This map is simpler.
What does it prove? It proves that all that slave money was ending up in New York, Boston and Washington DC.
The people who launched a war to protect their money streams.
This map is simpler.
What does it prove? It proves that all that slave money was ending up in New York, Boston and Washington DC.
The people who launched a war to protect their money streams.
You’ve yet to show how the bulk of these tariffs were paid by Southerners. How did 30% of the population buy 80% of the imports?
To recap:
The reason for secession was the South’s desire to preserve slavery.
The trigger for secession was the election of Abraham Lincoln, which fed fear of the abolitionist foundation of the Republican Party.
The American Civil War began when units of the South Carolina Militia fired upon a Union fort in Charleston harbor.
Not what you claim it proves.
It proves that there was a stack of coins in New York City that reached up into outer space and at least one giant human living somewhere in Texas or New Mexico -- and that's about it.
Yes, the South did produce 72+ % of the total trade value with Europe in 1860.
Trade is a two-way street. Importers also "produce" foreign trade, not just exporters.
I cite Thomas Prentice Kettell, but the official records reflect the same numbers.
Kettell's argument was refuted by Stephen Colwell in Five Cotton States and New York:
The mode of disposing of their cotton is that which the planters themselves have adopted, uncontrolled by any national legislation. The expense consists, in transportation to the port whence it is shipped to Europe or to a Northern destination at home, the charges of shipping, freight to Europe, commissions on advances, and commissions on sales. Exchange is sometimes a profit, and sometimes a loss. The ports whence the cotton is shipped for a foreign market are, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and 'New Orleans — the latter receiving about one-half of the whole quantity. The management of the cotton at these cities is wholly under the control of the planters who have not previously sold their cotton, and their factors or agents, and is the best no doubt which their experience and commercial skill can devise. The planter either sells his cotton at once, and realizes the amount in the way which best suits him : he ships it northward, coastwise, and to Europe on his own account; or, having received advances on account, it is shipped in the name of the party who has made advances. For the amount shipped coastwise domestic bills are drawn, and for the most part sold or discounted in the cities where the cotton is first received. Against the amount shipped to Europe foreign bills are drawn, and sold wherever the best rate can be obtained for them, which is almost always at New York, because that is the great market of foreign exchange for the United States. It is there that the importers of foreign goods are concentrated, and thence their remittances are made. There the buyers of exchange congregate, and there, of course, the best price can be obtained ; and that is the chief reason why the planter and his agents send their foreign bills to New York. Bills can be sold in that city when there is no demand elsewhere. A very large proportion of the money advanced upon cotton, at all the places of delivery, comes from New York ; and bills drawn upon cotton are transmitted thither, to reimburse advances. Besides this, the merchants of the whole cotton region find it their advantage, as well as convenience, to pay for all their purchases at the North and their purchases abroad through New York : it is, therefore, a matter not only of convenience, but economy, to keep a large deposit in that city, where it is more available for the uses to which it is to be applied, than if in their own banks.
Colwell has much more to say about the costs of producing, storing, shipping, insuring and selling cotton, and about the risks of loss in the cotton trade and the desire to profitably invest the profits of the trade. Slaveowners were used to not having to pay labor costs, so they resented having to pay for other goods and services. Colwell also compares the cotton production of the five Deep South states with the immense productivity of the Northeastern states industries, to the advantage of the latter. If you have read Kettell, you can read Colwell and see who has the better argument.
Kettell's argument, though, may be indicated in his subtitle. The full title of his pamphlet is: Southern wealth and northern profits, as exhibited in statistical facts and official figures: showing the necessity of union to the future prosperity and welfare of the Republic. Was he pleased or amused or saddened to see his faulty and misleading book used as an argument for disunion?
The transport trade had ended in 1808, and there was no further source of supply other than subsequent generations being born. Presumably the people who were running the plantations already owned the slaves, so how do they "invest" in slaves other than employing the slaves they already had?
That's the same problem that you have with your import/export theory. The economy is fluid. Money circulates. The price of slaves was rising. In the first half of the nineteenth century, more and more land was being used for cotton production. Slaveowners could always sell slaves to people who didn't have slaves. Virginians and Charlestonians who might have started factories or shipyards before the cotton boom bought slaves, moved West and bought land. Some economics classes would show you that there wasn't some fixed quantity of money for exports or fixed size of a market for slaves.
Been over this with you before. *SPECIE* is not trade. No nation willingly continues to use specie to purchase imports because it drains their wealth over the long term.
Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1957 provides data on this. I confess I can't make sense of all the charts. One set tells me that exports decreased during the war years, another says they didn't. But apparently, the export of gold doubled from 1863 to 1864. The US had vastly increased its gold reserves since the 1840s, so draining the reserve may not have been regarded as being as serious a problem as losing the war would have been. The war years were the greenback years, when money - in both the USA and CSA - wasn't backed by gold. That could be related to the outflow of gold as foreigners demanded gold, rather than paper money for their goods. I doubt the statistics were "cooked," but the monetary situation wasn't as fixed and unquestioned as it was in other eras.
Evidence is not really necessary in arguing with you because I have already been through the experience of you and others rejecting any evidence that doesn't suit what you wish to believe.
And you don't realize that applies to you as well? Or you more than anyone else?