Replies

When the words are unclear as to their meaning, then an effort to grasp intent must be initiated.

The Framers were not flummoxed about the meaning of natural born subject or natural born citizen. The words of the citizenship clause of 14A are too clear to admit of any misunderstanding.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning. The words prevail even where the lawgiver's words are contrary to his intent. This is even so with legislation where the legislators voted to pass legislation. The words are ratified or passed into law, the intent is not.

Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1925)

The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.

"A Matter of Interpretation," Federal Courts and the Law, by Antonin Scalia, 1997. This book contains an essay by Antonin Scalia and responses to that essay by professors Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Laurence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. There is a final response by Antonin Scalia.

Laurence Tribe, pp. 65-6

Let me begin with my principal area of agreement with Justice Scalia. Like him, I believe that when we ask what a legal text means — what it requires of us, what it permits us to do, and what it forbids — we ought not to be inquiring (except perhaps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question. To be sure, those matters, when reliably ascertainable, might shed some light on otherwise ambiguous or perplexing words or phrases - by pointing us, as readers, toward the linguistic frame of reference within which the people to whom those words or phrases were addressed would have "translated" and thus understood them. But such thoughts and beliefs can never substitute for what was in fact enacted as law. Like Justice Scalia, I never cease to be amazed by the arguments of judges, lawyers, or others who proceed as though legal texts were little more than interesting documentary evidence of what some lawgiver had in mind. And, like the justice, I find little to commend the proposition that anyone ought, in any circumstances I can imagine, to feel legally bound to obey another's mere wish or thought, or legally bound to act in accord with another's mere hope or fear.

Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

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Much of English statute law and common law was simply incompatible with American legal principles and had to be discarded. Madison even weighed in on the subject in a letter which I currently cannot find, because it's been so long ago and i've forgotten where I put it. (if you want to help find it, I believe Madison starts by saying "What can be said of the common law?")
At long last, in the case of Pennsylvania, the Legislature ordered the Pennsylvania Supreme court to resolve the issue by deciding what part of English law should be thrown out, and what part should be kept.

That you would even think this somehow applies to a curent or recent United States citizenship determination indicates you fail to understand the law itself.

Individual STATES adopted so much of the Common Law of England as they saw fit. The FEDERAL government, the UNITED STATES, —NEVER— adopted the Common Law of England.

United States citizenship is determined by the FEDERAL government, NOT any STATE government. FEDERAL law applies, the Common Law of England does not. State constitutions or statutes are irrelevant.

The Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 did not address the issue of adoption of the common law of England. It was addressed in Statute law. There is a constitutional provision using a noteworthy turn of phrase, natural born subject, and also the term denizen.

Constitution of Pennsylvania — 1776

SECT. 42. Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year’s residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative until after two years residence.

Pennsylvania, Act of 1777,

An Act to revive and put in force such and so much of the late laws of the province on Pennsylvania, as is judged necessary to be in force in this commonwealth, and to revive and establish the Courts of Justice, and for other purposes therein mentioned.
II. Be it therefore enacted, and it is hereby enacted, That each and every one of the laws or acts of General Assembly, that were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said be province on the fourteenth day of May last, shall be in force from and binding on the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of February next, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if the said laws, and each of them, had been made or enacted by this General Assembly; and all and every person and persons whomsoever are hereby enjoined and required to yield obedience to the said laws, as the case may require until the said laws or acts of General Assembly respectively shall be repealed or altered, or until they expire by their own limitation; and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have heretofore been in force in the said province, except as is hereafter excepted.

The Will of Sarah Zane, Opinion of the Circuit Court of the United States, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (1833)

The first law passed on the change of government, declared the province laws in force till altered or repealed; also the common law and such parts of the statute laws of England as had been before in force.—“And so much of any law or act of Assembly as declares, orders, directs, commands any matter or thing repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution, is hereby declared not to be revived, but shall be null and void, and of no force or effect.” 1 Dallas’ Laws, 722.

The words of the United States Constitution are too clear to admit of any misunderstanding.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

There are only two ways to become a U.S. citizen. (1) to be born a citizen, or (2) to be naturalized. To be naturalized, one must be an alien, legally present in the country. United States law has never recognized the existence of a denizen.

A State does not have any say whatever in who are citizens of the State. If a citizen of California chooses to move to Florida or Texas and resides there, he or she automatically becomes a citizen of Florida or Texas.

Attempting to cite English common law or state laws or state court opinions to nullify or modify any provision of the Constitution or Federal statute law is a non-starter.

As for a lack of adoption of the Common Law of England by the United States, as opposed to partial adoption by individual member states, see United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798).

Chase, J. at 2 U.S. 394-395

2 U.S. 394
The question, however, does not arise about the power; but about the exercise of the power: Whether the Courts of the United States can punish a man for any act, before it is declared by a law of the United States to be criminal? Now, it appears to my mind, to be as essential, that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction. It is attempted, however, to supply the silence of the Constitution and Statutes of the Union, by resorting to the Common law, for a definition and punishment of the offence which has been committed: But, in my opinion, the United States, as a Federal government, have no common law; and, consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their Courts, for offences merely at the common law. If, indeed, the United States can be supposed, for a moment, to have a common law, it must, I persume, be that of England; and, yet, it is impossible to trace when, or how, the system was adopted, or introduced. With respect to the individual States, the difficulty does not occur. When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the Judges and lawyers of England, that they brought hither, as a birth-right and inheritance; so much of the common law, as was applicable to their local situation, and change of circumstances. But each colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new condition; and in various modes, by Legislative acts, by Judicial decisions, or by constant usage, adopted some parts, and rejected others. Hence, he who shall travel through the different States, will soon discover, that the whole of the common law of England has been no where introduced; that some States have rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great and essential diversity; in the subjects to which the common law is applied, as well as in the extent of its application. The common law, therefore, of one State, is not the common law of another; but the common law of England, is the law of each State, so far as each state has adopted it; and it results from that position, connected with the Judicial act, that the common law will always apply to suits between citizen and citizen, whether they are instituted in a Federal, or State, Court.
2 U.S. 395
But the question recurs, when and how, have the Courts of the United States acquired a common law jurisdiction, in criminal cases? The United States must possess the common law themselves, before they can communicate it to their Judicial agents: Now, the United States did not bring it with them from England; the Constitution does not create it; and no act of Congress has assumed it. Besides, what is the common law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the States; and of the various modifications, which are we to select, the system of Georgia or New Hampshire, of Pennsylvania or Connecticut?