I understand what you’re saying and I didn’t command combat units. I was one of the guys a good CO “paid” to help him navigate the bureaucracy and get things done.
I invented ways to make the bureaucracy work for rather than against.
More on that later.
I earnestly believe that his actions could precipitate a challenge to our forces abroad that could result in deaths and injured by projecting weakness to our enemies. He’ll have to live with that.
But his chain of command certainly considered that possibility in not taking his ship offline at his request and I honor their judgment. It’s not politics driving their decision. It’s weighing all factors in balance.
You haven’t shown any angst about cutting naval airforces on the front lines by half and what vulnerabilities the Taliban or Iranians might try to exploit let alone the Chinese pushing us and our allies around in the South China sea, or I’ve missed it. That’s what puzzles me.
As far as CASREP 4 goes, his letter effectively made that declaration.
BTW I have the highest and deferential regard for Marines and yourself as well as airdales. Ship’s company - the jury is still out :-).
If I were advising that CO I’d have given him a reaming before sending that letter out. I was a respected airdale ground pounder because I had aviation readiness as my obsession and was instrumental in having the highest airwon mission readiness in the fleet ever up to that point. I knew how and when to bend regulations or use them to our advantage including addressing readiness. And I had their absolute trust so I could stand there and punishingly advise my CO to get him to do the right thing correctly or even the wrong thing correctly. Rule one. Never insert emotion in formal correspondence to the Naval chain of command. It creates immediate doubt about suitability.
I would have helped him craft a message that would get attention. I got JCS attention while deployed using Navy regs and chain of command and a well crafted message. They released the war reserve for my CV, something that until then was deemed impossible. We had to go borderline CASREP 4 without actually saying it. Everybody’s egos along the way were preserved, including CAG, Ship’s CO, task force Admiral, CINCPACFLT, COMNAVAIRPAC, all of whom were briefed along the way. In fact I strongly suspect JCS was waiting for the message.
All the above were cc’d with endorsements. Incidentally the cause of our unreadiness was political, in the abstract public, and sensitive. We kept our unique situation “secret”. I stood by the crypto msg guy as he sent the message. No one else ever saw or even knew about the msg. They did marvel when JCS gave an affirmative reply. We completed our Navy Expedition successfully and our CV CO was promoted to Rear Admiral.
This CO could have asked for volunteers to sail with reduced manning knowing they’d be working double duty. In my time nearly the whole airwing would have volunteered and likely the more senior enlisted ship’s company. Then instead of going up the chain of command with just a problem he’d (rule 2) have provided a viable solution. Rule 3 don’t show incompetence in recommending what is not viable. Rule no 4 respect the chain of command scrupulously. You can work that to your favor.
He should have demanded his Admin Officer find a way to work the system or gone to the Supply Officer who usually has a special knack for “working the system” and a special knack for interpreting regs creatively. One of his problems was not challenging his staff or worse not having confidence in them. Not the signs of a good CO.
And then demand adequate medical supplies. It takes just a few days to work the system in that regard. That’s back in my day when things were slower. That’s the SUPOs job.
Again, my regards. I don’t relish disagreeing with a Marine CO, but if I were your guy on the ground I’d make sure you succeed and expeditiously figure out the best way to communicate outward, advising you accordingly and forcefully if necessary so you could command effectively and not worry about repurcussions. Communication with the chain of command was my forte.
As my own airdale COs always knew I had their backs. I never took “no” as an answer from the bureaucracy ever. And my COs knew I would keep them out of trouble and looking good at all times. And we judiciously did what some would deem unsavory things but “by the book”. Knowing the book was our job not his but he had to follow our advice.
I don’t believe in the no win scenario. There is no such thing as a dilemma. Every problem has a solution. And there is always a win win solution lurking in the background if not in the open. That was/is my creed and it has never failed me.
I was stationed with COMNAVSURFLANT for a couple of years -an unhappy Marine captain on the admiral's staff - and came away with a deep respect for the navy and the training and commitment of its sailors.
The perspective I developed was how complex a ship was and how dependent it was that everyone from the Captain on down knew what they were doing and could do it in the face of anything.
I suspect that it is that value that I place on the individual sailor that would make me sympathize with the Skipper in this situation: yes, a Nimitz-Class carrier is an awesome piece of warfighting power but absolutely useless if the crew is disabled. I strongly suspect that during those three weeks since the portcall to Vietnam, the message traffic grew in intensity until it became absolutely critical to get help.
Did the top levels offer help like you suggest? Their public press release that they sent on the 23rd just said that they would continue the mission.
I think that the Captain's message was a last chance to save his crew and given the disastrous results of using sick men to manage air operations or maintenance or any of the hundreds of specialties on a carrier, other even worse disasters.
Anyway, glad to finally have a clearer picture of who you are and what you've done for our country.
Semper Fi!
Great post!