applies only to those born within the United States.
You are entitled to know whatever you believe, but that does not make it law. If there is a condition subsequent and it requires some act, failure to perform the required act is breach of performance. It is doing nothing when doing something is a specific requirement of law.
Persons naturalized were born aliens.Unless congress, using their power of naturalization, naturalizes them at "birth" and calls them "citizens" at birth.
Your imaginative misconstruing of 14A only places you in the twilight zone. Can you cite an example of where congress ever used the power of naturalization to naturalize a non-citizen at birth?
Just in case the obvious eludes you, a citizen cannot be naturalized.
You have not quoted a word of Trumbull so I will do it for you.Senator Trumbull stated:
Your two Trumbull quotes do not cover the statement he made about "temporary allegiance."
Several years ago I could have put my fingers right on it, but I have since changed computers and browsers and so do not have ready access to the bits of knowledge I acquired on this topic.
From memory, Trumbull said that the original wording they used was more like the Civil Rights act of 1868, but because he was informed of this concept of "temporary allegiance" (expected of legal aliens during times of war or disaster) he said they changed the verbiage to it's current form.
Perhaps you can find that particular Trumbull quote for me?
I believe your memory recalls content that is not there, especially on the topic of allegiance. I can provide links to each page of the debate and identify the pages where Trumbull appears to be speaking. Finding your alleged content is up to you.
THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session
May 30, 1866 Pages 2890-2902
Senator Jacob Howard introduction of citizenship amendment to 14A, and associated debate and adoption of Howard's citizenship clause in the Senate.
Trumbull appears speaking on 2893, 2894, 2900, 2901.
At 2893-2894, the debate is on the citizenship clause. On 2900-2901, debate is on another part of 14A. Below are links to all the pages of the Senate Debate 2890-2902.
- - - - -
2890
2891
2892
2893
2894
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
2901
2902
It matters not what Senator Trumbull may have said. The words were approved by the Senate as a body and ratified by the people as an amendment and they have been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.Well sure, after Trumbull and company changed their meaning to reflect his newly acquired understanding of "temporary allegiance" but with the rest of Congress understanding it's meaning in light of the original language.
This is why I said the later adopted language made the meaning less clear rather than more clear.
The words of the Howard citizenship clause were adopted.
Whatever musings you imagine to have been in Trumbull's head were not adopted.
The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning.Which they don't. The 14th is about the worst written amendment in the entire list. It has become the most abused amendment precisely because it can be interpreted so many different ways.
The citizenship clause of 14A is not negated because you have discovered myriad ways you can misinterpret or misconstrue the clear words. The Supreme Court is empowered to interpret the laws for all of us. They have done so, and I have quoted them having done so.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
If that is too much for you to comprehend, I suggest getting a lawyer.
"All persons" = All persons. There are no qualifiers about parentage.
"born or naturalized in the United States" = the two ways to become a citizen, to be born a citizen or to be naturalized through a legal process.
"and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" = subject to the laws of the United States, do not enjoy diplomatic immunity.
"are citizens of the United States" = exactly what it says.
"and of the state wherein they reside." = the extinction of state sovereignty. States do not enjoy the right of self-determination. In their infinite wisdom, the sovereign people decided that state have no say whatever in who are citizens of the state.
You are entitled to your opinion that the term natural born citizen cannot be comprehended.That is not my opinion. I believe "natural born citizen" can easily be comprehended, but due to forces and people deliberately misleading posterity, the original understanding of it's meaning has been lost, except for certain clues and references that have been left behind.
From memory of Minor v Happersett, (I think that is the one) the court acknowledges that some authorities use Jus Soli and other authorities use Jus Sanguinus but for the purposes of that decision, it was not necessary to address that question.
Why do you go from memory? Why do you not do your research?
The Scotus opinion is Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
Citizenship was not an issue in Minor v. Happersett. I happen to be so fortunate to have a copy of the Record of Transcript for the case of Minor v. Happersett. The Record of Transcript is the record of documents and pleadings forwarded by the court below to the Supreme Court. In an agreed statement submitted by both parties, it reads, "It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff is a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and the State of Missouri...."
The pull quote you are looking to misconstrue is at 88 U.S. 167-168:
The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [88 U. S. 168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last, they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact, the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea.
The citizenship of Virginia Minor was never an issue before the Court. Citizenship was not argued before the Court. While the writing justice issued a dictum about some unnamed persons holding doubts about the citizenship status of children born within the jurisdiction of non-citizen parents, that is not part of the case. While it was a unanimous decision, justices adopted the decision, not the musings of Chief Justice Waite in dictum. Those musings are dicta and his alone.
Minor held that voting rights (enfranchisement/suffrage) was not coextensive with citizenship.
It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the states at the time of its adoption. If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. [88 U. S. 172] But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.When the federal Constitution was adopted, all the states with the exception of Rhode Island and Connecticut had constitutions of their own. These two continued to act under their charters from the Crown. Upon an examination of those constitutions, we find that in no state were all citizens permitted to vote. Each state determined for itself who should have that power. Thus, in New Hampshire, "Every male inhabitant of each town and parish with town privileges and places unincorporated in the state of twenty-one years of age and upwards, excepting paupers and persons excused from paying taxes at their own request,"
Virginia Minor was a citizen, but citizenship did not confer the right to vote. The Constitution was later amended so women could not be denied enfranchisement due to sex. However, a state could still, if it so chose, eliminate the popular vote for president and have the state legislature do the voting.
Moreover, the law is the law. Virginia minor was a natural born U.S. citizen, and had attained the age of 35 years. She met all the qualifications to run for President. Women did run for President before they could vote in a presidential election.
Any doubts that Chief Justice Waite may have perceived were dealt with by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark which directly addressed the matter, after it was fully argued by both sides. The Minor court did not even have a citizenship issue before it.
I do not just believe it, I showed it to be a fact.I must have missed that. I only recall you asserting it as fact. I do not recall reading anything where you "showed it to be fact."
Try not to bastardize the quote or remove it from all context. The "it" in question was the Federal goverment, the United States, NEVER adopted the Common Law of England.
The FEDERAL government, the UNITED STATES, —NEVER— adopted the Common Law of England.If you believe that, then why do you insist "natural born citizen" derives from common law? Is that not a federal issue?
At my #57,
Attempting to cite English common law or state laws or state court opinions to nullify or modify any provision of the Constitution or Federal statute law is a non-starter. Using terminology used in the commmon law of England does not make the common law of England the law of the United States.
As for a lack of adoption of the Common Law of England by the United States, as opposed to partial adoption by individual member states, see United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798).
Chase, J. at 2 U.S. 394-395
2 U.S. 394The question, however, does not arise about the power; but about the exercise of the power: Whether the Courts of the United States can punish a man for any act, before it is declared by a law of the United States to be criminal? Now, it appears to my mind, to be as essential, that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction. It is attempted, however, to supply the silence of the Constitution and Statutes of the Union, by resorting to the Common law, for a definition and punishment of the offence which has been committed: But, in my opinion, the United States, as a Federal government, have no common law; and, consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their Courts, for offences merely at the common law. If, indeed, the United States can be supposed, for a moment, to have a common law, it must, I persume, be that of England; and, yet, it is impossible to trace when, or how, the system was adopted, or introduced. With respect to the individual States, the difficulty does not occur. When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the Judges and lawyers of England, that they brought hither, as a birth-right and inheritance; so much of the common law, as was applicable to their local situation, and change of circumstances. But each colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new condition; and in various modes, by Legislative acts, by Judicial decisions, or by constant usage, adopted some parts, and rejected others. Hence, he who shall travel through the different States, will soon discover, that the whole of the common law of England has been no where introduced; that some States have rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great and essential diversity; in the subjects to which the common law is applied, as well as in the extent of its application. The common law, therefore, of one State, is not the common law of another; but the common law of England, is the law of each State, so far as each state has adopted it; and it results from that position, connected with the Judicial act, that the common law will always apply to suits between citizen and citizen, whether they are instituted in a Federal, or State, Court.
2 U.S. 395
But the question recurs, when and how, have the Courts of the United States acquired a common law jurisdiction, in criminal cases? The United States must possess the common law themselves, before they can communicate it to their Judicial agents: Now, the United States did not bring it with them from England; the Constitution does not create it; and no act of Congress has assumed it. Besides, what is the common law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the States; and of the various modifications, which are we to select, the system of Georgia or New Hampshire, of Pennsylvania or Connecticut?
There is also the rather simple statement from Erie v. Tompkins. You insist upon resorting to a body of law that does not exist, and seem to hold it in higher regard than the Constitution and Federal statute law which do exist.
U.S. Reports: Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79-80 (1938)
"There is no Federal general common law."
U.S. Supreme Court
ERIE R. CO. v. TOMPKINS, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
Argued Jan. 31, 1938.
Decided April 25, 1938.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
304 U.S. 64 at 78-80
Third. Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. As stated by Mr. Justice Field when protesting in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 149 U. S. 401, against ignoring the Ohio common law of fellow servant liability:"I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country — which is often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular subject — has been often advanced in judicial opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a State. I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess that, moved and governed by the authority of the great names of those judges, I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and confidently, but I think now erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But, notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States — independence in their legislative and independence
304 U. S. 79
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence."
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. [Footnote 23] The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute," that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of common law are, and that, in the federal courts, "the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law":
"but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally, but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else. . . ."
"the authority and only authority is the State, and, if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word."
Thus, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said,
"an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."
In disapproving that doctrine, we do not hold
Page 304 U. S. 80
unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely declare that, in applying the doctrine, this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which, in our opinion, are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.
There is no "citizen" in the common law of England.
And nobody gives a crap because the English common law is not part of United States law.